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A Comparative Guide to the
Western States' Public Trust Doctrines:
Public Values, Private Rights, and the
Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust
Robin Kundis Craig*
This companion Article to the fall 2007 A Comparative Guide to the
Eastern Public Trust Doctrines explores the state public trust doctrines-
emphasis on the plural-in the nineteen western states. In so doing, this Article
seeks to make the larger point that, while the broad contours of the public trust
doctrine have a federal law basis, especially regarding state ownership of the
beds and banks of navigable waters, the details of how public trust principles
actually apply vary considerably from state to state. Public trust law, in other
words, is very much a species of state common law. Moreover, as with other
forms of common law, states have evolved their public trust doctrines in light of
the particular histories and the perceived needs and problems of each state.
This Article observes that, in the West, four factors have been most
important in the evolution of state public trust doctrines: (1) the severing of
water rights from real property ownership and the riparian rights doctrine; (2)
subsequent state declarations ofpublic ownership offresh water; (3) clear and
explicit perceptions of the scarcity of water and the importance of submerged
lands and environmental amenities; and (4) a willingness to consider water
and other environmental issues to be of constitutional importance and/or to
incorporate broad public trust mandates into statutes. From these factors, two
important trends in western states'public trust doctrines have emerged: (1) the
extension ofpublic rights based on states' ownership of the water itself; and (2)
an increasing, and still cutting-edge, expansion of public trust concepts into
ecological public trust doctrines that are increasingly protecting species,
ecosystems, and the public values that they provide.
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The Article includes an extensive appendix that summarizes each of the
nineteen states' public trust doctrines. These summaries include relevant
constitutional provisions, statutory provisions, and cases.
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In the arid West, balancing private needs for fresh water to consume
against the public values-recreational, aesthetic, and ecological-served by
leaving fresh water in situ has tended to favor the private use side. Evidence of
this result is both massive and minor, ranging from California's multi-billion-
dollar water transportation system,' to the routine de-watering of the Colorado
River so that little to no water reaches the Sea of Cortez,2 to water-related
Endangered Species Act lawsuits in dozens of watersheds. 3
One of the legal tools that can re-balance private and public rights in water
in any particular state is that state's public trust doctrine. In 1970, Professor
Joseph Sax published his seminal article arguing for revitalization of the public
trust doctrine,4 and, ever since, academics, politicians, voters, and judges have
been exploring the potential value of the public trust doctrine for protecting
public values in water, including recreational and ecological values.5
This Article is the second of two that explore what states are actually
doing with their public trust doctrines-emphasis on the plural. As I argued in
the first article, 6 which covered the thirty-one eastern states' public trust
doctrines, the states have progressed and diverged in interesting ways beyond
1. By September 30, 2006, the total construction costs of the CVP had reached approximately
$3.4 billion. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION: REIMBURSEMENT OF
CALIFORNIA'S CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION COSTS BY SAN LuIs UNIT
IRRIGATION WATER DISTRICTS 2 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08307r.pdf.
2. ROBERT W. ADLER, RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS: A TROUBLED SENSE OF
IMMENSITY 34 (2007); Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change, Regulatory Fragmentation, and Water
Triage, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 825, 826-27, 897-98 (2008).
3. Craig, supra note 2, at 875-78.
4. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
5. See, e.g., Marc R. Poirer, Modified Private Property: New Jersey's Public Trust Doctrine,
Private Development and Exclusion, and Shared Public Uses of Natural Resources, 15 SE. ENVTL. L.J.
71 (2006); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Ecosystem Services and the Public Trust Doctrine: Working
Change from Within, 15 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 223 (2006); Jeffrey W. Henquinet & Tracy Dobson, The Public
Trust Doctrine and Sustainable Ecosystems: A Great Lakes Fisheries Case Study, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 322 (2006); Zachary C. Kleinsasser, Public and Private Property Rights: Regulatory and Physical
Takings and the Public Trust Doctrine, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 421 (2005).
6. Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines:
Classification of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENvTL. L. REv. 1, 113
(2007).
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the precepts of the U.S. Supreme Court's seminal discussion of the public trust
doctrine in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois.7
In some ways, what was true for the eastern states is also true for the
western states. A state's public trust doctrine outlines public and private rights
in water and submerged lands by delineating five components of those rights:
(1) the beds and banks of waters that are subject to state/public ownership; (2)
the line or lines dividing private from public title in those submerged lands; (3)
the waters subject to public use rights; (4) the line or lines in those waters that
mark the limit of public use rights; and (5) the public uses that the doctrine will
protect in the waters where the public has use rights.8
In addition, prior discussions of western public trust doctrines are subject
to the same two general limitations I discussed for the eastern public trust
doctrines: "The first is a tendency to generalize all public trust law into a single
doctrine. The second and opposite tendency is to view each state's public trust
doctrine as unique."9
Nevertheless, public trust doctrine law in the western states can be
differentiated from that in the eastern states in several respects. First, in the
eastern states, coastal access, coastal development, and coastal rights have
generally been of more pressing concern than public trust rights in fresh waters.
Because of the timing of their statehood, many eastern states' public trust
doctrines have been influenced in significant ways by the English "ebb-and-
flow" tidal test of navigability for purposes of state title.10 In addition, many
eastern states recognize different public/private title lines along the sea coasts
and Great Lakes than they do in fresh water streams, rivers, and lakes and/or
protect more extensive sets of public rights in the ocean and Great Lakes." In
contrast, most western states became states after the U.S. Supreme Court had
outlined most of its core principles regarding navigable waters, and far fewer of
them are coastal states--only Alaska, California, Hawai'i, Oregon, Texas, and
Washington. Partially as a result of this timing and geographical reality,
western states, in general, have paid far greater attention than eastern states to
public rights in fresh waters.
In addition, western states are more arid than eastern states, resulting in a
consciousness of the importance of fresh water that pervades many of these
states' public trust doctrines. The Hundredth Meridian, which runs through
North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, is
generally considered the "water divide" of the United States-east of that line,
there is generally enough rainfall to support fanning without irrigation; west of
7. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
8. Craig, supra note 6, at 4.
9. Id. at 2-3.
10. Id. atI 1-14.
11. Id. at 16-17.
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the line, there generally is not.12 Survival in the west depends on access to
water, and water is generally viewed as being in short supply. As will be
discussed, this perception of shortage or potential shortage of fresh water has
influenced the public trust doctrine in many western states.
Further, the western states use a different system of water law than the
eastern states. Eastern states' water laws are founded on common-law
riparianism,13 although many states have transitioned to regulated riparian
systems.14 Riparianism incorporates notions of adjustable, correlative rights to
water among riparian property owners, with a general expectation-couched
originally in terms of a "natural flow" doctrine and more recently in terms of
"reasonable use"-that there is enough water to both serve human needs and
leave water in the natural system. In contrast, western states (with the notable
exception of Hawai'i) base their water law on prior appropriation, including
states like California that retain limited riparian rights.' 5 Prior appropriation is
based on the principle of "first in time, first in right" and acknowledges through
its priority system that water supplies from a given source will sometimes-
maybe often-be insufficient to meet all needs. Thus, prior appropriation as a
legal system acknowledges that fresh water is in short supply. In practice,
however, prior appropriation systems have allowed appropriators to drain
streams and rivers dry, making obvious the loss of public values such as
navigation, fishing and other recreation, aesthetics, species, biodiversity, water
quality, ecological health, and, more recently, ecosystem services.
Finally, in almost all prior appropriation states, state water law includes a
declaration, constitutional or statutory, that the state or the public owns the
fresh water itself. Legally, these declarations dissociate control over the water
from land ownership, including submerged land ownership. For public trust
purposes, therefore, such declarations leave western states free to impress
waters with public trust protections entirely independently of state ownership of
the beds and banks of navigable waters, extending many state public trust
doctrines to non-navigable waters.
All of these features of prior appropriation water law have become
relevant to states' public trust doctrines in the West. Indeed, western public
trust common law reflects conscious struggles, often lacking in the eastern
states, regarding the legal relationship between private appropriative water
rights, on the one hand, and public rights and values in water, on the other.
12. HERBERT C. YOUNG, UNDERSTANDING WATER RIGHTS AND CONFLICTS 42 (2d ed. 2003).
13. George A. Gould, Water Rights Systems, in WATER RIGHTS OF THE EASTERN UNITED STATES
8-9 (Kenneth R. Wright, ed., 1998).
14. Richard F. Ricci et al., Battles over Eastern Water, 21 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT. 38, 38
(2006); Jeremy Nathan Jungreis, "Permit" Me Another Drink: A Proposal for Safeguarding the Water
Rights offederal Lands in the Regulated Riparian East, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 369, 370-71 (2005).
15. Gould, supra note 13, at 7.
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This Article explores these and other features of western states' public
trust doctrines, identifying broad categories of how these nineteen states have
developed their common law regarding public rights in water. The Article is
both classificatory and comparative, first identifying categories of trends
among the western states and then comparing those approaches to demonstrate
the different ways that their public trust doctrines have developed.
At the same time, this Article seeks to make the larger point that, while the
broad contours of the public trust doctrine have a federal law basis, especially
regarding state ownership of the beds and banks of navigable waters, the details
of how public trust principles apply vary considerably from state to state.
Public trust law, in other words, is very much a species of state common law.
Moreover, as with other forms of common law, states have evolved their public
trust doctrines in light of the particular histories and perceived needs and
problems of each state. As Professors Robert Abrams and Noah Hall have
observed more generally for all of water law, any given state's public trust
doctrine "evolves instrumentally in ways that support a society's most pressing
needs. The periods of greatest change in water law tend to be the ones where
serious and protracted shortage or unsatisfied demand is felt in one or more key
economic sectors."16 Therefore, is it perhaps unsurprising that more robust
public trust doctrines have evolved in states such as Hawai'i, California, and
Montana where water- and environment-based tourism and recreation are
important contributors to the states' economies.
Part I of this Article provides a brief history of the public trust doctrine,
including its development before the formation of the United States and
emphasizing its public rights nature. Part II outlines the federal contours of
state public trust doctrines, including the federal law of state title to navigable
waters, the U.S. Supreme Court's pronouncements regarding the public trust
doctrine in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,17 and the Supreme Court's
further elaborations regarding states' authority to define rights to and in water.
Part III identifies and compares many of the trends in western states' public
trust doctrines, emphasizing moments when particular states' courts and, less
often, legislatures, acknowledge the evolving nature of public trust principles
and the need to protect public values recognized to be in short and decreasing
supply. The Article concludes with a short examination of the implications of
state public trust doctrines as a form of common law, arguing against the utility
of continuing to describe a single public trust "doctrine," particularly as
western states face unprecedented water supply pressures from climate change.
16. Robert H. Abrams & Noah D. Hall, Framing Water Policy in a Carbon Affected and Carbon
Constrained Environment, 49 NAT. RESOURCES 1 (2009).
17. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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I. HISTORICAL VIEWS OF PUBLIC INTERESTS IN WATER
As many writers have explained in varying degrees of detail, the public
trust doctrine has an extensive history dating back to Roman law.18 A short
review of this history is useful to underscore the concern for the public interests
in water that the public trust doctrine has always addressed.
As the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, "navigable waters uniquely
implicate sovereign interests."l 9 It has traced the protections for public rights in
water to the Institutes of Justinian, 20 which stated that "'[r]ivers and ports are
public; hence the right of fishing in a port, or in rivers are in common . . . ."'21
Such principles also have a long history in English common law:22 "[t]he
Magna Carta provided that the Crown would remove 'all fish-weirs . .. from
the Thames and the Medway and throughout all England, except on the sea
coast.' 23
The recognition of public interests and rights in waters has led to the
division of title in navigable waters between the jus privatum and jus publicum.
The jus privatum is the naked legal title to submerged lands, which may in fact
end up in private ownership. 24 However, private title to such lands generally
excludes the difficult-to-alienate jus publicum, which protects public access to
and rights to use navigable waters.25 The jus publicum may be protected legally
18. For more extensive discussions of the public trust doctrine's history, see Barton H. Thompson,
The Public Trust Doctrine: A Conservative Reconstruction and Defense, 15 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 47, 50-54
(2006); Eric Nelson, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Great Lakes, 11 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J.
131, 136-40 (2006); George D. Smith II & Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and
Natural Law: Emanations within a Penumbra, 33 BOsTON C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307, 310-14 (2006);
Henquinet & Dobson, supra note 5, at 24-30; Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae,
and the Attorney General as the Guardian of the State's Natural Resources, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y F. 57, 61-86 (2005); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 633-36 (1986);
Joseph L. Sax, supra note 4, at 475-78.
19. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 284 (1997).
20. Id.
21. Id. (quoting INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, Lib. II, Tit. 1, § 2 (T. Cooper transl. 2d ed. 1841)).
22. "The special treatment of navigable waters in English law was recognized in Bracton's time.
He stated that '[a]ll rivers and ports are public, so that the right to fish therein is common to all persons.
The use of river banks, as of the river itself, is also public."' Id. (quoting 2 H. BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET
CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 40 (S. Thome transl. 1968)).
23. Id. (quoting M. EVANS & R. JACK, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 53 (1984), and citing Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 410-13 (1842) ("tracing
tidelands trusteeship back to Magna Carta")).
24. Mary Turnipseed et al., The Silver Anniversary of the United States' Exclusive Economic
Zone: Twenty-Five Years of Ocean Use and Abuse, and the Possibility of a Blue Water Public Trust
Doctrine, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 25, 42 (2009); Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of
Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part II): Instilling a
Fiduciary Obligation in Governance, 39 ENvTL. L. 91, 122-23 (2009); Charles G. Stevenson, Title of
Land under Water in New York, 23 YALE L.J. 397, 399, 402-03 (1914).
25. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 284, 286 (quoting Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S.
1, 13 (1894)); New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1934); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387, 458, 466 (1892).
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in a number of ways. For example, in 1838, the U.S Supreme Court concluded
that because
the Potomac river is a navigable stream, a part of the jus publicum, any
obstruction to its navigation would, upon the most established principles,
be what is declared by law to be a public nuisance. A public nuisance being
the subject to criminal jurisdiction, the ordinary and regular proceeding at
law is by indictment or information, by which the nuisance may be abated;
and the person who caused it may be punished. If any particular individual
shall have sustained special damage from the erection of it, he may
maintain a private action for such special damage; because to that extent he
has suffered beyond his portion of injury, in common with the community
at large.26
Thus, according to the Court, the quintessential protection of the jus publicum
is a public nuisance lawsuit, preferably brought by the states themselves.
Private individuals may protect the jus publicum, but only to the extent that
they have suffered unusual private damages.
Building on this history, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1892 adopted the New
York courts' view that:
"The title to lands under tide waters, within the realm of England, were by
the common law deemed to be vested in the king as a public trust, to
subserve and protect the public right to use them as common highways for
commerce, trade, and intercourse. The king, by virtue of his proprietary
interest, could grant the soil so that it should become private property, but
his grant was subject to the paramount right of public use of navigable
waters, which he could neither destroy nor abridge....
"The principle of the common law to which we have adverted is
founded upon the most obvious principles of public policy. The sea and
navigable rivers are natural highways, and any obstruction to the common
right, or exclusive appropriation of their use, is injurious to commerce, and,
if permitted at the will of the sovereign, would be very likely to end in
materially crippling, if not destroying, it. The laws of most nations have
sedulously guarded the public use of navigable waters within their limits
against infringement, subjecting it only to such regulation by the state, in
the interest of the public, as is deemed consistent with the preservation of
the public right." 27
26. Mayor of City of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. 91, 97-98 (1838).
27. Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 458 (quoting People v. New York & S.I. Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71,
1877 WL 11834, at *3 (1877)); see also Shively, 152 U.S. at 11 ("By the common law, both the title and
the dominion of the sea, and of rivers and arms of the sea, where the tide ebbs and flows, and of all the
lands below high-water mark, within the jurisdiction of the crown of England, are in the king. Such
waters, and the lands which they cover, either at all times, or at least when the tide is in, are incapable of
ordinary and private occupation, cultivation, and improvement; and their natural and primary uses are
public in their nature, for highways of navigation and commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the
purpose of fishing by all the king's subjects. Therefore the title, jus privatum, in such lands, as of waste
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Thus, as a matter of both public policy and international consensus, the
Supreme Court early on connected the overall protection of public rights in
navigable waters to the protection and promotion of commerce and economic
growth.
Moreover, the federal government's early conveyances of title to riparian
properties in federal patents also reflect these public values. Grants of land
bordering navigable streams generally conveyed title that extended only to the
stream, which remained a "public highway." 28 Grants of land bordering rivers
above tide-water conveyed exclusive right and title to the center of the stream,
unless otherwise specified, but the public retained an easement or right of
passage along navigable streams-waters navigable for "boats and rafts." 29 In
other words, in the tidally influenced navigable waters, private landowners
claiming title through federal patents had no property rights sufficient to
interfere with public rights of commerce and navigation. Moreover, the U.S.
Supreme Court extended this rule to federal patents of land bordering
navigable-in-fact waters. 30
Thus, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that protecting public
rights in water, and limiting interfering private rights, promotes the overall
well-being of the nation by promoting navigation, trade, and commerce. These
and other public policy considerations remain relevant to the western states'
implementation of their public trust doctrines.
II. FEDERAL LAW COMPONENTS OF STATE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES
As noted above, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that
the submerged lands beneath navigable waters are subject to special
considerations because of their connections to sovereignty. However, the
sovereignty to which the Court usually refers, at least in the public trust
context, is state sovereignty. In 1842, the Court declared that "when the
[American] revolution took place, the people of each state became themselves
sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable
and unoccupied lands, belongs to the king, as the sovereign; and the dominion thereof, jus publicum, is
vested in him, as the representative of the nation and for the public benefit.").
28. Saint Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Schurmeier, 74 U.S. 272, 287 (1868).
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 336 (1876) (stating as a general rule that
private title to lands under navigable-in-fact waters extends only to the high-water mark); Shively, 152
U.S. at 11, 49-50 (adopting the English common law rule that federal conveyances go to the high-water
mark). In the most generalized sense, waters are "navigable in fact" when they can actually be used for
navigation, regardless of their immediate connection to the sea. Thus, in the United States, the adoption
of a "navigable in fact" test reflected a need to move away from the English tidal test, where waters are
deemed "navigable" only if they are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. That said, however, defining
"navigable in fact" has become a bit of an art in American water law, and several definitions potentially




waters, and the soils under them, for their own common use, subject only to the
rights since surrendered by the constitution to the general government." 31
The Supreme Court's most explicit articulation of the public trust doctrine
is found in the 1892 case of Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois.32 The
decision had the effect of reifying the doctrine's existence in American law
while simultaneously adapting it to the particular conditions of the United
States. Moreover, Illinois Central Railroad provided an apparent federal law
basis for many later state pronouncements of their own public trust doctrines.
The legal basis-federal common law, federal constitutional law, or state
law-for some aspects of the Court's pronouncements regarding the public
trust doctrine, such as the alienability of public trust lands, is questionable. 33
Such haziness of source, however, did not prevent many western states-
particularly Arizona-from adopting the Supreme Court's statements as
binding federal law. As Richard Lazarus has observed, "[s]tate courts have
repeatedly turned to [federal pronouncements] in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries to justify rejecting or at least carefully scrutinizing
shortsighted or even corrupt legislative attempts to convey into private hands
critical coastal or inland waterway resources." 34
The states' implementations of their own public trust doctrines began with
the assertion of state ownership of the beds and banks of navigable waters. In
the context of title disputes between the federal and state governments (as
opposed to title disputes between state governments and private landowners),
the question of title to these beds and banks is clearly a matter of federal law. 35
Western states such as Oregon and Utah played pivotal roles in developing the
jurisprudence of "state title navigability," which uses one definition of
"navigable waters" to determine whether a state has title to the beds and banks
of-and hence control over-a given waterway, 36 further evidencing the
western states' interests in controlling their fresh waters.
The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that, once federal law has
conferred title to the beds and banks of navigable waters on a particular state,
that state has broad authority to redefine the property rights between itself and
31. Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842).
32. Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
33. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, supra note 18, at 639-40 ("It is far from clear what source of law
the Court was drawing upon to reach its result."); Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395
(1926) (stating that the alienability ruling in Illinois Central was based on state law).
34. Lazarus, supra note 18, at 640.
35. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935);
United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931).
36. Definitions of "navigable waters" vary among legal contexts. For example, "navigable waters"
are defined differently for: (1) state title purposes; (2) the federal Commerce Clause power; (3) federal
jurisdiction under the federal Clean Water Act; (4) federal jurisdiction under the Rivers and Harbors
Act; (5) federal jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act; and (6) admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 30 (3d ed. 2006).
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its citizens.37 Similarly, the states have broad authority to define the public and
private rights in navigable waters themselves.38
A. State Ownership and Control of Submerged Lands
1. The Basic Rules
The original thirteen states acquired title to beds and banks underlying
tidal and, as would later be confirmed, navigable-in-fact nontidal waters as a
result of their conquest of England.39 All other states-including all of the
western states-acquired ownership of the beds and banks of these waters upon
their statehood as a result of the Equal Footing Doctrine, under which all
subsequent states were admitted with the same rights as the original thirteen.40
A given state's title to tidal and navigable waters is fixed as of the date of its
admission to the United States.41
Under federal law, the default rule and strong presumption is that a state
owns the beds of the navigable waters within its borders. 42 Sovereign
ownership of tidal waters-waters affected by the ebb and flow of the tide-
arises as a direct adoption of English common law.43 Moreover, the U.S.
Supreme Court clarified in 1988 that states own the beds of all tidal waters,
whether or not those waters are navigable-in-fact.44 State title, however, is
"subject always to the paramount right of [C]ongress to control ... navigation
so far as may be necessary for the regulation of commerce with foreign nations
and among the states." 45
37. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 380 (1891); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 669 (1891); Shively
v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 40 (1894); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429
U.S. 363, 370-72 (1977) (overruling Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973)).
38. Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 176 (1918).
39. Bonelli Cattle Co., 414 U.S. at 317-18, overruled on other grounds by Corvallis Sand &
Gravel Co., 429 U.S. at 370-72; Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. at 10; Den ex dem. Russell v. Ass'n of
Jersey Co., 56 U.S. 426, 432 (1853); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 223 (1845); Martin v.
Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842).
40. See Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 272 (2001); see also Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe
of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 283-84 (1997); United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 5 (1997); Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981); Bonelli Cattle Co., 414 U.S. at 317-18; United States v. Holt
State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926); Shively, 152 U.S. at 48-50; Weber v. Bd. of Harbor Comm'ners, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 65-66 (1873); Mumford v. Wardell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423, 436 (1867).
41. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. at 370-71 (citing Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
498 (1839)).
42. See Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. at 272-73; Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at
282; United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. at 34; Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193,
197-98 (1987); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 552; Shively, 152 U.S. at 26-50 (1894).
43. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892); Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S.
324, 336-38 (1876).
44. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469,476-81 (1988).




In contrast, state ownership of non-tidal "navigable-in-fact" waters was a
federal adaptation of English law to American realities. Thus, for example, the
Great Lakes "possess all the general characteristics of open seas, except in the
freshness of their waters, and in the absence of the ebb and flow of the tide,"
and hence "there is no reason or principle for the assertion of dominion and
sovereignty over and ownership by the state of lands covered by tide waters
that is not equally applicable to its ownership of and dominion and sovereignty
over lands covered by the fresh waters of these lakes."'46 Even earlier decisions
of the U.S. Supreme Court had announced a "navigable-in-fact" test for inland
rivers and streams. 47 However, waters must be navigable-in-fact as of the date
of the state's admission into the union.48
2. The Federal Test of Navigability for Navigable-in-Fact Waters
As noted, state title to the beds and banks of navigable-in-fact waters is a
question of federal law, determined in accordance with the federal test of
navigability for state title.49 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not been
uniformly consistent in how it defines "navigable" waters for these purposes.
Under the classic test of navigability from The Daniel Ball, waters
are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used,
in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade
and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and
travel on water. And they constitute navigable waters of the United States
within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the
navigable waters of the States, when they form in their ordinary condition
by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over
which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign
countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by
water.50
The Daniel Ball test thus closely aligns navigability with usefulness in
interstate commerce, suggesting that waterways must be navigable by fairly
large boats and ships.
46. Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 435-37.
47. See, e.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870) (holding that the English
common law tidal test has no applicability in the United States); Barney, 94 U.S. at 336 (stating that,
"[i]n this country, as a general thing, all waters are deemed navigable which are really so").
48. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971) (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26-28
(1894); Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 410, 316-17 (1842)); United States v. Oregon, 295
U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
49. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. at 10 (quoting The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563).
50. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563; see also Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. at 10-
11 (citing The Daniel Ball as the first important test of navigability for state title purposes and stating
that that test applies to all waters, not just rivers).
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However, the Supreme Court has also stated that a waterway is navigable
when it is useful for trade, agriculture, or commerce by any kind of vessel. For
example, in The Montello, the Court concluded:
It would be a narrow rule to hold that in this country, unless a river was
capable of being navigated by steam or sail vessels, it could not be treated
as a public highway. The capability of use by the public for purposes of
transportation and commerce affords the true criterion of the navigability of
a river, rather than the extent and manner of that use. If it be capable in its
natural state of being used for purposes of commerce, no matter in what
mode the commerce may be conducted, it is navigable in fact, and becomes
in law a public river or highway. Vessels of any kind that can float upon the
water, whether propelled by animal power, by the wind, or by the agency of
steam, are, or may become, the mode by which a vast commerce can be
conducted, and it would be a mischievous rule that would exclude either in
determining the navigability of a river. It is not, however, as Chief Justice
Shaw said, "every small creek in which a fishing skiff or gunning canoe
can be made to float at high water which is deemed navigable, but, in order
to give it the character of a navigable stream, it must be generally and
commonly useful to some purpose of trade or agriculture." 5 1
Moreover, in the course of adjudicating the navigability of waterbodies in
western states, the Court has emphasized that the water need not be "part of a
navigable or interstate or international commercial highway" in order for the
state to take title to its bed.52
Thus, depending on where a state court wants to focus its attention, the
U.S. Supreme Court's statements regarding navigability for state title purposes
allow for both liberal and stringent approaches to claiming title and, as a
consequence, asserting and protecting public rights. The Court itself, however,
attempted to reconcile its various definitions of navigability in two cases from
the 1930s involving allegedly navigable waters in Utah and Oregon. The 1931
Utah case resolved Utah's claims of title to the submerged lands beneath the
Green, Grand, and Colorado Rivers in Utah's favor. 53 The Court first reiterated
that states received title to the submerged lands of navigable waters, while the
federal government retained title to those beneath non-navigable waters, with
the question of title navigability to be resolved by federal law. 54 It then
established a definition of navigability that attempts to unify prior definitions
51. The Montello, 87 U.S. (11 Wall.) 430, 441-42 (1874).
52. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. at 10 (citing United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931);
United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. at 14).
53. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 89.
54. Id. at 74. Given the last point, the Utah legislature's declaration that the three rivers were
navigable was of no binding effect. Id. at 75 n.6.
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from The Daniel Ball, The Montello, and Holt State Bank.5 After reviewing
previous holdings on navigability, the Utah Court explained that:
The extent of existing commerce is not the test. The evidence of actual use
of streams, and especially of extensive and continued use for commercial
purposes may be most persuasive, but, where conditions of exploration and
settlement explain the infrequency or limited nature of such use, the
susceptibility to use as a highway of commerce may still be satisfactorily
proved. 56
As a result, the presence of sandbars that occasionally impeded navigation did
not make the three rivers non-navigable because the rivers were still generally
susceptible to use as channels of commerce.5 7
Four years later, applying the same test, the Supreme Court determined
that Lake Malheur, Mud Lake, Hamey Lake, the Narrows, and Sand Reef in
Oregon were not navigable. According to the Court's findings:
Neither trade nor travel did then [at statehood] or at any time since has or
could or can move over said Divisions, or any of them, in their natural and
or ordinary conditions according to the customary modes of trade and
travel over water; nor was any of them on February 14, 1859 [Oregon's
date of statehood] nor has any of them since been used or susceptible of
being used in the natural or ordinary condition of any of them as permanent
or other highways or channels for useful or other commerce.58
In contrast, under the same consolidated federal test, the Great Salt Lake was
navigable, and its beds owned by Utah, because of its use as a channel of
commerce, despite its not being part of an interstate or international network. 59
55. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926). In Holt State Bank, the U.S. Supreme
Court determined the navigability of Mud Lake in Minnesota. After emphasizing that the lower courts
erred in using a local state standard of navigability instead of a federal standard, id. at 55, the Court
applied the federal navigability test from The Montello. Specifically, the Court stated that:
The rule long since approved by this court in applying the Constitution and laws of the
United States is that streams or lakes which are navigable in fact must be regarded as
navigable in law; that they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of
being used, in their natural and ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which
trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on
water; and further that navigability does not depend on the particular mode in which such use
is or may be had-whether by steamboats, sailing vessels or flatboats-nor on an absence of
occasional difficulties in navigation, but on the fact, if it be a fact, that the stream in its
natural and ordinary condition affords a channel for useful commerce.
Id at 56 (citing The Montello, 87 U.S. at 439).
56. Unites States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 82.
57. Id. at 86.
58. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. at 15 (citing Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 56; United States
v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 76; Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86 (1922);
Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 586 (1922); Econ. Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113,
122-23 (1921); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 698 (1899); The
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870)).
59. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10-11 (1971).
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3. Exceptions to State Title in the Western States
Although the presumption is that western states received title to the beds
and banks of the navigable rivers within their borders, most western states
existed as federal territories for some time before achieving statehood. As a
result, state title in the West, far more than in the East, is subject to prior
federal conveyances and reservations of title to navigable waters.
For example, when the federal government reserved navigable waters to
some federal purpose before the date of statehood (or unappropriated waters
even after statehood), those navigable waters remain in federal ownership.
Many such reservations in the West benefit Indian tribes. For example, the
Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw Nations own the bed under portions of the
Arkansas River in Oklahoma,60 and the Osage Tribe owns the lands beneath
the Arkansas River flowing along the Osage Indian Reservation. 61 Similarly,
the United States holds title to Coeur d'Alene Lake and the St. Joe River in
Idaho in trust for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe.62
Other reservations, however, serve other federal purposes. Thus, the State
of Alaska did not receive title to any of the submerged lands within the
boundary of the National Petroleum Reserve or the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge. 63
In addition, the federal government retains title to lands under some
waters, especially coastal waters, as an aspect of its fundamental sovereignty.
For example, Alaska does not have title to the submerged lands in the lower
inlet of Cook Inlet because the state could not show a sufficient exercise of
sovereignty historically to make these waters a "historic bay," leaving title to
the inlet in the federal government.6
Finally, federal patents granted to private individuals before the date of
statehood can affect both a state's title to submerged lands and the application
of the state's public trust doctrine. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has
made clear that California cannot enforce any public trust easement over
tidelands that the federal government conveyed to private individuals pursuant
to the Act of 1851 if the federal patent makes no mention of a public
easement.65
60. Chocktaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-32 (1970); United States v. Cherokee
Nation of Oklahoma, 480 U.S. 700, 701 (1987).
61. Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co., 260 U.S. at 86-87.
62. Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 272 (2001).
63. United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 36-46 (1997).
64. United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 200-04 (1975).
65. Summa Corp. v. Cal. ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198, 205-09 (1984).
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4. Superiority of the Federal Interest in Navigation
Despite state ownership of the beds and banks of navigable waters, the
federal government retains a paramount interest in maintaining navigation in
the navigable waters. This interest is one of the most basic manifestations of the
federal government's Commerce Clause powers, but it can also serve to
reinforce the public values in navigable waters protected by the public trust
doctrine.
One aspect of this paramount federal navigation interest is the federal
navigation servitude. The main import of the federal navigation servitude is that
government actions to maintain navigation do not require the government to
compensate private persons and entities for injuries to private property rights.66
For example, as early as 1829 the U.S. Supreme Court noted that
[1]aws in relation to roads, bridges, rivers and other public highways, which
do not take away private rights to property, may be passed at the discretion
of the legislature, however much they may effect common rights; even
private rights, if they are not those of property, may be taken away, if it be
deemed necessary consequence of their construction, without making
compensation. 67
Thus, with respect to navigation, public values can intrude upon private.
Another aspect of the navigation interest is the federal government's
continuing right to regulate interstate commerce. This right, while
distinguishable from regulating navigation per se, nevertheless has substantial
overlaps with navigation concerns. 68 Moreover, under the Supremacy Clause,69
Congress's regulation of interstate commerce in navigable waters will trump
any conflicting state regulation.70
Finally, in the context of water law, the federal government's paramount
interest in navigation may, in extreme cases, limit the rights of western
appropriators to destroy public values in any waters that become navigable,
even if they are not so at the point of diversion. In an 1899 case, the U.S.
Supreme Court addressed the propriety of the complete diversion of the Rio
Grande River in New Mexico, where it is not navigable. The Court concluded
66. Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 271-76 (1897); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141,
156-58, 163-65 (1900).
67. Wilson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 252 n.1 (1829).
68. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 11-20, 64-69, 71-79 (1824).
69. The Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
70. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. at 71-79, 89-96.
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that such upstream diversions could not interfere with the federal government's
downstream interest in maintaining navigability, for two reasons:
First, . . . in the absence of specific authority from [C]ongress, a state
cannot, by its legislation, destroy the right of the United States, as the
owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters,
so far, at least, as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the
government property; second, . . . it is limited by the superior power of the
general government to secure the uninterrupted navigability of all
navigable streams within the limits of the United States. In other words, the
jurisdiction of the general government over interstate commerce and its
natural highways vests in that government the right to take all needed
measures to preserve the navigability of the navigable water courses of the
country, even against any state action. 7 1
The Court has reaffirmed these potential limitations on the destruction of
downstream navigability in subsequent cases. 72
B. The Supreme Court's Delineation of an American Public Trust Doctrine
and the Limitations the Doctrine Imposes on States73
The U.S. Supreme Court most clearly announced the existence of a public
trust doctrine in American law in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois.74
According to that decision, a state holds title to submerged lands,
[b]ut it is a title different in character from that which the state holds in
lands intended for sale . . .. It is a title held in trust for the people of the
state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce
over them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or
interference of private parties.75
Thus, the three public uses of waters that a public trust doctrine generally
protects are navigation, commerce, and fishing. 76
In addition, according to the Illinois Central Railroad Court, the doctrine
acts as a restraint on the state's ability to alienate the beds and banks of
71. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
72. See, e.g., Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 159-60 (1935).
73. As discussed supra, the extent to which the U.S. Supreme Court based some of these
limitations-especially the restraint on alienation-on federal law that could preempt state law is highly
debatable. As a result, states vary in how "binding" they consider the Court's articulations of public trust
doctrine restraints, although most have followed Illinois Central Railroad's restrictions.
74. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). For discussions of the history of this case and its relationship to state
public trust doctrines, see generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the
American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 799
(2004); Douglas L. Grant, Underpinnings of the Public Trust Doctrine: Lessons from Illinois Central
Railroad, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849 (2001); Eric Pearson, Illinois Central and the Public Trust Doctrine in
State Law, 15 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 713 (1996).
75. Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453.




navigable waters or to abdicate regulatory control over those waters. The Court
described the trust as essentially prohibiting a state from abdicating its general
control over lands under navigable waters, such as by granting very large
parcels to development interests: "The control of the state for the purposes of
the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting
the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial
impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining."" This
restraint on alienation-and its perception as a federal law requirement-has
been important in several western states, notably Arizona.78
C. A Note on Federal Law, Prior Appropriation,
and Non-Navigable Waters in the West
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress have recognized that western
states adopted prior appropriation as their dominant water law. In the Act of
July 26, 1866, Congress began to formally recognize prior appropriation's
ascendancy over riparian rights in the West. 79 In the Desert Land Act of
1877,80 as interpreted by the Supreme Court, it both subjected non-navigable
waters to prior appropriation and gave western states control over those waters.
The Desert Land Act applies to lands in California, Oregon, Nevada,
Colorado, Washington, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, New
Mexico, North Dakota, and South Dakota that were public at the time of
enactment. 81 In other words, it applies to all states discussed in this Article
except Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Hawai'i, and Alaska. In the Act,
Congress recognized that reclamation, large-scale development, and movement
of fresh water would be necessary in order to settle the arid western lands. 82 As
a result, according to the Supreme Court, Congress both severed non-navigable
waters from the public lands, ending common-law riparian rights,83 and gave
control over water rights in those waters to the states.84
Thus, through the Desert Land Act and statutes like it, Congress allowed
western states to assert ownership and control over non-navigable waters as
well as navigable, even though the states did not own the beds and banks
77. Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 452-53.
78. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 726-28 (Ariz. App. 2001) (relying on
Illinois Central Railroad to conclude that the restraint on alienation of submerged lands is a common-
law rule grounded in the Constitution that invalidates the Arizona legislature's attempts to disclaim or
restrict state ownership of those lands).
79. Act of July 26, 1866, c. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 251, 251.
80. 43 U.S.C. § 321 (2008).
81. Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 165 (1935).
82. Id. at 157-58.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 163-64; see also Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 139 n.5 (1976); Nebraska v.
Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 612 (1945); Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 95-96 (1937) (all confirming the import
of the Desert Land Act).
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beneath those waters. As will be discussed in more detail, this ability to declare
state ownership of all water has been an important component of many western
states' public trust doctrines.
III. WESTERN STATES' PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES:
TRENDS AND APPROACHES TO PUBLIC RIGHTS IN WATER
In the western states, the Illinois Central Railroad Court's pronouncements
regarding the public trust doctrine have generally been interpreted as defining
the doctrine's minimal applicability in terms of waters covered, uses protected,
and restraints on state authority to eliminate the public trust. The courts in
several western states-especially Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, and
Nebraska-have largely adhered to this "minimalist" public trust doctrine,
while Nevada courts simply lack sufficient public trust statutes to have effected
any state-law expansions of the doctrine.
The other thirteen western states, however, have added important state-law
dimensions to the scope of the public trust doctrine as it operates within their
respective borders. These states have used a variety of legal techniques to
protect and expand public rights in the waters of each state: redefining
"navigable" waters for state law purposes; expanding the list of protected
public uses beyond navigation, fishing, and commerce; and extending public
rights and public trust principles to all state waters, regardless of who owns the
beds and banks.
More recently, several states have extended the concept of a public trust in
waters to environmental protection-what this Article refers to as the
"ecological public trust." California and Hawai'i have most extensively
developed their ecological public trust doctrines, but nascent ecological public
trusts are detectable in several other western states as well.
In addition, as a result of the variety of elements on which state law might
operate-the definition of "navigable," the uses protected, extensions to all
water, and/or inclusion of ecological considerations-the western states' public
trust doctrines have become highly individualistic. Thus, the import of public
trust principles is now largely a matter of state common law, sometimes
supplemented by state statutes, rather than any kind of straightforward
application of the U.S. Supreme Court's statements from Illinois Central
Railroad.
A. Adaptations of the Public Trust Doctrines to Particular State
Circumstances and Public Policies
Courts and, to a lesser extent, legislatures in western states often clearly
connect the state's public trust doctrine to larger issues of state public policy. In
states where these larger public policies include recognition of actual or
potential loss of the public values of fresh water, more robust public trust
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doctrines are often the result. In contrast, in states where public policies favor
private rights, more restricted public trust doctrines have been the norm.
Arizona, for example, is an example of the latter kind of state-so much so
that legislative attempts to restrict the state's public trust doctrine have
prompted repeated interventions by the Arizona courts.85 By statute, Arizona
limits "navigable waters"-and its public trust doctrine-to those waters
subject to the federal equal footing doctrine. 86 In contrast, Hawai'i courts are
acutely aware of the scarcity of fresh water in the state and have subordinated
private water rights to the public interest in preserving the state's "natural
bounty."87
States that seek to preserve the public interest in waters have used a
variety of legal techniques for doing so. For example, the North Dakota
Supreme Court adapted the state's law regarding shifting rivers to protect the
public rights in those rivers:
The Territorial Legislative Assembly recognized that our state would
receive title to the beds of navigable waters at statehood. Accordingly, by
1877, it had enacted a code that would secure title of the state to such lands
and modify common law so that the state's title would follow the
movement of the bed of the river. This accords with underlying public
policy, since the purpose of a state holding title to a navigable riverbed is to
foster the public's right of navigation, traditionally the most important
feature of the public trust doctrine. Moreover, it seems to use that other
important aspects of the state's public interest, such as bathing, swimming,
recreation, and fishing, as well as irrigation, industrial and other water
supplies, are most closely associated with where the water is in the new
riverbed, not the old.88
To address a different threat to public rights in waters, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court has distinguished navigability for title purposes from
navigability for public use purposes. Using a pleasure boat test of navigability,
it protects its smaller rivers and the recreational and aesthetic amenities that
85. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 727 (Ariz. App. 2001); San Carlos Apache Tribe
v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999); Calmat of Ariz. v. State
ex rel. Miller, 836 P.2d 1010, 1020-21 (Ariz. App. 1992); Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v.
Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 162-73 (Ariz. App. 1991).
86. As such, a "navigable watercourse" for purposes of both state title and the application of the
public trust doctrine is
a watercourse that was in existence on February 14, 1912, and at that time was used or was
susceptible to being used, in its ordinary and natural condition, as a highway for commerce,
over which trade and travel were or could have been conducted in the customary modes of
trade and travel on water.
ARIz. REV. STAT. § 37-1130(5) (LexisNexis 2009). "Public trust lands" are limited to the beds of these
navigable watercourses. Id. § 37-1130(8).
87. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 311-12 (Haw. 1982).
88. J.P. Furlong Enters., Inc. v. Sun Exploration & Production Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 140 (N.D.
1988).
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they provide. It found, for instance, "that the Kiamichi River is one of the
beautiful streams of southeastern Oklahoma that has for many years been
known as one of the best fishing streams in the State and used by the public for
fishing, recreation, and pleasure" and extended legal protections to those public
uses and values. 89
More extensively, courts in California have explicitly and repeatedly
emphasized that lands beneath nontidal navigable waters "constitute a resource
which is fast disappearing in California; they are of great importance for the
ecology, and for the recreational needs of the residents of the state."90
Moreover, the California Supreme Court considers the public trust doctrine to
be adaptable and evolving, noting that "[t]he objective of the public trust has
evolved in tandem with the changing public perception of the values and uses
of waterways." 91 It recognizes that the trust traditionally protects navigation,
commerce, and fishing, but also has expansively announced that public trust
rights "have been held to include the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for
boating, and general recreation purposes the navigable waters of the state, and
to use the bottom of the navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or other
purposes." 92
The Texas courts, similarly, have noted that "[t]he purpose of the State
maintaining title to the beds and waters of all navigable bodies is to protect the
public's interest in those scarce natural resources." 93 As such, "the State, as
trustee, is entitled to regulate those waters and submerged lands to protect its
citizens' health and safety and to conserve natural resources." 94
Oregon has used a variety of legal mechanisms to acknowledge and
protect the public interests in tidal and navigable-in-fact waters. Like in
California, the Oregon courts view the state's waters as a limited and precious
resource:
The severe restriction on the power of the state as trustee to modify water
resources is predicated not only upon the importance of the public use of
such waters and lands, but upon the exhaustible and irreplaceable nature of
89. Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933, 935 (Okla. 1969).
90. State v. Superior Court (Lyons), 625 P.2d 239, 242 (Cal. 1981).
91. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983) (citing Marks v.
Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971)); see also Pers. Watercraft Coal. v. Marin County Bd. of
Supervisors, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 425, 437 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (repeating that the doctrine is "sufficiently
flexible to encompass changing public needs" (citations omitted)).
92. Marks, 491 P.2d at 379-80 (Cal. 1971); see also City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d
362, 365 (Cal. 1980); Grafv. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 7 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1228-29 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992).
93. Cummins v. Travis County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 17, 175 S.W.2d 34, 49
(Tex. App. 2005).
94. Id. (citing Goldsmith & Powell v. Texas, 159 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942)); see
also Carruthers v. Terramar Beach Cmty. Improvement Ass'n, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. 1983)
("The waters of public navigable streams are held by the State in trust for the public, primarily for
navigation purposes." (citing Motl v. Boyd, 286 S.W. 458 (Tex. 1926))).
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the resources and its fundamental importance to our society and our
environment. These resources, after all, can only be spent once. Therefore,
the law has historically and consistently recognized that rivers and estuaries
once destroyed or diminished may never be restored to the public and,
accordingly, has required the highest degree of protection from the public
trustee.95
Thus, in applying the public trust doctrine, the Oregon courts have noted that
"lands underlying navigable waters have been recognized as unique and limited
resources and have been accorded special protection to insure their preservation
for public water-related uses such as navigation, fishery and recreation." 96 As a
result, "[u]nder the common law public trust doctrine, the public use of such
waters could not be substantially modified except for water-related
purposes." 97
Moreover, like Oklahoma,98 Oregon has refined its definition of
navigability to reflect the physical realities and public policy priorities of the
state. Thus, Oregon early on adopted a log floatation test for navigability
because that rule
best accords with common sense and public convenience, for these rapid
streams, penetrating deep into the mountains, are the only means by which
timber can be brought from these rugged sections, without great labor and
expense; and by their use large tracks of timber, otherwise too remote or
difficult of access, can be rendered of great value, as the country shall grow
and timber become scarce. 99
Finally, unusually (but not uniquely)100 among states, Oregon has employed
the doctrine of custom to ensure public access to dry sand beaches not
protected by the public trust doctrine.1 01 As a result, the Oregon Supreme Court
concluded that no taking of private property had occurred when the state denied
landowners permits to build sea walls. 102
Other states have also used some of these mechanisms to adapt the public
trust doctrine to the particular public interests and policies of that state. For
example, by statute, and for purposes of establishing public rights in waters,
Alaska defines a "navigable water" to be:
95. Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands, 581 P.2d 520, 524 (Or. Ct. App. 1978), af'd, 590 P.2d 709
(Or. 1979).
96. Id. at 523.
97. Id.
98. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
99. Felger v. Robinson, 3 Or. 455, 458 (1869).
100. Because the public has long used the beaches of Hawai'i, that use "has ripened into a
customary right. Public policy, as interpreted by this court, favors extending to public use and ownership
as much of Hawaii's shoreline as is reasonably possible." Hawaii County v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57, 61-
62 (Haw. 1973) (citing Oregon ex rel. Thorton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969)).
101. Oregon ex rel. Thornton, 462 P.2d at 673-78.
102. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449,451 (Or. 1993).
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any water of the state forming a river, stream, lake, pond, slough, creek,
bay, sound, estuary, inlet, strait, passage, canal, sea or ocean, or any other
body of water or waterway within the territorial limits of the state or
subject to its jurisdiction, that is navigable in fact for any useful public
purpose, including but not limited to water suitable for commercial
navigation, floating of logs, landing and takeoff of aircraft, and public
boating, trapping, hunting waterfowl and aquatic animals, fishing, or other
public recreational purposes .. .103
The public also has rights in "public waters," which by statute include not only
navigable waters, but also "all other water, whether inland or coastal, fresh or
salt, that is reasonably suitable for public use and utility, habitat for fish and
wildlife in which there is a public interest, or migration and spawning of fish in
which there is a public interest . . . ."104 These definitions and public rights
protections reflect Alaska's unique environmental and cultural circumstances.
Alaska, for example, is the only western state that explicitly identifies use of
waters by seaplanes as an important public use to be protected by law. In
addition, Alaska is a prime fishing state, and its statutory declarations of what
constitute public waters give special consideration to the use of waters not just
for fishing but also for spawning and migration, reflecting most obviously the
peculiarities of salmon life cycles; salmon in Alaska are important to
commercial fishermen, recreational fishers and the recreation industry, and
Native Alaskans.105 The public trust doctrines of Oregon' 0 6 and Washington 0 7
similarly reflect the importance of salmon and shellfish, respectively, to those
states' citizens.
103. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 38.05.965(13) (2004).
104. Id § 38.05.965(18).
105. Timothy J. Mullins, The Clean Water Initiatives and the Proper Balance Between the Right to
Ballot Initiatives and the Prohibition on Appropriations, 26 ALASKA L. REv. 135, 141, 168 (2009); Katy
Hansen, Rebecca Vernon, & Hana Bae, Supreme Court Preview, 56 FED. LAWYER 62, 62-63 (2009).
106. For example, Oregon's public trust responsibilities have been applied to fishing regulation. As
a result, statutes purporting to convey exclusive rights to fish in navigable waters violated the Privileges
and Immunities Clause in the Oregon Constitution. Hume v. Rogue River Packing Co., 92 P. 1065,
1072-73 (Or. 1907); see also Johnson v. Hoy, 47 P.2d 252, 252 (Or. 1935) (holding that the Legislature
cannot grant an exclusive right to fish for salmon). Nevertheless, because the state has jurisdiction over
navigable waters, it can regulate fishing. Oregon v. Nielsen, 95 P. 720, 722 (Or. 1908); Antony v.
Veatch, 220 P.2d 493, 498-99 (Or. 1950). Specifically, fishing methods can be enjoined if they interfere
with the public's common right of fishing. Radich v. Frederckson, 10 P.2d 352, 355 (Or. 1932);
Johnson, 47 P.2d at 252.
107. "[In Washington, the public trust doctrine does not encompass the right to gather clams on
private property" because shellfish rights follow title to the submerged lands. Washington v. Longshore,
982 P.2d 1191, 1195-96 (Wash. App. 1999), affd, 5 P.3d 1256, 1259-63 (Wash. 2000) (en bane); see
also Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass'n v. Wash. State Dept of Natural Res., 101 P.3d 891, 895
(Wash. App. 2004) (noting that shellfish are not typical wildlife in Washington because they are




B. Public Ownership ofSubmerged Lands,
Public Ownership of Water, and Public Rights in Water
As discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court has most explicitly
connected public trust rights to navigable waters-that is, the waters in which
the state owns the beds and banks. Thus, in what might be called the state-
property-based view of public trust doctrines, public rights follow state title to
submerged lands.
However, in the West, as noted, federal and state law both allow for-and
most states have declaredIO8-state or public ownership of the fresh waters
themselves, independent of ownership of submerged lands. This public aquatic
property right provides these states with another property law basis upon which
to recognize and expand public rights in water beyond those recognized in
traditional concepts of the public trust doctrine, as articulated in Illinois Central
Railroad. Thus, as was true for the eastern states, 109 most western states have
divorced public rights in waters from state or public ownership of the relevant
submerged lands, although the western states generally rely on different legal
mechanisms-such as state ownership of water-to do so.
Among the western states, Colorado and Idaho have most clearly adhered
to the strict and limited traditional view of public rights in their public trust
doctrines. Relying on the federal test of navigability, the Colorado Supreme
Court has declared almost all streams in Colorado to be non-navigable: "the
natural streams of this state are, in fact, nonnavigable within its territorial
limits, and practically all of them have their sources within its own boundaries,
and. . .no stream of any importance whose source is without those boundaries,
flows into or through this state."110 It then explicitly refused to follow the
"modem trend" and allow public rights in non-navigable rivers based on state
ownership of the water itself, concluding that the Colorado Constitution does
not preserve public recreation rights in such waters.111 Instead, "[w]ithout
permission, the public cannot use such waters for recreation." 1 2
108. ALASKA CONST., art. VIII, § 13; ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.030 (2009); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-
141(A) (LexisNexis 2009); CAL. WATER CODE § 1201 (2009); COLO. CONST., art. XVI, § 5; HAW.
CONST., art. XI, §§ 1, 7; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-702 (2009); MONT. CONST., art. IX, § 3(3); NEB.
CONST., art. XV, § 5; NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025 (2008); N.M. CONST., art. XVI, § 2; N.M. STAT. § 72-
1-1 (2009); N.D. CONST., art. XI, § 3; N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.010,
537.525 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 46-1-3 (2009); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021(a) (Vernon
2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.010 (2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. §
41-3-115(a) (2009).
109. Craig, supra note 6, at 14-16.
110. Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P. 220, 222 (Colo. 1912), overruled on other grounds, Denver Ass'n
for Retarded Children, Inc. v. School Dist. No. 1, 535 P.2d 200 (Colo. 1975); see also United States v.
Dist. Court, 458 P.2d 760, 762 (Colo. 1969) (holding that even though the Eagle River is a tributary of
the Colorado River, it is non-navigable).
111. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027-28 (Colo. 1979).
112. Id. at 1029; see also Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685, 686-87 (Colo. 1905) (holding that public
ownership of the water itself, as stated in the Colorado Constitution, does not create a public fishery in
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In contrast, the Idaho courts until 1996 were following the western
"modem trend," indicating that water and "proprietary rights to use water ...
are held subject to the public trust." 1l3 In 1996, however, Idaho's legislature
invalidated this line of cases, instead defining (and confining) the state's public
trust doctrine by statute. 114 These provisions declare that
[t]he public trust doctrine as it is applied in the state of Idaho is solely a
limitation on the power of the state to alienate or encumber the title to the
beds of navigable waters as defined in this chapter . . . . The public trust
doctrine shall not be applied to any purpose other than as provided in this
chapter, [especially not to' [t]he appropriation or use of water, or the
granting, transfer, administration, or adjudication of water or water rights . .
. or any other procedure or law applicable to water rights in the state of
Idaho [or to] [t]he protection or exercise of private property rights within
the state of Idaho. 115
Most other western states, however, have followed the "modem trend"
that the Colorado Supreme Court rejected. For example, according to the
Montana Supreme Court, "[t]he public trust doctrine in Montana's Constitution
grants public ownership in water not in beds and banks of streams," and "[a]ll
waters are owned by the State for the use of its people."I16 As a result, "the
public has the right to use the water for recreational purposes and minimal use
of underlying and adjoining real estate essential to enjoyment of its ownership
in water," even if the bed and banks are privately owned. 17 Nevertheless,
non-navigable streams; instead, the private landowner owns the right of fishery, and only appropriative
rights can trump this common-law rule). Kansas takes the same approach:
Owners of the bed of a nonnavigable stream have the exclusive right of control of everything
above the stream bed, subject only to constitutional and statutory limitations, restrictions, and
regulations. Where the legislature refuses to create a public trust for recreational purposes in
non-navigable streams, courts should not alter the legislature's statement of public policy by
judicial legislation.
State ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1350, 1364-65 (Kan. 1990). As a result, "[tihe public has no right
to the use of nonnavigable water overlying private lands for recreational purposes without the consent of
the landowner." Id. at 1365.
113. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho, 911 P.2d 748, 750 (Idaho 1995); Kootenai Envtl.
Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1094 (Idaho 1983) (holding that "the public
trust doctrine takes precedence even over vested water rights.").
114. IDAHO CODE §§ 58-1201 to 58-1203 (1996).
115. Id. §§ 58-1203(1), (2)(b), (c). These statutes define "navigable waters" as "those waters that
were susceptible to being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce on the date of
statehood, under the federal test of navigability" and identify the line of "natural or ordinary high water
mark" as the boundary of the beds of navigable waters, in complete agreement with federal law. Id. §
58-1202(1).
116. Galt v. Montana, 731 P.2d 912, 915 (Mont. 1987) (emphasis added).
117. Id.; Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1092 (Mont. 1984)
(noting that underlying ownership of the bed does not matter for the public's recreational use right);
Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984) (holding that "under the
public trust doctrine and the 1972 Montana Constitution, any surface waters that are capable of
recreational use may be so used by the public without regard to streambed ownership or navigability for
nonrecreational purposes.").
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Montana statutes make it clear that appropriated water rights trump any other
public interest in the waters, including environmental protections and public
use rights.118
New Mexico and North Dakota, similarly, have found constitutional and
statutory declarations that waters are publicly owned relevant to their public
trust doctrines. Thus, in 1947, the New Mexico Supreme Court declared that all
waters are public waters until beneficially appropriated and that the public can
thus use all waters for outside recreation, sports, and fishing.1 9 In 1976, North
Dakota declared that the public trust doctrine extends broadly to management
of the state's water resources, requiring the State Engineer to determine "the
potential effect of [a proposed] allocation of water on the present water supply
and future needs of this State," necessitating water resources planning.120
More recently, the South Dakota Supreme Court decided to follow
"modem trend" decisions in Idaho (now overruled by statute), Montana, New
Mexico, Wyoming, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Iowa to open all waters in
the state to public use.121 As a result, the South Dakota Water Resources Act,
which governs allocation of appropriative water rights in the state, must now
work in tandem with the public trust doctrine:
[W]hile we regard the public trust doctrine and Water Resources Act as
having shared principles, the Act does not supplant the scope of the public
trust doctrine. The Water Resources Act evinces a legislative intent both to
allocate and regulate water resources. In part, this Act codifies public trust
principles. The first three sections of the Act embody the core principles of
the public trust doctrine-"the people of the state have a paramount interest
in the use of all the water of the state," SDCL 46-1-1; "the state shall
determine in what way the water of the state, both surface and
underground, should be developed for the greatest public benefit," SDCL
46-1-2; and "all water within the state is the property of the people of the
state." SDCL 46-1-3.122
Moreover, when increased precipitation creates new lakes on private property,
"the State of South Dakota retains the right to use, control, and develop the
water in these lakes as a separate asset in trust for the public," and the public
trust doctrine applies independently of bed ownership.123 In summary, "all
waters within South Dakota, not just those waters considered navigable under
the federal test, are held in trust by the State for the public." 24
118. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-5-705, 75-7-104, 85-1-111 (2009).
119. State ex rel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421, 429-32 (N.M.
1947).
120. United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 461,
463 (N.D. 1976).
121. Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 833-36 (S.D. 2004).
122. Id. at 838.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 838-39.
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Under Utah's statutes, waters are owned by the public,125 and the Utah
Supreme Court has tied the need for public rights to water scarcity: water is "a
scarce and essential resource in this area of the country" that "is indispensable
to the welfare of all people; and the State must therefore assume the
responsibility of allocating the use of water for the benefit and welfare of the
people of the State as a whole."1 26 Thus:
Under this "doctrine of public ownership," the public owns state waters and
has "an easement over the water regardless of who owns the water bed
beneath." In granting this public this easement, "state policy recognizes an
interest of the public in the use of state waters for recreational purposes."
This court has enumerated the specific recreational rights that are within
the easement's scope. They include "the right to float leisure craft, hunt,
fish, and participate in any lawful activity when utilizing that water."127
Hence, bed ownership is irrelevant for the public's rights to use waters in the
state. 128 Moreover, "the scope of the public's easement in state waters provides
the public the right to engage in all recreational activities that utilize the water
and does not limit the public to activities that can be performed upon the
water."129 As a result, "the public has the right to touch privately owned beds
of state waters in ways incidental to all recreational rights provided for in the
easement."1 30
Finally, Wyoming, too, has extended public use rights to all waters based
on its ownership of the water itself. According to the Wyoming Supreme Court,
"the actual usability of the waters is alone the limit of the public's right to
employ them."131 Except in federally navigable waters, "the exclusive control
of waters is vested in the state," and hence "[i]t follows that the state may lay
down and follow such criteria for cataloguing waters as navigable or
nonnavigable, as it sees fit, and the state may also decide the ownership of
submerged lands, irrespective of the navigable or nonnavigable character of the
waters above them." 132 As a result, state ownership of the waters themselves
impresses those waters with a public trust.133 The public can float craft down
any waters so usable, regardless of bed ownership, and can scrape bottom,
disembark, and pull the craft over shoals. 134 Moreover, members of the public
125. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 (2009).
126. JJNP Co. v. Utah, 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982).
127. Conater v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 899-900 (Utah 2008) (quoting JJNP Co., 655 P.2d at
1137).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 901.
130. Id. at 901-02 (limiting criminal trespass liability for water users).
131. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 143 (Wyo. 1961).
132. Id. at 143.
133. Id. at 145.
134. Id. at 145-46.
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can hunt or fish while floating.135 However, public use rights do not give the
public the right to wade or walk on privately owned streambeds. 136
C. The Emergence ofEcological Public Trust Doctrines in the West
As in eastern states, 137 most western states have expanded the protected
public rights in waters beyond the three acknowledged in Illinois Central
Railroad-navigation, fishing, and commerce-to recreation and other public
uses, including, in some states, aesthetics.138 Only Arizona (by statute)139 and
Colorado (by case lawl40) have intentionally limited public rights in waters,
135. Id. at 147.
136. Id. at 146.
137. Craig, supra note 6, at 17-19.
138. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 38.05.965(13) (2004) (defining "navigable waters" to include
waters that are usable for "floating of logs, landing and takeoff of aircraft, and public boating, trapping,
hunting waterfowl and aquatic animals, fishing, or other public recreational purposes"); Marks v.
Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (noting that public trust rights "have been held to include the
right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for boating, and general recreation purposes the navigable waters
of the state, and to use the bottom of the navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or other purposes");
In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 448 (Haw. 2000) (recognizing broad public rights in
its waters, noting that "the trust has traditionally preserved public rights of navigation, commerce, and
fishing" but also mentioning "a wide range of recreational uses, including bathing, swimming, boating,
and scenic viewing, as protected trust purposes"); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht
Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Idaho 1983) (acknowledging recreation as a public trust right); Kansas
v. Akers, 140 P. 637, 640 (Kan. 1914) (protecting "the purposes for which [submerged land] has been
used from time immemorial, viz; the common right of passage, of fishing, of the use of the waters for
domestic, agricultural, and commercial purposes"); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-301 to 23-2-322, 85-1-
111, 85-1-112, 85-16-102, 87-2-305 (2009) (codifying public rights of recreation, fishing, and
navigation); New Mexico ex rel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421, 429-32
(N.M. 1947) (recognizing public rights of recreation, sports, and fishing); J.P. Furlong Enters., Inc. v.
Sun Exploration & Prod. Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 140 (N.D. 1988) (recognizing bathing, swimming,
fishing, and irrigation as protected public interests); Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933, 935-36 (Okla. 1969)
(acknowledging that the public can have rights of boating, recreation, and fishing in waters that are not
navigable under the federal title test); Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands, 581 P.2d 520, 523 (Or. App.
1978), afJd, 590 P.2d 709 (Or. 1979) (noting that public trust rights extend to recreation); Hillebrand v.
Knapp, 274 N.W. 821, 822 (1937) (listing sailing, rowing, fishing, fowling, bathing, skating, taking
water, and cutting ice as public uses); Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 86 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Texas 1935)
(noting that public rights include hunting, fishing, navigation, "and other lawful purposes"); JJNP Co. v.
Utah, 655 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1982) (noting that public rights include "the right to float leisure craft,
hunt, fish, and participate in any lawful activity when utilizing that water"); Wilbour v. Gallagher, 462
P.2d 232, 239 & n.7 (Wash. 1969) (holding that in navigable waters, the public has rights of navigation,
"fishing, boating, swimming, water skiing, and other related recreational" rights, which probably include
boating, bathing, fishing, fowling, skating, cutting ice, water skiing, and skin diving); Day v. Armstrong,
362 P.2d 137, 145-47 (Wyo. 1961) (holding that the public can float craft down any waters so usable,
regardless of bed ownership, and can scrape bottom, disembark, and pull the craft over shoals and can
hunt or fish while floating).
139. AIuz. REV. STAT. § 37-1130(9) (LexisNexis 2009).
140. The Colorado Supreme Court has declared most streams in Colorado non-navigable.
Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P. 220, 222 (Colo. 1912), overruled on other grounds, Denver Ass'n for
Retarded Children, Inc. v. School Dist. No. 1, 535 P.2d 200 (Colo. 1975). In a non-navigable river, title
to the bed and banks belongs to the private landowner, giving the landowner exclusive control over the
water and the right to exclude recreational users who would like to use the water for floating or fishing.
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although neither Nebraska nor Nevada has yet fully developed its public trust
law in this respect.
Such expanded public rights, however, still remain focused on public uses
of waters-not on the ecological and ecosystem services values of aquatic and
other ecosystems. Indeed, with the emergence of pervasive statutory
environmental and natural resources law in the 1970s and 1980s, both federal
and state, the need for broader public trust principles to protect ecological
values seemed highly questionable. Thus, Richard Lazarus concluded in 1986
that the day of "final reckoning" for the doctrine is here, or soon will be,
and reliance upon it is no longer in order . . . . [T]he law of standing, tort
law, property law, administrative law, and the police power have all
evolved in response to increased societal concern for and awareness of
environmental and natural resources problems and are weaving a new and
unified fabric for natural resources law. Whether these developments are
viewed as totally independent of the doctrine or, alternatively, as somehow
having subsumed the doctrine's principles does not matter. The conclusion
is the same from either perspective: much of what the public trust doctrine
offered in the past is now, at best, superfluous and, at worst, distracting and
theoretically inconsistent with new notions of property and sovereignty
developing in the current reworking of natural resources law. 14 1
Nevertheless, scholars continue to assert the need for expanded public
trust doctrines. For example, in 1991, Alison Rieser summarized the drive to
broaden public trust concepts as follows:
Due largely to recent decisions of the California courts, the notion that the
public has a right to expect certain lands and natural areas to retain their
natural characteristics is finding its way into American law. Through
interpretation and expansion of the common law public trust doctrine, state
courts are identifying governmental duties to redefine existing private
property rights where such rights may threaten the ecological value of
natural areas. Courts have subjected to this special duty primarily
properties associated with navigable waters. Litigants and state agencies,
however, appear poised and willing to invoke the public trust doctrine with
respect to a number of other resources unrelated to navigation. Several
public trust commentators-including Professor Joseph Sax, the modern
doctrine's earliest and most prominent proponent-either urge or foresee a
continuing expansion in the doctrine's scope. Some predict that courts will
eventually apply public trust protections to all waterbodies, as well as to
such diverse resources as old growth forests, mountains, and wildlife. 14 2
People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1979) (upholding a criminal trespass conviction for
floating down a non-navigable river).
141. Lazarus, supra note 18, at 658.
142. Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging Doctrine in
Search of a Theory, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 393, 393-94 (1991). See generally Susan Morath Homer,
Embryo, Not Fossil: Breathing Life into the Public Trust in Wildife, 35 LAND & WATER L. REv. 23
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More recently, Mary Christina Wood has argued for comprehensively
expanded public trust concepts in American environmental and natural
resources law to address emerging environmental crises and the impacts of
climate change.143
Academic scholars' continuing revisitations of the public trust doctrine
suggest that the doctrine can provide remedies to perceived shortcomings in
environmental law and policy. Indeed, two drivers for these returns are
discernible in the literature. First, scholars often turn to the public trust doctrine
when they conclude that statutory law has not, in fact, been sufficient to protect
the full gamut of public interests in the environment.144 For example, in light of
the acknowledged weaknesses in U.S. ocean and coastal law, 145 scholars with
interests in these areas have repeatedly suggested the public trust doctrine as a
means of better protecting coastal and marine resources. 146 Similarly, the
public trust doctrine has been of interest to scholars promoting the relatively
new-and hence statutorily slighted-conception of ecosystem services,
(2000); Gary D. Meyers, Variations on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine to Include
Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENVTL. L. 723, 728-35 (1989).
143. Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the
Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a
Pardigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43, 43-45, 65-84 (2009).
144. "Under the system of environmental statutory laws enacted in the United States over the past
three decades, agencies at every jurisdictional level have gained nearly unlimited authority to manage
natural resources and allow their destruction by private interests through permit systems." Id. at 44; see
also id. at 54-61 (discussing the failed paradigm of environmental law).
145. See, e.g., U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY (2004); PEW OCEANS COMMISSION, AMERICA'S LIVING OCEANS: CHARTING A COURSE FOR
SEA CHANGE (May 2003).
146. See, e.g., Madeleine Reed, Seawalls and the Public Trust: Navigating the Tension between
Private Property and Public Beach Use in the Face ofShoreline Erosion, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV.
305 (2009); Turnipseed et al., supra note 24, at 1; F. Patrick Hubbard, The Impact of Lucas on Coastal
Development: Background Principles, The Public Trust Doctrine, and Global Warming, 16 SE. ENVTL.
L.J. 65 (2007); Hope M. Babcock, Grotius, Ocean Fish Ranching, and the Public Trust Doctrine: Ride
'Em Charlie Tuna, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2007); Kevin J. Lynch, Note, Application of the Public
Trust Doctrine to Modern Fishery Management Regimes, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 285 (2007); Ewa M.
Davison, Note, Enjoys Long Walks on the Beach: Washington's Public Trust Doctrine and the Right of
Pedestrian Passage Over Private Tidelands, 81 WASH. L. REV. 813 (2006); Kim Diana Connolly,
Bridging the Divide: Examining the Role of the Public Trust in Protecting Coastal and Wetland
Resources, 15 SE. ENvTL. L.J. 1 (2006); J.C. Sylvan, How to Protect a Coral Reef: The Public Trust
Doctrine and the Law of the Sea, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 32 (2006); Kristen M. Fletcher,
Regional Ocean Governance: The Role of the Public Trust Doctrine, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F.
187 (2006); Gail Osherenko, New Discourses on Ocean Governance: Understanding Property Rights
and the Public Trust, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 317 (2006); Monserrat Gorina-Yserri, World Ocean
Public Trust: High Seas Fisheries After Grotius-Towards a New Ocean Ethos?, 34 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REV. 645 (2004); Donna R. Christie, Marine Reserves, the Public Trust Doctrine and
Intergenerational Equity, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 427 (2004); Robin Kundis Craig, Mobil Oil
Exploration, Environmental Protection, and Contract Repudiation: It's Time to Recognize the Public
Trust in the Outer Continental Shelf 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 11,104 (2000).
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acknowledging that ecosystems provide economically valuable services to
human beings. 147
Second, and more importantly, the articulation of a "public trust"
encapsulates a more general values system for the environment and its
ecosystems-an environmental ethos, if you will-that is longer-term in focus,
more comprehensive in its considerations, and more willing to preserve purely
public values than regulatory law. Wood, for example, has recently argued that
there is a need for a fundamental paradigm shift in environmental and natural
resources law and has focused on the public trust doctrine as her model because
it is "the most compelling beacon for a fundamental and rapid paradigm shift
towards sustainability." 148 Moreover, the public trust doctrine provides one
well-grounded legal mechanism for re-balancing private and public rights in the
environment, and scholars increasingly perceive such a rebalancing to be
necessary. 149 Thus, the legal recognition of a "public trust" provides both a
rhetorically resonant articulation of the larger public interests in intact and
functional ecosystems and a means of imposing broad duties on governments to
act for the long-term preservation of ecosystems and other environmental
values-what I have termed the ecological public trust.s 0
In many ways, however, the western states have anticipated these
scholarly calls for the expansion of public trust concepts to the environment
generally. While California is widely acknowledged to have evolved its public
trust doctrine into an ecological public trust (at least when navigable waters are
affected), it is not alone. Hawai'i has, if anything, an even broader ecological
public trust doctrine than California, and other western states are more
cautiously using public trust principles to expand the legally cognizable public
values in the environment.
The emergence of these ecological public trust doctrines represents the
leading edge of public trust common law. However, the ecological public trust
doctrines are also highly individualistic, underscoring the need for scholars to
147. See, e.g., Patrick J. Connolly, Note, Saving Fish to Save the Bay: Public Trust Doctrine
Protection for Menhaden's Foundational Ecosystem Services in the Chesapeake Bay, 36 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REv. 135 (2009); J.B. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 5, at 223.
148. Wood, supra note 143, at 45.
149. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 24, at 117 (arguing that "thirty years of statutory law has produced
an imbalanced picture in which public property rights are simply not in the equation," but that "public
trust law springs from the property realm and forces an adjustment of private property rights and
expectation to protect the people's property rights in common, vital assets"); see also Christine A. Klein,
The New Nuisance: An Antidote to Wetland Loss, Sprawl, and Global Warming, 48 B.C. L. REv. 1155,
1158-67 (2007) (in the context of a nuisance law article, tracing the "supersizing" of private property
rights and the demonization of public rights, interests, and values in the environment in law, policy, and
rhetoric to argue that public and private rights have become unbalanced in American culture and law).
150. Professor Wood has called this "Nature's Trust." Wood, supra note 143, at 65-84. In the
second of her two articles on this subject, she has discussed in detail the governmental obligations to
protect natural resources that she would impose through this expanded public trust. See Wood, supra
note 24, at 93-116.
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acknowledge public trust doctrines in the plural and to actively discern and
compare the common law evolutions of those doctrines in and among particular
states.
1. California
It is no accident that Rieser tied the conception of an ecological public
trust to California. In the 1971 case of Marks v. Whitney, the California
Supreme Court announced:
There is growing public recognition that one of the most important public
uses of the tidelands-a use encompassed within the tidelands trust-is the
preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as
ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments
which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which
favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area.151
In connection with Lake Tahoe litigation, the court soon extended its
recognition of ecological values to nontidal submerged lands as well,
underscoring the human-created scarcity and fragility of these resources. It
noted that "the [fresh water] shorezone has been reduced to a fraction of its
original size in this state by the pressures of development. Such lands now
cover less than one half of 1 percent of the state .. . ."152 Moreover,
The shorezone is a fragile and complex resource. It provides the
environment necessary for the survival of numerous types of fish (including
salmon, steelhead, and striped bass), birds (such as the endangered species:
the bald eagle and the peregrine falcon), and many other species of wildlife
and plants. These areas are ideally suited for scientific study, since they
provide a gene pool for the preservation of biological diversity. In addition,
the shorezone in its natural condition is essential to the maintenance of
good water quality, and the vegetation acts as a buffer against floods and
erosion.153
Thus, the California public trust doctrine extends to "environmental . . .
purposes." 54
California courts have extended public trust concepts not just to aquatic
wildlife habitat, but also to the wildlife itself,155 creating "two distinct public
trust doctrines" in the state. 156 Wildlife "are natural resources of inestimable
151. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (citations omitted).
152. California v. Superior Court (Fogerty), 625 P.2d 256, 258-59 (Cal. 1981).
153. Id.
154. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 644 P.2d 792, 794 (Cal. 1982).
155. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 596-98 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008) (citing Golden Feather Cmty. Ass'n v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989)).
156. According to the California Supreme Court:
First is the common law doctrine, which involves the government's "affirmative duty to take
the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources ..... The
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value to the community as a whole. Their protection and preservation is a
public interest that is now recognized in numerous state and federal statutory
provisions,"l 57 and those statutes generally define the contours of the public
trust obligation regarding wildlife. 158 Members of the general public can sue to
enforce the wildlife public trust as well as the navigable water public trust,
because the public trust doctrine "places a duty upon the government to protect
those resources."1 59
Within the navigable waters trust, moreover, public trust interests can
extend California's authority and duties beyond the navigable waters. For
example, "[t]he state's right to protect fish is not limited to navigable or
otherwise public waters but extends to any waters where fish are habitated or
accustomed to resort and through which the have the freedom of passage to and
from the public fishing grounds of the state."160 Similarly, in National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court (the "Mono Lake case"),161 the California
Supreme Court determined that the public trust doctrine could restrict or
require modifications in established water rights even in non-navigable
tributaries of navigable waters. Withdrawals of water from Mono Lake's
tributaries were imperiling "both the scenic beauty and the ecological values of
Mono Lake . . . ."162 As a result, the public trust doctrine required
second is a public trust duty derived from statute, specifically Fish and Game Code section
711.7, pertaining to fish and wildlife: "The fish and wildlife resources are held in trust for the
people of the state by and through the department." There is doubtless an overlap between
the two public trust doctrines - the protection of water resources is intertwined with the
protection of wildlife. . . . Nonetheless, the duty of government agencies to protect wildlife is
primarily statutory.
Envtl. Prot. & Information Ctr. v. Cal. Dept of Forestry & Fire Prot., 187 P.3d 888, 926 (Cal. 2008)
(quoting and citing Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983)); see also Cal.
Trout, Inc. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (establishing
that Fish and Game Code § 5946 establishes a public trust rule but noting "that it does not follow from
the application of the term 'public trust' to the state's interest in fisheries of non-navigable streams that
all of the consequences of the public trust doctrine as applicable to navigable waters also apply to non-
navigable streams. For example, the beds of non-navigable streams are not owned by the state based
upon a public trust fishery interest.").
157. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 598.
158. Id. at 599-600.
159. Id. at 600-01.
160. Golden Feather Cmty. Ass', 257 Cal. Rptr. at 840; see also People v. Truckee Lumber Co.,
48 P. 374, 399-401 (Cal. 1897) (noting that "the right and power to protect and preserve [fish] for the
common use and benefit is one of the recognized prerogatives of the sovereign, coming to us from the
common law" and asserting that the state's authority to protect fish for the public is not limited to fish in
navigable waters; "[t]o the extent that waters are the common passageway for fish, although flowing
over lands entirely subject to private ownership, they are deemed for such purposes public waters, and
subject to all laws of the state regulating the right of fishery"); Cal. Trout, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 212 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989) (concluding "that a public trust interest pertains to non-navigable streams which sustain a
fishery").
161. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
162. Id. at 711.
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modifications in the prior appropriation system.163 Specifically, "the public
trust doctrine . .. protects navigable waters from harm caused by diversion of
non-navigable tributaries,"1 64 and "when the public trust doctrine clashes with
the rule of priority, the rule of priority must yield."l 65
Nevertheless, despite its reputation as the vanguard of the ecological
public trust doctrine movement, California does limit the breadth of its
doctrine. In particular, the National Audubon rule does not apply to water
withdrawals from purely non-navigable waters in the absence of an effect on
navigable waters. 166 Similarly, the California courts have declined to extend
the National Audubon doctrine to groundwater.167 Thus, despite having
recognized a second, largely statutory, wildlife public trust doctrine, California
maintains a connection between its ecological public trust doctrine and the
traditional American source of public trust rights: state ownership of the beds
and banks of navigable waters.
2. Hawai'i
Like California, Hawai'i recognizes two different public trust doctrines-
in Hawaii's case, the navigable water public trust doctrine and a unique public
trust growing out of Hawaii's complex history and Native Hawaiian rights,
known as the water resources public trust. Both have contributed to a broad
ecological public trust perspective in the state that favors public rights over
private.
The Hawai'i water resources public trust doctrine has largely superseded
the navigable waters public trust in the context of water rights and fresh waters.
The Hawai'i Supreme Court has noted that in the Kingdom of Hawai'i, the
right to water was reserved to the people for their common good in all land
grants, and ownership of the water remained at all times in the people. 168 This
sovereign reservation imposed a public trust on the water itself, similar to but
different from the navigable waters public trust doctrine.169
163. Id. at 712, 727-28.
164. Id.at721.
165. El Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 490 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006).
166. Golden Feather Cmty. Ass'n v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836, 839 (1989).
167. Santa Teresa Citizen Action Group v. City of San Jose, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868, 884 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003); Cal. Water Network v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, Civil Nos. B177978, B181463, 2006 WL
726882, at * 11 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 2006) (holding that the public trust doctrine does not apply
to groundwater or non-navigable waterways, absent some impact on navigable waters).
168. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 441 (Haw. 2000); see also Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 310-11 (Haw. 1982).
169. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 441; Robinson, 658 P.2d at 310 (noting that
this sovereign interest was more than just a police power interest; "[the nature of this ownership is thus
akin to the title held by all states in navigable waterways").
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Given the limited availability of fresh water resources in Hawai'i,
reassertion of this traditional water resources trust has been deemed critical,
both as against assertions of riparian rights and in light of the Hawai'i Water
Code and water use permits. With respect to riparian rights:
The reassertion of dormant public interests in the diversion and application
of Hawaii's waters has become essential with the increasing scarcity of the
resource and recognition of the public's interests in the utilization and flow
of these waters. . . . [W]hile there indeed exist relative usufructory rights
among landowners, these rights can no longer be treated as though they are
absolute and exclusive interests in the waters of our state.170
Instead, "underlying every private diversion and application there is, as there
always has been, a superior public interest in this natural bounty."171 Thus, the
Hawai'i Supreme Court has clearly re-balanced public and private interests in
these scarce resources in favor of the public.
With respect to the Hawai'i Water Code, "[t]he public trust in the water
resources of this state, like the navigable waters trust, has its genesis in the
common law.... The [State Water] Code does not evince any legislative intent
to abolish the common law public trust doctrine. To the contrary, . . . the
legislature appears to have engrafted the doctrine wholesale in the Code."172 As
a result, the Hawai'i Water Code "does not supplant the protections of the
public trust doctrine," and "the public trust doctrine applies to all water
resources without exception or distinction," including ground waters. 173
As in California, Hawai'i may "revisit prior diversions and allocations,
even those made with due consideration of their effect on the public trust," in
implementing its water law. 174 Moreover,
the constitutional requirements of "protection" and "conservation," the
historical and continuing understanding of the trust as a guarantee of public
rights, and the common reality of the "zero-sum" game between competing
water uses demand that any balancing between public and private purposes
begin with a presumption in favor of public use, access, and enjoyment ...
175
As a result, the state water agency's decisions in favor of private uses of water
are subject to "higher scrutiny." 76 Finally, the state agency must consider the
170. Robinson, 658 P.2d at 311.
171. Id. at 312.
172. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 443 (citations omitted).
173. Id. at 445.
174. Id. at 409, 452 (citations omitted).
175. Id. at 454.
176. Id.; see also In re Water Use Permit Applications, 93 P.3d 643, 650, 657 (Haw. 2004) (noting
that "because water is a public trust resource and the public trust is a state constitutional doctrine, this
court recognizes certain qualifications to the standard of review regarding the Water Commission's
decisions" and in effect imposes a burden on proposed users to justify their uses of water).
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cumulative impacts of diversions and "implement reasonable measures to
mitigate this impact, including the use of alternative sources."l 77
Importantly, according to the Hawai'i Supreme Court, "the maintenance
of waters in their natural state constitutes a distinct 'use' under the water
resources trust."178 Thus, this public trust doctrine encompasses ecological
protection and preservation. To underscore that point, in expounding the water
resources trust, the Hawai'i Supreme Court explicitly has followed the
California Supreme Court's decision in National Audubon Society.179
Unlike in California, however, both of Hawaii's two water-based public
trusts are incorporated into the state's much broader constitutional public trust
doctrine. 80 The Hawai'i Constitution provides that:
For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political
subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii's natural beauty and all
natural resources, including land, water, air, minerals and energy sources,
and shall promote the development and utilization of these resources in a
manner consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the self-
sufficiency of the State. All public natural resources are held in trust by the
State for the benefit of the people.181
The Hawai'i Supreme Court has indicated that these more general
constitutional public trust concepts extend to environmental and biodiversity
protection, such as regulation of the Palila, an endangered bird. 182 In 2006,
moreover, it explicitly connected the constitutionally incorporated navigable
waters public trust doctrine to environmental protection when it held that the
doctrine applies to the Hawai'i Department of Health's implementation of the
federal Clean Water Act. Thus, when environmental groups asserted that the
Department violated the public trust doctrine by failing to prevent a developer
from violating state water quality standards for coastal waters, the court
concluded that state issuance of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System permits pursuant to the Clean Water Act are subject to the public trust
doctrine and that the Department must ensure that water quality measures are
actually being implemented.' 83
3. Other States
Other states besides California and Hawai'i have incorporated public trust
principles into resource management and ecological conservation, although not
177. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 409,455 (citations omitted).
178. Id. at 448.
179. Id. at 452 (adopting the reasoning of Nat'1 Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709
(Cal. 1983)).
180. Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1009, 1002 (Haw. 2006).
181. HAW. CONST., art. X1, § 1.
182. Morimoto v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res., 113 P.3d 172, 184 (Haw. 2005).
183. Kelly, 140 P.3d at 1009, 1011.
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so extensively. For example, according to the Alaska Supreme Court, "[t]he
public trust doctrine provides that the State holds certain resources (such as
wildlife, minerals, and water rights) in trust for public use and that government
owes a fiduciary duty to maintain such resources for the common good of the
public as beneficiary." 84 Moreover, while that court has made it clear that the
navigable waters public trust doctrine per se does not extend to wildlife
management, the state does have a duty under the Alaska Constitution to
manage fish, wildlife, and water resources for the people's benefit, "to
guarantee the common citizen participation in wildlife harvest, and to divest the
[government] of exclusive entitlement to those resources."1 85 Thus, according
to the Alaska Supreme Court:
We have frequently compared the state's duties as set forth in Article VIII
to a trust-like relationship in which the state holds natural resources such as
fish, wildlife, and water in "trust" for the benefit of all Alaskans. Instead of
recognizing the creation of a public trust in these clauses per se, we have
noted that "the common use clause was intended to engraft in our
constitution certain trust principles guaranteeing access to the fish, wildlife,
and water resources of the state."1 86
Nevertheless, in general, the State of Alaska cannot be liable in damages under
the public trust doctrine for allowing the destruction of natural resources, such
as when beetles destroy trees. 187
There are also indications from the Texas courts that fish and other aquatic
life are subject to public trust principles. As far back as 1942, the Texas Civil
Court of Appeals declared:
The waters of all natural streams of this State and all fish and other aquatic
life contained in fresh water rivers, creeks, stream, and lakes or sloughs
subject to overflow from rivers or other streams within the borders of this
State, are declared to be the property of the State; and the Game, Fish and
Oyster Commission has jurisdiction over and control over such rivers and
aquatic life. The ownership is in trust for the people . . . , and pollution of
streams and water courses is condemned . . . . The Constitution of Texas,
Art. 16, § 59(a) . . . designates rivers and streams as natural resources,
184. Baxley v. Alaska, 958 P.2d 422, 434 (Alaska 1998). Nevertheless, mining is not an activity
protected by the public trust. Commercial uses protected under the Illinois Central Railroad decision are
commerce in the sense of trade, traffic or transportation of goods over navigable waters, a
meaning which does not include mining. Most importantly, a mining claim is not a "public
use," but rather an exclusive, depleting use of a non-renewable resource for public profit. We
believe that even the most expansive interpretation of the scope of public trust easements
would not include private mining enterprises.
Hayes v. A.J. Assocs., Inc., 846 P.2d 131, 133 (Alaska 1993).
185. McDowell v. Alaska, 785 P.2d 1, 16 (Alaska 1989).
186. Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1031 (Alaska 1999) (citation omitted). But see Pullen v.
Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 60 (Alaska 1996) (noting that the state has a trust responsibility to manage fish,
wildlife, and water resources, including salmon).
187. Brady v. Alaska, 965 P.2d 1, 17 (Alaska 1998).
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declares that such belong to the State, and expressly invests the Legislature
with the preservation and conservation of such resources.188
In 2005, moreover, the court indicated that the public trust doctrine allows the
state to "conserve natural resources."1 89
Washington has also flirted with applying some version of a public trust
doctrine to wildlife, especially shellfish. For example, the Washington Court of
Appeals has stated that the public trust doctrine applies to the Washington
Department of Natural Resources' regulation of shellfish, such as geoducks.190
Nevertheless, the Department's regulation of the commercial geoduck harvest
did not violate the public trust doctrine despite the public right to fish, because:
(1) the state must "balance the protection of the public's right to use resources
on public land with the protection of the resources that enable these activities";
(2) the Department had not given up its control over the state's geoduck
resources; and (3) the regulation facilitated sustainable geoduck harvesting and
natural regeneration of the resource, serving the public interest. 191 These
conclusions thus fairly clearly suggest that Washington is beginning to connect
public trust principles to sustainable development.
Similarly to Washington, North Dakota has considered the role of the
public trust doctrine with regard to more general ecological considerations but
has nevertheless continued to confine the doctrine's application to water
resources. The North Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged as early as 1976
that "[i]t is evident that the Public Trust Doctrine is assuming an expanding
role in environmental law."192 The public trust doctrine does not prohibit all
development, and hence the State Engineer can grant permits to drain wetlands,
especially when he studied the consequences, imposed permit conditions, and
was subject to a public interest requirement. 193 Nevertheless, the public trust
doctrine does limit the state's discretionary authority "to allocate vital state
resources," as enunciated in Illinois Central Railroad.194 Nor is the doctrine
restricted to conveyances of submerged lands; "[t]he State holds the navigable
waters, as well as the lands beneath them, in trust for the public," as provided in
188. Goldsmith & Powell v. Texas, 159 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
189. Cummins v. Travis County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 17, 175 S.W.2d 34, 49
(Tex. App. 2005).
190. Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass'n v. Wash. State Dept. of Natural Res., 101 P.3d 891, 895
(Wash. App. 2004). But see Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. Washington, 103 P.3d 203, 205
(Wash. App. 2004) ("No Washington case has applied the public trust doctrine to terrestrial wildlife or
resources. But we need not decide whether the public trust doctrine applies [to prohibitions on terrestrial
hunting and trapping] because, even if it does, Citizens' challenge fails." (emphasis added)).
191. Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass'n, 101 P.3d at 895, 896-97.
192. United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 463
(N.D. 1976).
193. In the Matter of the Application for Permits to Drain Related to Stone Creek Channel
Improvements and White Spur Drain, 424 N.W.2d 894, 901 (N.D. 1988) (citing United Plainsmen
Ass'n, 247 N.W.2d at 463 (quoting Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Cmwlth 1973))).
194. United Plainsmen Ass'n, 247 N.W.2d at 460.
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the North Dakota Constitution and refined by statute. 195 As a result, "protecting
the integrity of the waters of the State is a valid exercise of the [North Dakota
Water Commission's] duties," allowing it, for example, to control the drainage
of a lake. 196
More general-but also more embryonic-discussions of an ecological
public trust have also surfaced in South Dakota and Utah. The South Dakota
Supreme Court has determined that the state's Environmental Protection Act
embodies a broader public trust doctrine than the navigable waters public trust
alone would allow. 197 This Act "authoriz[es] legal action to protect 'the air,
water and other natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution,
impairment or destruction."' 1 98 Utah also appears to be extending its public
trust doctrine to ecological protection, because, according to the Utah Supreme
Court, "[t]he 'public trust' doctrine . . . protects the ecological integrity of
public lands and their public recreational uses for the benefit of the public at
large."' 99
CONCLUSION
In contrast to the many discussions over the years seeking to accurately
describe "the" public trust doctrine, this Article argues that the contemporary
power of public trust concepts lies not in tracing their historical bases but rather
in embracing their status as varying and evolving state common law. Like any
other category of state common law, such as early landlord/tenant law, tort law,
or contract law, state public trust doctrines both reflect historic concerns and
public policies-specifically, the particular public concerns regarding water in
particular locations of the United States-and provide the states with an
"ability to adapt to emerging societal needs."200 State courts on both sides of
the Hundredth Meridian have celebrated the flexible and evolutionary nature of
their public trust doctrines,201 but scholars have been reluctant to embrace the
rich mixture of approaches to balancing public and private rights in water and
other natural resources that has emerged. 202
195. Id. at 461 (also noting that "[w]e believe that § 61-01-01, NDCC, expresses the Public Trust
Doctrine.").
196. N.D. State Water Comm'n v. Bd. of Managers, 332 N.W.2d 254, 258 (N.D. 1983).
197. Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 838 (S.D. 2004).
198. Id. (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34A-10-1 (1973)).
199. Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 919 (Utah 1993).
200. Wood, supra note 143, at 78.
201. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971); Matthews v. Bay Head
Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984).
202. See, e.g., David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights, and the
Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 711, 713-20 (2008) (laying out a singular public
trust doctrine). See generally James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths-A History of the
Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1 (2007) (discussing at length the "mythical"
history of a singular American public trust doctrine).
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The western states, ranging from Hawai'i and California on one end of a
complex spectrum to Arizona and Colorado on the other, provide a particularly
instructive diversity of approaches to the recognition (or not) of public rights
in, and the public values of, water and other aspects of the environment. In
comparing the public trust doctrines of the western states, moreover, four
factors emerge as most important in the evolution of state public trust doctrines.
First, the severing of water rights from real property ownership and the riparian
rights doctrine freed these states from one set of potentially confining private
property rights. Second, subsequent state declarations of public ownership of
fresh water allow western states' public trust doctrines to operate independently
of state title to submerged lands and federal pronouncements regarding "the"
public trust doctrine. Third, perceptions of shortages of fresh water, submerged
lands, and environmental amenities have prompted increased interest,
compared to the East, in preserving the public values in these resources.
Finally, the willingness of most western states to raise water and other
environmental issues to constitutional status and/or to incorporate broad public
trust mandates into statutes has encouraged their courts to evolve water-based
public trust principles into expanding ecological public trust doctrines.
As the most recent cases demonstrate, and despite occasional limiting
interventions by states legislatures (as in Idaho), the evolution of western state
public trust doctrines is not slowing. Instead, in true common law fashion, state
courts are using state public trust doctrines to respond to particular and
emerging state needs-the loss of native species and critical need to protect
coastal waters in Hawai'i; profound conflicts between appropriators, species,
and ecological values in California; and the perhaps climate-change driven
appearance of new publicly usable water resources in South Dakota. While
such evolutions and expansions complicate the identity-indeed, the very
existence-of any unitary, national, perhaps Constitution-based public trust
doctrine, they also provide place-based balancings of public and private needs
and values in that most basic of natural resources-fresh water-that may
better serve the long-term interests of the nation as a whole.
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APPENDIX: SUMMARIES OF INDIVIDUAL STATE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES
ALASKA
Date of Statehood: 1959
Water Law System: Prior appropriation
Alaska Constitution: Alaska has constitutionalized some of the access and
use rights guaranteed by the public trust doctrine. Article VIII of the Alaska
Constitution governs natural resources, including waters and submerged lands.
Relevant provisions of this Article include:
* § 1: "It is the policy of the State to encourage the settlement of its
land and the development of its resources by making them available
for maximum use consistent with the public interest."
* § 2: "The legislature shall provide for the utilization, development,
and conservation of all natural resources belonging to the State,
including land and waters, for the maximum benefit of its people."
* § 3: "Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and
waters are reserved to the people for common use."
* § 5: "The legislature may provide for facilities, improvements, and
services to assure greater utilization, development, reclamation, and
settlement of lands, and to assure fuller utilization and development
of fisheries, wildlife, and waters."
* § 6: "Lands and interests therein, including submerged and tidal
lands, possessed or acquired by the State, and not used or intended
exclusively for governmental purposes, constitute the state public
domain. The legislature shall provide for the selection of lands
granted to the State by the United States, and for the administration
of the state public domain."
* § 8: "The legislature may provide for the leasing of, and the
issuance of permits for exploration of, any part of the public domain
or interest therein, subject to reasonable concurrent uses. Leases and
permits shall provide, among other conditions, for payment by the
party at fault for damage or injury arising from noncompliance with
terms governing concurrent use, and for forfeiture in the event of
breach of conditions."
* § 9: "Subject to the provisions of this section, the legislature may
provide for the sale or grant of state lands, or interests therein, and
establish sales procedures. All sales or grants shall contain such
reservations to the State of all resources as may be required by
Congress or the State and shall provide for access to these resources.
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Reservation of access shall not unnecessarily impair the owners'
use, prevent the control of trespass, or preclude compensation for
damages."
* § 13: "All surface and subsurface waters reserved to the people for
common use, except mineral and medicinal waters, are subject to
appropriation. Priority of appropriation shall give prior right. Except
for public water supply, an appropriation of water shall be limited to
stated purposes and subject to preferences among beneficial uses,
concurrent or otherwise, as prescribed by law, and to the general
reservation of fish and wildlife."
* § 14: "Free access to the navigable or public waters of the State, as
defined by the legislature, shall not be denied any citizen of the
United States or resident of the State, except that the legislature may
by general law regulate and limit such access for other beneficial
uses or public purposes."
* § 15: "No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be
created or authorized in the natural waters of the State. This section
does not restrict the power of the State to limit entry into any fishery
for purposes of resource conservation, to prevent economic distress
among fishermen and those dependent upon them for a livelihood
and to promote the efficient development of aquaculture in the
State."
Alaska Statutes:
* ALASKA STAT. § 38.04.062: In general, "the state owns all
submerged land underlying navigable water to which title passed to
the state at the time the state achieved statehood under the equal
footing doctrine" or under the federal Submerged Lands Act of
1953.203 The Commissioner must make a list of all waters deemed
navigable or nonnavigable by state or federal agencies or courts, but
"[w]ater not included on the lists . . . is not considered either
navigable or nonnavigable until the commissioner has made a
determination as to its navigability at the time the state achieved
statehood." 204 However, submerged lands that the state conveyed
pursuant to state statute are not governed by this section. 205
"Navigable water," for purposes of this statute, is "water that, at the
time the state achieved statehood, was used, or was susceptible of
being used, in its ordinary condition as a highway for commerce
over which trade and travel were or could have been conducted in
the customary modes of trade and travel on water; the use or
203. ALASKA STAT. § 38.04.062(a) (2009) (referencing 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1953)).
204. Id § 38.04.062(b), (c), (d).
205. Id § 38.04.062(f).
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potential use does not need to have been without difficulty,
extensive, or long and continuous ... 206
* ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.126: This statute recognizes the public trust
doctrine in Alaska, declaring that: (a) "[t]he people of the state have
a constitutional right to free access to and use of the navigable or
public water of the state"; (b) "that state holds and controls all
navigable or public water in trust for the use of the people of the
state"; (c) "[o]wnership of land bordering navigable or public water
does not grant an exclusive right to the use of the water and a right
of title to the land below the ordinary high water mark is subject to
the rights of the people of the state to use and have access to the
water for recreational purposes or other public purposes for which
the water is used or capable of being used consistent with the public
trust"; and (d) nothing in this statute "affect[s] or abridge[s] valid
existing rights or create a right or privilege of the public to cross or
enter private land."
* ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.127: Before the state can sell, lease, grant, or
otherwise dispose of lands adjacent to water, the Commissioner
must determine whether the water is a navigable water, a public
water, or neither. If the water is navigable or public, the state must
"provide for the specific easements or rights-of-way necessary to
ensure free access to and along the body of water, unless the
commissioner finds that regulation or limiting access is necessary
for other beneficial uses or public purposes."
* ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.128: No person may obstruct a navigable
water or interfere with others' use of that water unless authorized by
state or federal law. "An unauthorized obstruction or interference is
a public nuisance and is subject to abatement." Moreover, "[fjree
passage or use of any navigable water includes the right to use land
below the ordinary high water mark to the extent reasonably
necessary to use the navigable water consistent with the public
trust," and "[f]ree passage or use of any navigable water includes
the right to enter adjacent land above the ordinary high water mark
as necessary to portage around obstacles or obstructions to travel on
the water .... "
* ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.825: "Unless the commissioner finds that the
public interest in retaining state ownership of the land clearly
outweighs the municipality's interest in obtaining the land, the
commissioner shall convey to a municipality tide or submerged land
requested by the municipality that is occupied or suitable for
occupation and development," so long as the land is within or
contiguous to the municipality and "use of the land would not
unreasonably interfere with navigation or public access."
206. Id. § 38.0 4 .062(g).
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* ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.965: This statute defines "navigable water"
for purposes other than state title and also distinguishes "navigable
water" and "public water." "Navigable water" is "any water of the
state forming a river, stream, lake, pond, slough, creek, bay, sound,
estuary, inlet, strait, passage, canal, sea or ocean, or any other body
of water or waterway within the territorial limits of the state or
subject to its jurisdiction, that is navigable in fact for any useful
public purpose, including but not limited to water suitable for
commercial navigation, floating of logs, landing and takeoff of
aircraft, and public boating, trapping, hunting waterfowl and aquatic
animals, fishing, or other public recreational purposes . . . ."207
"Public water" is "navigable water and all other water, whether
inland or coastal, fresh or salt, that is reasonably suitable for public
use and utility, habitat for fish and wildlife in which there is a public
interest, or migration and spawning of fish in which there is a public
interest . . . ."208 The statue also includes other definitions of
relevance to the state public trust: "shoreland" is "land belonging to
the state which is covered by nontidal water that is navigable under
the laws of the United States up to ordinary high water mark";
"submerged land" is "land covered by tidal water between the line
of mean low water and seaward to a distance of three geographical
miles or further as may hereafter be properly claimed by the state";
and "tideland" is "land that is periodically covered by tidal water
between the elevation of mean high water and mean low water ...
"209
* ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.15.010-46.15.270: Alaska Water Use Act.
"Wherever occurring in a natural state, the water is reserved to the
people for common use and is subject to appropriation and
beneficial use and to reservation of instream flows and levels of
water, as provided in this chapter."2 10 Reservations are allowed for
fish. 2 11 Appropriations are subject to a public interest review, which
includes "the effect on fish and game resources and on public
recreational opportunities" and "the effect upon access to navigable
or public water."2 12 Moreover, the Act allows reservations of water
or instream flows to "protect . .. fish and wildlife habitat, migration,
and propagation," for "recreation and park purposes," for
"navigation and transportation purposes," and for "sanitary and
water quality purposes." 2 13
207. Id. § 38.05.965(13).
208. Id. § 38.05.965(18).
209. Id. § 38.05.965(20), (22), (23).
210. Id § 46.15.030.
211. Id. § 46.15.035(c).
212. Id. § 46.15.080(b)(3), (8).
213. Id. § 46.15.145(a).
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Definition of "Navigable Waters":
By statute, Alaska has adopted the federal title definition of "navigable
water" to identify the waters for which the state owns the bed and banks. Thus,
"navigable water" for state title purposes is
water that, at the time the state achieved statehood, was used, or was
susceptible of being used, in its ordinary condition as a highway for
commerce over which trade and travel were or could have been conducted
in the customary modes of trade and travel on water; the use or potential
use does not need to have been without difficulty, extensive, or long and
continuous ... 214
For other purposes, including public rights in waters, a "navigable water" is
any water of the state forming a river, stream, lake, pond, slough, creek,
bay, sound, estuary, inlet, strait, passage, canal, sea or ocean, or any other
body of water or waterway within the territorial limits of the state or
subject to its jurisdiction, that is navigable in fact for any useful public
purpose, including but not limited to water suitable for commercial
navigation, floating of logs, landing and takeoff of aircraft, and public
boating, trapping, hunting waterfowl and aquatic animals, fishing, or other
public recreational purposes ... .215
In addition, the public has rights in "public waters," which by statute include
not only navigable waters but also "all other water, whether inland or coastal,
fresh or salt, that is reasonably suitable for public use and utility, habitat for
fish and wildlife in which there is a public interest, or migration and spawning
of fish in which there is a public interest.. . ."216
Because of federal reservations, however, Alaska did not acquire title to
the submerged lands within the boundary of the National Petroleum Reserve or
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.2 17 Nor does Alaska hold title to the lower
inlet of Cook Inlet.2 18
Rights in "Navigable Waters":
In general, the state owns the beds of the navigable waters "up to the
ordinary high-water mark."2 19 However, the public has rights of access and use
214. Id § 38.04.062(g).
215. Id. § 38.05.965(13).
216. Id. § 38.05.965(18).
217. United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 36-46 (1996).
218. United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 200-04 (1975).
219. Alaska Dep't of Natural Res. v. Pankratz, 538 P.2d 984, 988 (Alaska 1975); see also Pankratz
v. Alaska Dep't of Highways, 652 P.2d 68, 73 (Alaska 1982) (noting that "it is clear that a state has title
to land underlying navigable waters up to the mean high water mark").
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to both state-defined navigable and public waters, even if the landowner owns
below the high-water mark. 220
In its case law regarding public uses, Alaska remains closely aligned with
the principles set forth in Illinois Central Railroad. For example, tidelands "are
subject to the public's right to use tidelands for navigation, commerce, and
fishing." 221 However, by statute, Alaska deems state "navigable waters" to
include waters that are usable for "floating of logs, landing and takeoff of
aircraft, and public boating, trapping, hunting waterfowl and aquatic animals,
fishing, or other public recreational purposes," 222 suggesting that these uses are
also protected under the state public trust doctrine. No person may obstruct a
navigable water or interfere with others' use of that water unless authorized by
state or federal law,223 and "[a]n unauthorized obstruction or interference is a
public nuisance and is subject to abatement."224 Moreover, "[fjree passage or
use of any navigable water includes the right to use land below the ordinary
high water mark to the extent reasonably necessary to use the navigable water
consistent with the public trust," and "[fjree passage or use of any navigable
water includes the right to enter adjacent land above the ordinary high water
mark as necessary to portage around obstacles or obstructions to travel on the
water . . . ."225
Also in line with Illinois Central Railroad, conveyances of tidelands to
private owners generally convey only "naked title," and the tidelands remain
subject to the public trust unless the conveyance meets the Illinois Central
Railroad criteria-"first, whether the conveyance was made in furtherance of
some specific public trust purpose and, second, whether the conveyance can be
made without substantial impairment of the public's interest in state
tidelands."226 No such intent is present in § 38.05.820 of the Alaska statutes,
especially in light of Article VIII, § 3 of the Alaska Constitution, so those
conveyed tidelands remain subject to the public trust.227 Moreover, even
conveyances of tidelands to municipalities pursuant to § 38.05.825 remain
subject to the public trust; "[t]he conveyance transfer to the municipality the
state's right to use and manage the tidelands, but does not confer the right to
sell of dispose of the lands or exempt them from the public trust doctrine." 228
In terms of resource protection, "[tjhe public trust doctrine provides that
the State holds certain resources (such as wildlife, minerals, and water rights) in
trust for public use and that government owes a fiduciary duty to maintain such
220. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.126.
221. City of St. Paul v. Alaska Dep't of Natural Res., 137 P.3d 261, 263 n.8 (Alaska 2006).
222. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.965(13).
223. Id. § 38.05.128.
224. Id
225. Id
226. CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d I115, 1118-19 (Alaska 1988).
227. City of St. Paul v. Alaska Dep't of Natural Res., 137 P.3d 261 (Alaska 2006).
228. Id
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resources for the common good of the public as beneficiary." 229 Nevertheless,
mining is not an activity protected by the public trust. Commercial uses
protected under the Illinois Central Railroad decision are
commerce in the sense of trade, traffic or transportation of goods over
navigable waters, a meaning which does not include mining. Most
importantly, a mining claim is not a 'public use,' but rather an exclusive,
depleting use of a non-renewable resource for public profit. We believe that
even the most expansive interpretation of the scope of public trust
easements would not include private mining enterprises. 2 30
The public trust doctrine per se does not extend to wildlife management,
although the state does have a duty under Article VIII, § 3 of the Alaska
Constitution to manage fish, wildlife, and water resources for the people's
benefit, "to guarantee the common citizen participation in wildlife harvest, and
to divest the [government] of exclusive entitlement to those resources." 23 1
According to the Alaska Supreme Court:
We have frequently compared the state's duties as set forth in Article VIII
to a trust-like relationship in which the state holds natural resources such as
fish, wildlife, and water in "trust" for the benefit of all Alaskans. Instead of
recognizing the creation of a public trust in these clauses per se, we have
noted that "the common use clause was intended to engraft in our
constitution certain trust principles guaranteeing access to the fish, wildlife,
and water resources of the state." 232
Access rights are equal for both personal and professional fishing.2 33 However,
in general, the state cannot be liable in damages under the public trust doctrine
for allowing the destruction of natural resources, such as when beetles
destroyed trees.2 34
ARIZONA
Date of Statehood: 1912
Water Law System: Prior appropriation
Arizona Constitution: Article XVII of the Arizona Constitution governs water
rights. Relevant provisions include:
229. Baxley v. Alaska, 958 P.2d 422, 434 (Alaska 1998).
230. Hayes v. A.J. Assocs., Inc., 846 P.2d 131, 133 (Alaska 1993).
231. McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 16 (Alaska 1989).
232. Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1031 (Alaska 1999) (citation omitted). But see Pullen v.
Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 60 (Alaska 1996) (noting that the state has a trust responsibility to manage fish,
wildlife, and water resources, including salmon).
233. Owsichek v. Alaska Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 497 (Alaska 1988).
234. Brady v. State, 965 P.2d 1, 17 (Alaska 1998).
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* 1: "The common law doctrine of riparian water rights shall not
obtain or be of any force or effect in the State."
* 2: "All existing rights to the use of any of the waters in the State
for all useful or beneficial purposes are hereby recognized and
confirmed."
Arizona Statutes:
* ARIZ. REv. STAT. §§ 37-1130 to 37-1156: State Claims to
Streambeds. These provisions establish the Arizona Navigable
Stream Adjudication Commission, which acts as an advocate for the
public trust.2 35 The Commission issues a determination of
navigability after a public hearing and issues a report on the public
trust values of any navigable stream or watercourse. 236 its
determinations are subject to judicial review. 237 A determination of
non-navigability relinquishes the state's claims to the bed and
banks.23 8 The state can appropriate water "to maintain and protect
public trust values," but only by complying with the normal
requirements for an appropriation. 239 The statute also provides for
refunds of taxes and purchase prices, and compensation for
improvements to landowners who "lose" title to the beds of waters
determined to be navigable. 240 Finally, the statutes provide a
petition process to release public trust status.24 1 In these provisions,
"navigable watercourse" "means a watercourse that was in existence
on February 14, 1912, and at that time was used or was susceptible
to being used, in its ordinary and natural condition, as a highway for
commerce, over which trade and travel were or could have been
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water."242
The state generally owns the beds and banks of navigable
watercourses to the ordinary high watermark.243 "Public trust land"
is "the portion of the bed of a watercourse that is located in this state
and that is determined to have been a navigable watercourse as of
February 14, 1912. Public trust land does not include land held by
this state pursuant to any other trust." 244 "Public trust purposes" and
"public trust values" are "commerce, navigation, and fishing."245
235. Aluz. REv. STAT. § 37-1121 (LexisNexis 2009).
236. Id. § 37-1128.
237. Id. § 37-1129.
238. Id. § 37-1130.
239. Id.
240. Id § 37-1132.
241. Id. § 37-1151.
242. Id. § 37-1101(5).
243. Id § 37-1101(6).
244. Id. § 37-1101(8).
245. Id. § 37-1101(9).
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"Watercourse" does not include man-made water conveyance
systems. 24 6
* ARIz. REv. STAT. §§ 45-101 to 45-343: Department of Water
Resources and Appropriation. "The waters of all sources, flowing in
streams, canyons, ravines, or other natural channels, or in definite
underground channels, whether perennial or intermittent, flood,
waste or surplus water, and of lakes, ponds and springs on the
surface, belong to the public and are subject to appropriation and
beneficial use as provided in this chapter."247 Arizona's water law
creates a hierarchy of the relative value of uses of water: (1)
domestic and municipal; (2) irrigation and stock watering; (3) power
and mining; (4) recreation and wildlife, including fish; and (5)
nonrecoverable water storage. 24 8 In the 1995 laws discussing these
provisions, "the legislature declares that it does not intend to create
an implication that the public trust doctrine applies to water rights in
this state." 249
Definition of "Navigable Waters":
By statute, Arizona limits "navigable waters"-and its public trust
doctrine-to those waters subject to the federal equal footing doctrine. As such,
a navigable watercourse for purposes of both state title and the application of
the public trust doctrine is
a watercourse that was in existence on February 14, 1912, and at that time
was used or was susceptible to being used, in its ordinary and natural
condition, as a highway for commerce, over which trade and travel were or
could have been conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on
water.250
"Public trust lands" are limited to the beds of these navigable watercourses. 251
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that the
Colorado River in Arizona is navigable, and that Arizona owns the beds and
banks of that river.252
246. Id. § 37-1 101(l 1).
247. Id. § 45-141(A).
248. Id. § 45-157(B).
249. 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 9, § 25(B).
250. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 37-1101(5).
251. Id. § 37-1101(8).
252. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 319 (1973) (noting that Arizona holds title to the
bed of the Colorado River), overruled on other grounds, Or. ex rel. State Lands Bd. v. Corvallis Sand &
Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 370-72 (1977); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 452-54 (1931) (holding
that the Colorado River below Black Canyon is navigable).
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Rights in "Navigable Waters":
The state's title to the beds and banks of navigable waters, like the
Colorado River, extends up to the ordinary high water mark.253 This line is
defined by soil and vegetation, 254 but is not "the line reached by the water in
unusual floods." 255
By statute, Arizona limits "public trust purposes" and "public trust values"
to the three uses recognized in Illinois Central Railroad: commerce, navigation,
and fishing.256 Moreover, while the state can appropriate water to promote
these uses, it must follow the normal appropriation requirements and does not
receive any preference in priority. 257 However, the Arizona Court of Appeals
recently emphasized in connection with the Central Arizona Water
Conservation District that landowners take their properties subject to existing
and initiated water rights,258 suggesting that the public trust doctrine can
insulate the state from regulatory takings claims.
Like many western states, Arizona manages groundwater under a different
regulatory regime-the Groundwater Management Act of 1980-than it
manages surface water rights. The Arizona courts have determined that the
state public trust doctrine does not apply to the Groundwater Management
Act.259 As a result, the public trust doctrine cannot influence the establishment
of rights to pump groundwater in Arizona.
Since 1987, Arizona's legislature has engaged in numerous efforts to
restrict the public trust doctrine's application in the state, only to be thwarted
repeatedly by the Arizona courts. The controversy began in 1985, when
Arizona officials began asserting state ownership rights in the beds of the
state's navigable waters based on the federal equal footing doctrine; until that
time, the Colorado River had been the state's only equal footing/public trust
claim.260 In 1987, the legislature responded with H.B. 2017, which attempted
to relinquish most of Arizona's title claims through an "uncompensated
quitclaim of the state's equal footing interest in all watercourses other than the
Colorado, Gila, Salt, and Verde Rivers and in all lands formerly within those
253. State v. Bonelli Cattle Co., 495 P.2d 1312, 1313 (Ariz. 1972).
254. Id. at 1314.
255. Id. at 1315.
256. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 37-1101(9).
257. Id. § 37-1130.
258. S. W. Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Cent. Arizona Water Conservation Dist., 212 P.3d 1, 4 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2008); W. Maricopa Combine, Inc. v. Arizona Dep't of Water Res., 26 P.3d 1171, 1180 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2001).
259. Seven Springs Ranch, Inc. v. State ex rel. Arizona Dep't of Water Res., 753 P.2d 161, 165-66
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
260. For additional information about the controversy, see Tracey Dickman Zobenica, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Arizona's Streambeds, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1053, 1059-78 (1996).
102 [Vol. 37:53
WESTERN STATES' PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES
rivers but outside their current beds." 261 The Arizona Court of Appeals held
many of the relevant provisions unconstitutional. 262 It declared that every
future land patent includes the equal footing interest, that the standard of
navigability is federal, and that navigability is established as of the date of
statehood.263 Relying on Illinois Central Railroad, moreover, the Court of
Appeals declared that "the state's responsibility to administer its watercourse
lands for the public benefit is an inabrogable attribute of statehood itself," and
"the state must administer its interest in lands subject to the public trust
consistently with trust purposes." 264
In 1995, the legislature amended Arizona's water law to include a
provision stating:
The public trust is not an element of a water right in an adjudication
proceeding held pursuant to this article. In adjudicating attributes of water
rights pursuant to this article, the court shall not make a determination as to
whether public trust values are associated with any or all of the river
system or resource. 265
The Arizona Supreme Court found these provisions unconstitutional. 266
Finally, in 1998, after fact-finding by the Arizona Navigable Stream
Adjudication Commission pursuant to 1994 amendments to Arizona's water
law, the Arizona legislature enacted S.B. 1126. This statute "disclaim[ed] the
state's 'right, title, or interest based on navigability and the equal footing
doctrine' to the bed lands of the Agua Fria, New, Hassayampa, and Lower Salt
Rivers, as well as Skunk Creek" and Verde River, based on an overly
constricted definition of "navigable." 267 The Arizona Court of Appeals found
that S.B. 1126 violated both the gift clause in Arizona's Constitution and the
public trust doctrine. 268 Moreover, with respect to the public trust, the court
held that the legislature had to apply the navigability test from The Daniel
Ball,269 to determine what qualified as a "navigable water," and that the
legislature had constructed a much more constrained test for navigability than
the Daniel Ball standard. 270 Because federal law under the equal footing
doctrine presumes that the state has title to beds and banks of navigable waters,
federal law preempted S.B. 1126.271
261. Arizona Ctr. for Law in the Public Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 162 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1991).
262. Id. at 173.
263. Id. at 163-65.
264. Id. at 168.
265. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 45-263(B) (LexisNexis 2009).
266. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179, 199
(Ariz. 1999).
267. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 727 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
268. Id. at 729.
269. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
270. Id. at 730-37.
271. Id. at 737.
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This litigation made clear that the Arizona courts view the public trust
doctrine as a federal constitutional issue because the equal footing doctrine is
grounded in the U.S. Constitution 272:
The public trust doctrine is a constitutional limitation on legislative power
to give away resources held by the state in trust for its people. The
Legislature cannot order the courts to make the doctrine inapplicable to
these or any other proceedings. . .. It is for the courts to decide whether the
public trust doctrine is applicable to the facts. The Legislature cannot by
legislation destroy the constitutional limits on its authority. 273
As such, the state has a duty to assert its ownership interest in navigable or
potentially navigable waters, and the courts will remand cases where the state
has not done so.274 For example, estoppel may not be asserted to defeat the
public interest in navigable waters.275
CALIFORNIA
Date of Statehood: 1850
Water Law System: California Doctrine-mostly prior appropriation, but
with recognition of some riparian rights
California Constitution: Several provisions of the California Constitution
embody or are otherwise relevant to the state's public trust doctrine. Article X,
for example, governs water, Article XA governs water resources development,
and Article XB contains the Marine Resources Protection Act of 1990.
Especially relevant provisions of these and other articles include:
* Art. I, § 25: "The people shall have the right to fish upon and from
the public lands of the State and in the waters thereof, excepting
upon lands set aside for fish hatcheries, and no land owned by the
State shall ever be sold or transferred without reserving in the
people the absolute right to fish thereupon; and no law shall ever be
passed making it a crime for the people to enter upon the public
lands within this State for the purpose of fishing in any water
containing fish that have been planted therein by the State;
provided, that the Legislature may by statute, provide for the season
when and the conditions under which the different species of fish
may be taken."
* Art. X, § 1: "The right of eminent domain is hereby declared to exist
in the State to all frontages on the navigable waters of this State."
272. See Arizona Ctr. for Law in the Public Interest, 837 P.2d 158, 161-62 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
273. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179, 199
(Ariz. 1999) (citing Arizona Ctr.for Law in the Public Interest, 837 P.2d at 166-68).
274. Calmat of Ariz. v. State ex rel. Miller, 836 P.2d 1010, 1020-21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
275. Id. at 1021.
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* Art. X, § 2: "It is hereby declared that because of the conditions
prevailing in this State the general welfare requires that the water
resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of
which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable use or
unreasonable method of use of water be prevented, and that the
conservation of such waters is to be exercised with a view to the
reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people
and for the public welfare. The right to water or to the use or flow of
water in or from any natural stream or water course in this State is
and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for
the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall not
extend to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of
use or unreasonable method of diversion of water. Riparian rights in
a stream or water course attach to, but to no more than so much of
the flow thereof as may be required or used consistently with this
section, for the purposes for which such lands are, or may be made
adaptable, in view of such reasonable and beneficial uses; provided,
however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed as
depriving any riparian owner of the reasonable use of water of the
stream to which the owner's land is riparian under reasonable
methods of diversion and use, or as depriving any appropriator of
water to which the appropriator is lawfully entitled."
* Art. X, § 3: "All tidelands within two miles of any incorporated city,
city and county, or town in this State, and fronting on the water of
any harbor, estuary, bay, or inlet used for the purposes of
navigation, shall be withheld from grant or sale to private persons,
partnerships, or corporations; provided, however, that any such
tidelands, reserved to the State solely for street purposes, which the
Legislature finds and declares are not used for navigation purposes
and are not necessary for such purposes may be sold to any town,
city, county, city and county, municipal corporations, private
persons, partnerships or corporations subject to such conditions as
the Legislature determines are necessary to be imposed in
connection with any such sales in order to protect the public
interest."
* Art. X, § 4: "No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or
possessing the frontage or tide lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary,
or other navigable water in this State, shall be permitted to exclude
the right of way to such water whenever it is required for any public
purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct the free navigation of such water;
and the Legislature shall enact such laws as will give the most
liberal construction of this provisions, so that access to the




* Art. X., § 5: "The use of all water now appropriated, or that may
hereafter be appropriated, for sale, rental, or distribution, is hereby
declared to be a public use, and subject to the regulation and control
of the State, in the manner to be prescribed by law."
* Art. XA, § 3: "No water shall be available for appropriation by
storage in, or by direct diversion from, any of the components of the
California Wild and Scenic River System, as such system exists on
January 1, 1981, where such appropriation is for export of water
into another major hydrologic basin of the state, . . . unless such
export is expressly authorized prior to such appropriation be: (a) an
initiative statute approved by the electors, or (b) the Legislature, by
statute passed in each house by roll call vote entered in the journal,
two-thirds of the membership concurring."
* Art. XB, § 14: "Prior to January 1, 1994, the Fish and Game
Commission shall establish four new ecological reserves in ocean
waters along the mainland coast. Each ecological reserve shall have
a surface area of at least two square miles. The commission shall
restrict the use of these ecological reserves to scientific research
relating to the management and enhancement of marine reserves."
* Art. XB, § 15: "This article does not preempt or supersede any other
closures to protect any other wildlife, including sea otters, whales,
and shorebirds."
California Statutes:
* CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 6301 to 6369.3: Administration and
Control of Swamp, Overflowed, Tide, or Submerged Lands, and
Structures Thereon. These provisions give "exclusive jurisdiction
over all ungranted tidelands and submerged lands owned by the
State" to the State Lands Commission.276 Any exchanges of lands
that are subject to the public trust doctrine must ensure that the lands
acquired "will provide a significant benefit to the public trust" and
that "the exchange does not substantially interfere with public rights
of navigation and fishing." 277
* CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1200 to 1248: Appropriation. "All water
flowing in any natural channel, excepting so far as it has been or is
being applied to useful and beneficial purposes upon, or in so far as
it is or may be reasonably needed for useful and beneficial purposes
upon lands riparian thereto, or otherwise appropriated, is hereby
declared to be public water of the State and subject to appropriation
in accordance with the provisions of this code." 278 These provisions
276. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 6301 (2009).
277. Id. § 6307.
278. CAL. WATER CODE § 1201 (2009).
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allow for protections of flows to "protected areas," 2 79 and establish
that "[t]he use of water for recreation and preservation and
enhancement of fish and wildlife resources is a beneficial use of
water." 280
* CAL. Gov'T CODE § 39933: "All navigable waters situated within or
adjacent to a city shall remain open to the free and unobstructed
navigation of the public. Such waters and the water front of such
waters shall remain open to free and unobstructed access by the
people from the public streets and highways within the city."
* CAL. Gov'T CODE § 56740: "No tidelands or submerged lands...
which are owned by the State or by its grantees in trust shall be
incorporated into, or annexed to, a city, except lands which may be
approved by the State Lands Commission." For purposes of this
provision, "'submerged lands' . . . includes, but is not limited to,
lands underlying navigable waters which are in sovereign ownership
of the State whether or not those waters are subject to tidal
influence."
* CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66478.1 to 66478.14: Public Access to Public
Resources. These public access provisions apply to navigable
waters. 28 1 "The Legislature further finds and declares that it is
essential to the health and well-being of all citizens of this state that
public access to public natural resources be increased. It is the intent
of the Legislature to increase public access to public natural
resources."
2 8 2
* CAL. HARB. & NAV. CODE § 36: "'Navigable waters' means waters
which come under this jurisdiction of the United States Army Corps
of Engineers and any other waters with the state with the exception
of those privately owned."
* CAL. HARB. & NAV. CODE §§ 90 to 153: Navigable Waters.
"Navigable waters and all streams of sufficient capacity to transport
the products of this country are public ways for purposes of
navigation and such transportation." 2 83 However, navigable waters
do not include floodwaters. 284 These provisions also expressly list
several watercourses as navigable waters and public ways,2 85 and
they define California's coastline. 286
279. Id. §§ 1215-1216.
280. Id. § 1243.
281. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66478.1 (2009).
282. Id. § 66478.3.
283. CAL. HARB. & NAV. CODE § 100 (2009).
284. Id.
285. Id. §§ 101-106.
286. Id. § 107.
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* CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 117510: "'Navigable waters'
means all public waters of the state in any river, stream, lake,
reservoir, or other body of water, including all salt water bays,
inlets, and estuaries within the jurisdiction of the state."
Definition of "Navigable Waters":
The California courts recognize the differences between various
definitions of "navigable waters." For example, in 1976 the California Court of
Appeals acknowledged that there were two relevant federal definitions of
navigability: the Commerce Clause definition and the state title definition.
Further, the state title test from Utah v. United States determines the waters for
which California holds title to the bed and banks as a result of its admission to
the Union.287 However, the court also recognized that for non-federal matters,
the states are free to use different definitions of "navigable waters" to
determine rights.288
Under these rules, "[w]aters which are subject to tidal influence are
subject to the public trust regardless of whether they are navigable." 289
Although the boundary between public and private ownership in littoral waters
is the low-water mark,290 in tidal waters, the "lands between the mean high tide
and mean low tide are owned by the public." 291 "Tidelands" can cover both
true tidelands and submerged lands more generally.292
In addition, California has explicitly rejected arguments based on
traditional English common law that state ownership of submerged lands is
limited to tidal waters. 293 Instead, the California Supreme Court has
emphasized that lands beneath nontidal navigable waters "constitute a resource
which is fast disappearing in California; they are of great importance for the
ecology, and for the recreational needs of the residents of the state." 294
Upon its admission to the Union, California received title to the beds and
banks of federally defined navigable waters "to the high-water mark." 295
Nevertheless, an 1872 statute conveyed title to properties bordering these lands
to the low-water mark.296 Even so, the public trust doctrine applies to the lands
287. Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park Dist., 127 Cal. Rptr. 830, 834 (Cal. Ct. App.
1976).
288. Id at 835.
289. Golden Feather Cnty. Ass'n v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836, 841 n.3 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989).
290. County of Lake v. Smith, 278 Cal. Rptr. 809, 819-20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
291. California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 625 P.2d 239, 241 (Cal. 1981).
292. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 363 n.l (Cal. 1980).
293. California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 625 P.2d at 242-45.
294. Id at 242.
295. Id. at 246.
296. Id. at 245, 248; Bess v. County of Humboldt, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 401-02 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992).
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between the low- and high-water marks, although the landowner "may utilize
them in any manner not incompatible with the public's interest in the
property." 297
For purposes of state-law public trust rights, a stream that can only float
logs is not navigable. 298 Landowners can obstruct non-navigable waters at
will.299
Nevertheless, "all waters are deemed navigable which are really so."300
"A waterway usable only for pleasure boating is nevertheless a navigable
waterway and protected by the public trust."301 Moreover, "[t]here is no
authority, or at least none cited to use, for the proposition a river must be
designated 'non-navigable' because it may be navigated only seasonally." 302
The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the Sacramento River in
California is navigable and that private landowners along that river received
title only to the high water mark.303 In addition, and supported by the fact that
California legislatively deemed the Klamath River in California non-navigable,
the Supreme Court held that title to the Klamath River's beds in California
remained with the United States and became part of the Hoopa Valley
Reservation. 30
Rights in "Navigable Waters":
Article X of the California Constitution constitutionalizes the public trust
doctrine in California. 305 California acquired title to the navigable waterways
and tidelands by virtue of her sovereignty when admitted to the Union in
1850.306 The traditional uses that the trust protects are navigation, commerce,
297. California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 625 P.2d at 252; Golden Feather Community Ass'n v.
Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal Rptr. 836, 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
298. People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 97 Cal. Rptr. 488, 450 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (citing American
River Water Co. v. Amsden, 6 Cal. 443, 443-46 (1856)).
299. Id.
300. Churchill Co. v. Kingsbury, 174 P. 329, 330-31 (Cal. 1918).
301. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 720 n. 17 (Cal. 1983) (citing People ex
rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 157 Cal. Rptr. 815 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Baker, 97 Cal. Rptr. at
448); see also Golden Feather, 257 Cal. Rptr. 836, 839 n.2; People v. Weaver, 197 Cal. Rptr. 521, 524
n.2 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1983); Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park Dist., 127 Cal.
Rptr. 830, 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Baker, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 450 (all asserting the same
pleasure/recreational boating test).
302. Bess v. County of Humboldt, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 402 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); accord
Hitchings, 127 Cal Rptr. at 837.
303. Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 666-68, 672-73 (1891).
304. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 260-64 (1913).
305. See, e.g., Younger, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 835 (holding that public access to the South Fork of the
American River for whitewater rafting is protected by the California Constitution).
306. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 379 n.5 (Cal. 1971) (citing Borax Consolidated Ltd. v. Los
Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15-16 (1935)).
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and fishing.307 More expansively, public trust rights "have been held to include
the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for boating, and general recreation
purposes the navigable waters of the state, and to use the bottom of the
navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or other purposes." 308 Importantly,
the California Supreme Court considers the public trust doctrine to be adaptable
and evolving, noting that "[t]he objective of the public trust has evolved in
tandem with the changing public perception of the values and uses of
waterways." 309
"The power of the state to control, regulate and utilize its navigable
waterways and the lands lying beneath them, when acting within the terms of
the trust, is absolute, except as limited by the paramount supervisory power of
the federal government over navigable waters."310 Specifically, "[p]reservation
of the public trust in the shorezone will allow the state flexibility in
determining the appropriate use of such land so that, for example, areas which
are endangered by overuse can be closed to certain activities," because "[t]he
exercise of the police power has proved insufficient to protect the
shorezone." 311 No estoppel is available against the government with respect to
public trust interests, 312 and exercise of the public trust doctrine is not an
unconstitutional taking of private property.313 However, "the public trust
doctrine as codified in the California Constitution does not prevent the state
from preferring one trust use over another" in particular situations.314
Moreover, the state can delegate its regulatory authority over particular public
trust lands to state agencies and municipalities. 315
In early parts of California's history, the state extensively conveyed public
trust lands to private individuals for a variety of purposes. For example, about
one-quarter of the original San Francisco Bay was conveyed into private
ownership and filled for development. As a result, California recognizes
different public trust rights in different public trust lands. Nevertheless, the
public generally retains its public trust rights even when the state has conveyed
tidelands and lands under navigable waters to private owners, unless the state
307. Id.
308. Id. at 380 (citations omitted); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 365 (Cal.
1980); Grafv. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 7 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1228-29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
309. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983) (citing Marks, 491
P.2d at 374); see also Personal Watercraft Coal. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 425, 437 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002) (repeating that the doctrine is "sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs"
(citations omitted)).
310. Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 (citations omitted); Graf 7 Cal. App. 4th at 1228-29, 1231-32.
311. California v. Superior Court (Fogerty), 625 P.2d 256, 260 (Cal. 1981).
312. Id. at 258-59.
313. Nat' Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 723.
314. Carstens v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 227 Cal. Rptr. 346, 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
315. Graf 7 Cal. App. 4th at 1231-32.
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conveyed the lands in furtherance of navigation or commerce.3 16 Thus, the
public trust applies to the "lands between high and low water in nontidal
navigable lakes," even if that land in is private ownership. 317 Especially since
the public trust amendments to the California Constitution in 1879, public trust
lands "may be conveyed to private persons only to promote trust uses," 318 and
statutes purporting to abandon the public trust are to be strictly construed;
the intent to abandon must be clearly expressed or necessarily implied; and
if any interpretation of the statute is reasonably possible which would retain
the public's interest in the tidelands, the court must give the statute such an
interpretation. 319
When trust lands have been conveyed to private individuals, "the interests
of the public are paramount in property that is still physically adaptable for
trust uses, whereas the interests of the grantees and their successors should
prevail insofar as the tidelands have been rendered substantially valueless for
those purposes." 320 However,
there is no legal obligation on the part of a landowner subject to the public
trust doctrine to inspect or warn of natural hazards in navigable waters
subject to recreational use abutting the property, or to make such water safe
for recreational uses by trespassers or those on the water by means other
than access over abutting land.321
As a result, landowners along navigable waters who do not alter those waters
are entitled to the tort liability protections in the California Civil Code. 322
Under the public trust doctrine, owners of property along public trust
waters are entitled to natural accretions, because "[t]he state has no control over
nature; allowing private parties to gain by natural accretion does not harm to
the public trust doctrine." 323 In contrast, "to allow accretion caused by artificial
means to deprive the state of trust lands would effectively alienate what may
not be alienated."324
Unlike most states, California has extended its public trust doctrine,
beginning in 1971, to the preservation of the natural environment and
316. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 363-67 (Cal. 1980); San Diego County
Archeological Soc'y, Inc. v. Compadres, 146 Cal. Rptr. 786, 787-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); People v.
Sweetser, 140 Cal. Rptr. 82, 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 378-79 (Cal.
1971).
317. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Props., 644 P.2d 792, 793-94 (Cal. 1982) (citing
California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 625 P.2d 239 (Cal. 1981); California v. Superior Court (Fogerty),
625 P.2d at 256).
318. City ofLos Angeles, 644 P.2d at 793-94.
319. City ofBerkeley, 606 P.2d at 369.
320. Id. at 373.
321. Charpentier v. Von Geldem, 236 Cal. Rptr. 223, 239 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
322. Id. (discussing CAL. CIVIL CODE § 846 (1980)).




ecosystems as well as to public uses of the navigable waters and tidelands. In
the 1971 case of Marks v. Whitney, the California Supreme Court announced:
The public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible to
encompass changing public needs. In administering the trust the state is not
burdened with an outmoded classification favoring one mode of utilization
over another. There is growing public recognition that one of the most
important public uses of the tidelands-a use encompassed within the
tidelands trust-is the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so
that they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space,
and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine
life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area. It is not
necessary here to define precisely all the public uses which encumber
tidelands.325
The recognition of the ecological value of submerged lands extends to nontidal
submerged lands as well. As the California Supreme Court stated in connection
with Lake Tahoe litigation:
[T]he shorezone has been reduced to a fraction of its original size in this
state by the pressures of development. Such lands now cover less than one
half of 1 percent of the state; a further reduction by 15 percent was
projected for 1980. Some authorities have warned that at the present rate of
destruction nearly all riparian vegetation on the Sacramento River could be
eliminated in the next 20 years.
The shorezone is a fragile and complex resource. It provides the
environment necessary for the survival of numerous types of fish (including
salmon, steelhead, and striped bass), birds (such as the endangered species:
the bald eagle and the peregrine falcon), and many other species of wildlife
and plants. These areas are ideally suited for scientific study, since they
provide a gene pool for the preservation of biological diversity. In addition,
the shorezone in its natural condition is essential to the maintenance of
good water quality, and the vegetation acts as a buffer against floods and
erosion. 326
Thus, the California public trust doctrine extends to "environmental . . .
purposes,"32 7 and encompasses "the right to preserve the tidelands in the
natural state as ecological units for scientific study." 328
California courts have also extended the public trust doctrine not just to
aquatic wildlife habitat, but also to the wildlife itself.329 "These are natural
325. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (citations omitted).
326. California v. Superior Court (Fogerty), 625 P.2d 256, 258-59 (Cal. 1981).
327. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Props., 644 P.2d 792, 794 (Cal. 1982).
328. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 363 (Cal. 1980) (citing Marks, 491 P.2d at
374).
329. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 596-98 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008) (citing Golden Feather Comty. Ass'n v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989)).
112 [Vol. 37:53
WESTERN STATES' PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES
resources of inestimable value to the community as a whole. Their protection
and preservation is a public interest that is now recognized in numerous state
and federal statutory provisions ... ."33o Those statutes generally define the
contours of the public trust obligation regarding wildlife. 331 Members of the
general public can sue to enforce the wildlife public trust as well as the
navigable water public trust, because the public trust doctrine "places a duty
upon the government to protect those resources." 332
The California Supreme Court clarified in 2008 that California has "two
distinct public trust doctrines":
First is the common law doctrine, which involves the government's
"affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and
allocation of water resources . . . ." The second is a public trust duty
derived from statute, specifically Fish and Game Code section 711.7,
pertaining to fish and wildlife: "The fish and wildlife resources are held in
trust for the people of the state by and through the department." There is
doubtless an overlap between the two public trust doctrines-the protection
of water resources is intertwined with the protection of wildlife. . . .
Nonetheless, the duty of government agencies to protect wildlife is
primarily statutory. 333
Given this statutory focus, an incidental take permit did not violate the
common-law public trust doctrine.334
Public trust interests can extend the state's authority and duties beyond the
navigable waters. For example, "[t]he state's right to protect fish is not limited
to navigable or otherwise public waters but extends to any waters where fish
are habitated or accustomed to resort and through which the have the freedom
of passage to and from the public fishing grounds of the state."335
330. Id. at 598.
331. Id.at599-600.
332. Id. at 600.
333. Envtl. Prot. & Info. Ctr. v. Cal. Dep't of Forestry & Fire Prot., 80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 28, 73 (2008)
(quoting Nat'1 Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728-29 (1983)); see also Cal. Trout,
Inc. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 138, 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (establishing that Fish
and Game Code § 5946 establishes a public trust rule but noting "that it does not follow from the
application of the term 'public trust' to the state's interest in fisheries of non-navigable streams that all
of the consequences of the public trust doctrine as applicable to navigable waters also apply to non-
navigable streams. For example, the beds of non-navigable streams are not owned by the state based
upon a public trust fishery interest.").
334. Envtl. Prot. & Info Ctr., 80 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
335. Golden Feather Cmty. Ass'n v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836, 840 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989); see also People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 48 P. 374, 399-400, 400-01 (Cal. 1897) (noting
that "the right and power to protect and preserve [fish] for the common use and benefit is one of the
recognized prerogatives of the sovereign, coming to us from the common law" and asserting that the
state's authority to protect fish for the public is not limited to fish in navigable waters; "[t]o the extent
that waters are the common passageway for fish, although flowing over lands entirely subject to private
ownership, they are deemed for such purposes public waters, and subject to all laws of the state
regulating the right of fishery"); Cal. Trout, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 212 (concluding "that a public trust
interest pertains to non-navigable streams which sustain a fishery").
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Similarly, in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,336 the
California Supreme Court determined that the public trust doctrine could
restrict or modify established water rights even in non-navigable tributaries of
navigable waters. Withdrawals of water from Mono Lake's tributaries were
imperiling "both the scenic beauty and the ecological values of Mono Lake ...
."337 As a result, the public trust doctrine could require modifications in the
prior appropriation system:
In our opinions, the core of the public trust doctrine is the state's authority
as sovereign to exercise a continuous supervision and control over the
navigable waters of the state and the lands underlying those waters. This
authority applies to the waters tributary to Mono Lake and bars DWP or
any other party from claiming a vested right to divert waters once it
becomes clear that such diversions harm the interests protected by the
public trust. . . . Approval of such diversions with considering public trust
values . . . may result in needless destruction of those values. Accordingly,
we believe that before state courts and agencies approve water diversions,
they should consider the effect of such diversion upon interests protected
by the public trust, and attempt, so far as feasible, to avoid or minimize any
harm to these interests. 338
As such, "the public trust doctrine . . . protects navigable waters from harm
caused by diversion of non-navigable tributaries." 339 The state retains the
authority to review and reconsider water rights when harm becomes evident,
particularly if it did not consider public trust values in the original granting of a
water right.340 Moreover, "in determining whether it is 'feasible' to protect
public trust values like fish and wildlife in a particular instance, the [State
Water Resources Control] Board must determine whether protection of those
values, or what level of protection, is 'consistent with the public interest.'"
341
"[W]hen the public trust doctrine clashes with the rule of priority, the rule of
priority must yield. [Nevertheless,] every effort must be made to preserve water
right priorities to the extent those priorities do not lead to violation of the public
trust doctrine," and "the subversion of water right priority is justified only if
336. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (the "Mono Lake case"). For discussions of the Mono Lake dispute,
see generally Timothy J. Conway, Note, National Audubon Society v. Superior Court: The Expanding
Public Trust Doctrine, 14 ENVTL. L. 617 (1984); Kevin M. Raymond, Protecting the People's Waters:
The Calfornia Supreme Court Recognizes Two Remedies to Safeguard Public Trust Interests in Water,
59 WASH. L. REv. 357 (1984); Martha Guy, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine and California Water
Law: National Audubon Society v. Department of Water and Power, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 653 (1982). For a
more recent discussion of subsequent developments, see generally Craig Anthony Arnold, Litigation's
Bounded Effectiveness and the Real Public Trust Doctrine: The Aftermath of the Mono Lake Case, 14
HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 1177 (2008).
337. Nat'lAudubon Soc y, 658 P.2d at 711.
338. Id. at 712; see also id. at 727-28.
339. Id. at 721.
340. Id. at 728.
341. State Water Res. Control Bd. Cases, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189, 272 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (involving
water rights and salmon protection in the Bay Delta).
114 [Vol. 37:53
WESTERN STATES' PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES
enforcing that priority will in fact lead to the unreasonable use of water or
result in harm to values protected by the public trust."342
However, the National Audubon rule does not apply to water withdrawals
from purely non-navigable waters in the absence of an effect on navigable
waters. 343 "The public trust doctrine is based upon public access and usage of
navigable waters and pursuant to that doctrine the public has an easement and
servitude upon such waters. But the public has never had common access and
usage of nonnavigable streams . . . ."3" Similarly, the California courts have
declined to extend the National Audubon doctrine to groundwater. 345
While the California public trust doctrine protects a variety of natural
resources as well as public uses of water, it does not extend to everything. For
example, as a result of California's complicated history, California did not
acquire title to-and the public trust doctrine. does not apply to-"lands which
were the subject of a prior Mexican land grant and later patented by the United
States government in accordance with its obligations under the treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo." 346 Less uniquely, "[t]he public trust doctrine applicable to
beaches owned by the sovereign does not apply to hotels located on land which
is privately owned. Although hotel owners have certain common law
obligations to travelers, hotels are by no means owned in public trust like
public beaches." 347 Instead, "[t]he doctrine has been restricted to tidelands,
navigable waters, and situations where the government or public in general own
the property"-situations where "the state holds or held title because it was
important the land be available to all. It does not involve private property
except where the state has conveyed the land into private hands. It does not
cover artifacts located on private property." 348 The public trust doctrine does
not apply to public employment contracts, 349 or to formal trusts.350
342. El Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 489-90 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2006).
343. Golden Feather Comty. Ass'n v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836, 839 (Cal Ct.
App. 1989).
344. Id. at 840; accord Hi-Desert County Water Dist. v. Blue Skies Country Club. Inc., 28 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 909, 916 n.10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
345. Santa Teresa Citizen Action Group v. City of San Jose, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868, 884 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003); Cal. Water Network v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, Civil Nos. B 177978, B 181463, 2006 WL
726882, at * Il (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 2006) (holding that the public trust doctrine does not apply
to groundwater or non-navigable waterways, absent some impact on navigable waters).
346. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Props., 253 Cal. Rptr. 331, 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988);
Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198, 205-09 (1984).
347. Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels, 140 Cal. Rptr. 599, 603 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
348. San Diego County Archeological Soc'y, Inc. v. Compadres, 145 Cal. Rptr. 786, 787-89 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1978); see also Pitt River Tribe v. Donaldson, No. C051902, 2007 WL 1874323, at *7 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007) (holding that a transfer of tribal remains to private parties, when "there is no allegation that
the remains in question were located on navigable waters in tidelands," did not constitute a claim under
the public trust doctrine).
349. Lucas v. Santa Maria Pub. Airport Dist., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).




Date of Statehood: 1876
Water Law System: Prior appropriation
Colorado Constitution: Several provisions of Colorado's constitution relate to
water, but the state does not have a constitutionalized public trust doctrine,
despite state ballot initiatives in the mid-1990s that repeatedly sought to amend
Article XVI, § 5 of the Colorado Constitution to require the state to "adopt and
defend a strong public trust doctrine," even for nonnavigable waters.35 1
Important water-related and other relevant provisions include:
* Art. IX, § 10: Selection and Management of Public Trust Lands.
This section identifies state school lands as public trust lands, to be
managed in accordance with Colorado Revised Statutes § 36-1-
101.5.
* Art. XVI, § 5: "The water of every natural stream, not heretofore
appropriated, within the State of Colorado, is hereby declared to be
the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of
the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter
provided."
* Art. XVI, § 6: "The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any
natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied. Priority of
appropriation shall give the better right as between those using the
water for the same purpose; but when waters of any natural stream
are not sufficient for the service of all those desiring the use of the
same, those using the water for domestic purposes shall have the
preference over those claiming for any other purpose, and those
using the water for agricultural purposes shall have preference over
those using the same for manufacturing purposes."
* Art. XXVII: Great Outdoors Colorado Program. In § I of this
Article, the Colorado Constitution dedicates lottery money "to the
preservation, protection, enhancement and management of the
state's wildlife, park, river, trail and space heritage . . . ." Section 2
establishes a trust fund. However, § 7 declares that "[n]othing in this
article shall affect in any way whatsoever any of the provisions
under Article XVI of the State Constitution of Colorado, including
351. See, e.g., Matter of Title, Ballot Title, Submission Clause, and Summary Adopted April 6,
1994, by Title Board Pertaining to a Proposed Initiative on Water Rights, 877 P.2d 321, 326-29 (Colo.
1994) (en banc) (upholding the initiative); In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title, Submission Clause,
and Summary Adopted April 5, 1995 by the Board Pertaining to a Proposed Initiative "Public Rights in
Water II," 898 P.2d 1076, 1078-80 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (holding the initiative invalid because it
contained more than one subject); In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title, Submission Clause, and
Summary Adopted March 20, 1996, by the Title Board Pertaining to Proposed Initiative "1996-6," 917
P.2d 1277, 1279-82 (Colo. 1996) (en banc) (upholding the initiative).
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those provisions related to water, nor any of the statutory provisions
related to the appropriation of water in Colorado."
Colorado Statutes:
* COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-80-101 to 37-80-120: State Engineer.
* COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-81-101 to 37-81-104: Diversion of Waters.
* COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-82-101 to 37-82-106: Appropriation and
Use of Water.
* COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-83-101 to 37-83-106: Exchange of Water.
* COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-84-101 to 37-84-125: Responsibility of
User or Owner.
* COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-85-101 to 37-85-111: Charge for Delivery
of Water.
* COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-86-101 to 37-86-113: Rights of Way and
Ditches.
* COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-87-101 to 37-87-125: Reservoirs. Section
37-87-102(1) defines "natural stream" and "ordinary high
watermark."
* COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-88-101 to 37-88-110: State Canals and
Reservoirs.
* COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-89-101 to 37-89-104: Offenses.
* COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-90-101 to 37-90-143: Underground Water.
* COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to 37-92-602: Water Right
Determination and Administration. Colorado relies on a judicial
system rather than a permitting system for its water rights.
* COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-6-201 to 38-6-216: Condemnation of
Water Rights.
Definition of "Navigable Waters":
Colorado retains a "commercial use" definition of "navigable waters." 352
However, the Colorado Supreme Court has declared most streams in Colorado
non-navigable: "the natural streams of this state are, in fact, nonnavigable
within its territorial limits, and practically all of them have their sources within
its own boundaries, and . . . no stream of any importance whose source is
352. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1026 (Colo. 1979).
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without those boundaries, flows into or through this state."353 As a result, there
is almost no case law further explicating the definition of "navigable water."
Rights in "Navigable Waters":
Article XVI, § 5, of the Colorado Constitution establishes the state's
property right to the water in natural streams. 354 Nevertheless, in a non-
navigable river, title to the bed and banks is in the private landowner, giving the
landowner exclusive control over the water and the right to exclude recreational
users who would like to use the water for floating or fishing.355
The Colorado Supreme Court refused to follow the "modem trend"-as
represented by Wyoming's interpretation of similar provisions in its
constitution-and allow public rights in non-navigable rivers, concluding that
Art. XVI, § 5 of the Colorado Constitution does not preserve public recreation
rights.356 Instead, "[w]ithout permission, the public cannot use such waters for
recreation." 357
One early case notes that in navigable waters, the riparian landowner owns
to the thread, or center, of the stream.358
HAWAI'I
Date of Statehood: 1959
Water Law System: Combination of Native Hawaiian rights with elements
of both riparianism and prior appropriation
Hawai'i Constitution: "[T]he people of this state have elevated the public
trust doctrine to the level of constitutional mandate .... We therefore hold that
article XI, section 1, and article XI, section 7 adopt the public trust doctrine as a
353. Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P. 220, 222 (Colo. 1912), overruled on other grounds, Denver Ass'n
for Retarded Children, Inc. v. School Dist. No. 1, 535 P.2d 200 (Colo. 1975); see also United States v.
Dist. Court, 458 P.2d 760, 762 (Colo. 1969) (holding that even though the Eagle River is a tributary of
the Colorado River, it is non-navigable).
354. Stockman, 129 P. at 222.
355. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1027 (upholding a criminal trespass conviction for floating down a non-
navigable river); see also Heimbecher v. City & County of Denver, 9 P.2d 280, 281 (Colo. 1932) (noting
that the general presumption at common law is that title to land riparian to a non-navigable stream
extends to the center of the river); More v. Johnson, 568 P.2d 437, 439 (Colo. 1977) (same).
356. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1027-28.
357. Id. at 1029; see also Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685, 686-87 (Colo. 1905) (holding that public
ownership of the water itself, as stated in the Colorado Constitution, does not create a public fishery in
non-navigable streams; instead, the private landowner owns the right of fishery, and only appropriative
rights can trump this common-law rule).
358. Hanlon v. Hobson, 51 P. 433, 435 (Colo. 1897).
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fundamental principle of constitutional law in Hawai'i."35 9 The Hawai'i
Constitution constitutionalizes many public trust rights, including the
traditional public trust doctrine and a water rights public trust. Relevant
provisions include:
* Art. IX, § 8: "The State shall have the power to promote and
maintain a healthful environment, including the prevention of any
excessive demands upon the environment and the State's resources."
* Art. XI, § 1: "For the benefit of present and future generations, the
State and its political subdivisions shall conserve and protect
Hawaii's natural beauty and all natural resources, including land,
water, air, minerals and energy sources, and shall promote the
development and utilization of these resources in a manner
consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the self-
sufficiency of the State. All public natural resources are held in trust
by the State for the benefit of the people."
* Art. XI, § 2: "The legislature shall vest in one or more executive
boards or commissions powers for the management of natural
resources owned or controlled by the State, and such powers of
disposition thereof as may be provided by law; but land set aside for
public use, other than for a reserve for conservation purposes, need
not be placed under the jurisdiction of such a board or commission."
* Art. XI, § 6: "The State shall have the power to manage and control
the marine, seabed and other resources located within the
boundaries of the State, including the archipelagic waters of the
State, and reserves to itself all such rights outside state boundaries
not specifically limited by federal or international law. All fisheries
in the sea waters of the State not included in any fish pond, artificial
enclosure or state-licensed mariculture operation shall be free to the
public, subject to vested rights and the right of the State to regulate
the same; provided that mariculture operations shall be established
under guidelines enacted by the legislature, which shall protect the
public's use and enjoyment of the reefs. The State may condemn
such vested rights for public use."
* Art. XI, § 7: "The State has an obligation to protect, control and
regulate the use of Hawaii's water resources for the benefit of its
people. The legislature shall provide for a water resources agency
which, as provided by law, shall set overall water conservation,
quality and use policies; define beneficial and reasonable uses;
protect ground and surface water resources, watersheds and natural
stream environments; establish criteria for water use priorities while
assuring appurtenant rights and existing correlative and riparian uses
359. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 443-44 (Haw. 2000) (citations omitted); see
also Morgan v. Planning Dep't, 86 P.3d 982, 993 n.12 (Haw. 2004).
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and establish procedures for regulating all uses of Hawaii's water
resources."
* Art. XI, § 9: "Each person has the right to a clean and healthful
environment, as defined by laws relating to environmental quality,
including control of pollution and conservation, protection and
enhancement of natural resources. Any person may enforce this
right against any party, public or private, through appropriate legal
proceedings, subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as
provided by law."
* Art. XI, § 11: "The State of Hawaii asserts and reserves its rights
and interest in its exclusive economic zone for the purpose of
exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing natural resources,
both living and nonliving, of the seabed and subsoil, and
superadjacent waters."
* Art. XII, § 4: Public Trust: "The lands granted to the State of
Hawaii by Section 5(b) of the Admission Act and pursuant to
Article XVI, § 7 of the State Constitution . . . shall be held by the
State as a public trust for native Hawaiians and the general public."
* Art. XII, § 5: "There is hereby established an Office of Hawaiian
Affairs. The Office of Hawaiian Affairs shall hold title to all the real
and personal property now or hereafter set aside or conveyed to it
which shall be held in trust for native Hawaiians and Hawaiians."
* Art. XII, § 6: "The board of trustees of the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs shall exercise power as provided by law: to manage and
administer the proceeds from the sale or other disposition of the
lands, natural resources, minerals and income derived from
whatever sources for native Hawaiians and Hawaiians, including all
income and proceeds from that pro rata portion of the trust referred
to in section 4 of this article for native Hawaiians; to formulate
policy relating to affairs of native Hawaiians and Hawaiians; and to
exercise control over real and personal property set aside by state,
federal or private sources and transferred to the board for native
Hawaiians and Hawaiians."
* Art. XII, § 7: "The State reaffirms and shall protect all rights,
customarily and traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural and
religious purposes and possessed by ahupua'a tenants who are
descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian
Islands prior to 1778, subject to the right of the State to regulate
such rights."
* Art. XVI, § 7: Compliance with Trust: "Any trust provisions which
the Congress shall impose, upon the admission of this State, in
respect of the lands patented to the State by the United States or the
proceeds and income therefrom, shall be complied with by
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appropriate legislation. Such legislation shall not diminish or limit
the benefits of native Hawaiians under Section 4 of Article XII."
Hawai'i Statutes:
* HAW. REv. STAT. § 7-1: "The people shall have a right to drinking
water, and running water, and the right of way. The springs of
water, running water, and roads shall be free to all, on lands granted
in fee simple. . . ."
* HAW. REV. STAT. § 10-1(a): Incorporates the trust for Native
Hawaiians into the Office of Hawaiian Affairs.
* HAW. REv. STAT. § 171-1: The public lands include submerged
lands.
* HAW. REv. STAT. § 171-2: This provision defines the public lands.
* HAW. REV. STAT. § 171-3: The Department of Land and Natural
Resources "shall manage, administer, and exercise control over
public lands, the water resources, ocean waters, navigable streams,
coastal areas, and minerals and all other interests therein . . ..
* HAW. REV. STAT. § 171-18: Public trust lands for schools.
* HAW. REV. STAT. § 171-36(a)(9): The public has the right to use
piers.
* HAW. REV. STAT. § 171-53: Reclamation of submerged lands is
prohibited without the state's permission.
* HAW. REV. STAT. ch. 174C: State Water Code. Section 174C-2(a)
"recognize[s] that the waters of the State are held for the benefit of
the citizens of the State" and "declare[s] that the people of the State
are beneficiaries and have a right to have the waters protected for
their use." In addition, the Code requires the "protection of
traditional and customary Hawaiian rights, the protection and
procreation of fish and wildlife, the maintenance of proper
ecological balance and scenic beauty, and the preservation and
enhancement of waters of the State for municipal uses, public
recreation, public water supply, agriculture, and navigation. Such
objectives are declared to be in the public interest."360
* HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 174C-31 to 174C-32: Hawaii Water Plan. The
Commission must "[i]dentify rivers or streams, or a portion of a
river or stream, which appropriately may be placed within a wild
and scenic rivers system, to be preserved and protected as part of the
public trust." 36 1
360. HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-2(c) (2009).
361. Id. § 174C-31(c)(4).
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* HAW. REv. STAT. § 174C-41 to 174C-63: Regulation of Water Use.
Before the State of Hawai'i can regulate water use in a given area, it
must designate a water management area.
* HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 174C-66 to 174C-71: Water Quality. These
statutes provide protection of instream uses.362
* HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-101: Native Hawaiian Water Rights.
* HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 190D-1 to 190D-36: Oceans and Submerged
Lands Leasings.
* HAW. REV. STAT. § 200-6: Permits are required for structures or
moorings in ocean waters or navigable streams.
* HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 205A-1 to 205A-71: Coastal Zone
Management.
Definition of "Navigable Waters":
The Hawaiian courts are well aware of the convoluted nature of the
"navigable waters" definition.363 "Navigable waters" in Hawai'i include all
waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, whether navigable or not, and
waters that are navigable-in-fact, even if not tidal.364 Hawai'i has long accepted
the tidal test of navigability. 365
Perhaps because of its water resources trust (see below) and its island
nature, Hawai'i does not have well-developed law for non-tidal navigable-in-
fact waters. Nevertheless, for public trust purposes, Hawai'i appears to have
adopted the pleasure boat test for navigability: "Navigable waters, including
both those navigable by larger vessels and those navigable by rowboats and
other small craft, are public highways. The right of navigation includes the
right to travel on the waters not only for business purposes but also in pursuit of
pleasure." 366
Rights in "Navigable Waters":
Relying on Illinois Central Railroad, the Hawai'i Supreme Court declared
in 1899 that "[t]he people of Hawaii hold the absolute rights to all its navigable
waters and the soils under them for their own common use. The lands under the
navigable waters in and around the territory of the Hawaiian Government are
362. Id § 174C-71.
363. In re Sanbom, 562 P.2d 771, 776 n.6 (Haw. 1977).
364. Id.
365. In re Bishop, 35 Haw. 608 (Haw. Terr. 1940).
366. Kuramoto v. Hamada, 30 Haw. 841, 845 (Haw. Terr. 1929).
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held in trust for the public uses of navigation." 367 Traditionally in Hawai'i, the
right of navigation supersedes the right of fishery.368
More recently, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has described the public trust
as "a dual concept of sovereign right and responsibility." 369 Hawai'i recognizes
broad public rights in its waters, noting that "the trust [has] traditionally
preserved public rights of navigation, commerce, and fishing. Courts have
further identified a wide range of recreational uses, including bathing,
swimming, boating, and scenic viewing, as protected trust purposes." 370
Moreover, given Hawaii's history, "the exercise of Native Hawaiian and
traditional and customary rights [is] a public trust purpose." 371 In contrast, "the
public trust has never been understood to safeguard rights of exclusive use for
private commercial gain. Such an interpretation, indeed, eviscerate[d] the
trust's basic purpose[-]of reserving the resource for use and access by the
general public without preference or restriction." 372 Thus, "[a]s commonly
understood, the trust protects public waters and submerged lands against
irrevocable transfer to private parties, or 'substantial impairment,' whether for
private or public purposes . . . ."373
"[T]he ultimate authority to interpret and defend the public trust in Hawaii
rests with the courts," and "[j]ust as private trustees are judicially accountable
to their beneficiaries for dispositions of the res, so the legislative and executive
branches are judicially accountable for dispositions of the public trust."374
Moreover, "[t]he beneficiaries of the public trust are not just present
generations but those to come." 375
In general, "beachfront title lines run along the upper annual reaches of the
waves, excluding storm and tidal waves." 376 Similarly, although "Hawaii's
land laws are unique in that they are based on ancient tradition, custom,
practice and usage," the boundary designated "ma ke kai" "is along the upper
367. King v. Oahu Ry & Land Co., II Haw. 717, 725 (Haw. Terr. 1899) (citations omitted); see
also Carter v. Territory, 14 Haw. 465, 1902 WL 1419, at *3, *10 (Haw. Terr. 1902) (announcing a
public trust for navigation and fishing but allowing exclusive rights of sea fisheries to be acquired by
grant or prescription, although the presumption is against the claimant). For a comprehensive
examination of Hawaii's public trust doctrine, see generally Denise E. Antolini, Water Rights and
Responsibilities in the Twenty-First Century: A Forward to the Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium on
Managing Hawaii's Public Trust Doctrine, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 1 (2001); Symposium, Proceedings of
the 2001 Symposium on Managing Hawaii's Public Trust Doctrine, 24 U. HAW. L. REv. 21 (2001).
368. Kuramoto, 30 Haw. at 845.
369. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 448 (Haw. 2000).
370. Id. at 448.
371. Id. at 449.
372. Id at 450.
373. In re Wai'ola 0 Moloka'i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 692 (Haw. 2004) (citations omitted).
374. Id. at 684-85.
375. Id. at 685.
376. In re Sanborn, 562 P.2d 771, 776 n.6 (Haw. 1977).
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reaches of the wash of waves, usually evidence by the edge of vegetation or by
the line of debris left by the wash of waves . . . ."377
The public trust doctrine can invalidate any attempts to extend property
boundaries beyond the high-water mark:
In Hawaii, the public trust doctrine, recognized in our case law prior to the
enactment of our land court statute, can similarly be deemed to create an
exception to our land court statute, thus invalidating any purported
registration of land below the high water mark. . . . [L]and below high
water mark is held in public trust by the State, whose ownership may not be
relinquished, except where relinquishment is consistent with certain public
purposes.378
Moreover, because the public has long used the beaches of Hawai'i, that use
"has ripened into a customary right. Public policy, as interpreted by this court,
favors extending to public use and ownership as much of Hawaii's shoreline as
is reasonably possible." 379 Finally, for similar public policy reasons, "lava
extensions vest when created in the people of Hawaii, held in public trust by
the government for the benefit, use, and enjoyment of all the people," and
therefore "the State as trustee has the duty to protect and maintain [this] trust
property and regulate its use." 380
Most recently, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has suggested that the public
trust doctrine extends to environmental and biodiversity protection. For
example, in 2005, it suggested that the public trust doctrine applies, via Article
XI, § 1 of the Hawai'i Constitution, to regulation of the Palila, an endangered
bird.381 The following year, it explicitly held that the Department of Health and
counties are bound by the public trust doctrine when implementing the federal
Clean Water Act. Thus, when environmental groups sued the Department of
Health asserting that the Department had violated the public trust doctrine by
failing to prevent a developer from violating state water quality standards for
coastal waters, the court concluded that state issuance of National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permits pursuant to the Clean Water Act are
subject to the public trust doctrine and that the Department of Health must
ensure that water quality measures are actually being implemented. 382 In
377. In re Application of Ashford, 440 P.2d 76, 77 (Haw. 1968) (citing Keelikolani v. Robinson, 2
Haw. 514 (Hawaii Terr. 1862)); see also Territory v. Kerr, 16 Haw. 363, 1905 WL 1327, at *4 (Haw.
Terr. 1905) (holding that grants of property "along the sea" go to the high water mark); In re Sanborn,
562 P.2d at 776 n.6 (noting that title to non-tidal navigable-in-fact waters goes to the high-water mark).
378. In re Sanborn, 562 P.2d at 776; see also Hawaii County v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57, 63 (Haw.
1973) (noting that, pursuant to the public trust doctrine, land below the high water mark belongs to the
public).
379. Hawaii County v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d at 61-62 (citing Oregon ex rel. Thorton v. Hay, 462
P.2d 671 (Or. 1969)).
380. Kobayashi v. Zimring, 566 P.2d 725, 735 (Haw. 1977).
381. Morimoto v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res., 113 P.3d 172, 184 (Haw. 2005).
382. Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1009, 1011 (Haw. 2006).
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addition, under Article XI, § 1 of the constitution, counties have public trust
duties as well, and they "have an obligation to conserve and protect the state's
natural resources." 383
Public trust principles in Hawai'i extend to water rights through a unique
water resources trust akin to, but of different origin from, the navigable waters
public trust. Emphasizing the 1978 amendments to the Hawai'i Constitution
that constitutionalized the public trust doctrine, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has
noted that in the Kingdom of Hawai'i, the right to water was reserved to the
people for their common good in all land grants, and ownership of the water
itself remained at all times in the people.384 This sovereign reservation imposed
a public trust on the water itself, similar to, but different from, the public trust
doctrine that arises as a result of state title to the beds and banks of navigable
waters. 385
Given Hawaii's water situation, the reassertion of this traditional water
resources trust has been deemed critical, both as against assertions of riparian
rights and in light of the State Water Code and water use permits. With respect
to riparian rights,
[t]he reassertion of dormant public interests in the diversion and application
of Hawaii's waters has become essential with the increasing scarcity of the
resource and recognition of the public's interests in the utilization and flow
of these waters. . . . [W]hile there indeed exist relative usufructory rights
among landowners, these rights can no longer be treated as though they are
absolute and exclusive interests in the waters of our state. 386
Instead, "underlying every private diversion and application there is, as there
always has been, a superior public interest in this natural bounty. "387
With respect to the State Water Code:
The public trust in the water resources of this state, like the navigable
waters trust, has its genesis in the common law. . . . The [State Water] Code
does not evince any legislative intent to abolish the common law public
trust doctrine. To the contrary,... the legislature appears to have engrafted
the doctrine wholesale in the Code.388
As a result, the State Water Code "does not supplant the protections of the
public trust doctrine," and "the public trust doctrine applies to all water
resources without exception or distinction," including ground waters. 389 In
383. Id. at 1004-05.
384. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 441 (Haw. 2000); see also Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 310-11 (Haw. 1982) (giving same history).
385. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 441; Robinson, 658 P.2d at 310 (noting that
this sovereign interest was more than just a police power interest; "[t]he nature of this ownership is thus
akin to the title held by all states in navigable waterways").
386. Robinson, 658 P.2d at 311.
387. Id. at 312.




addition, "the maintenance of waters in their natural state constitutes a distinct
'use' under the water resources trust."390
Similarly, "a reservation of water constitutes a public trust purpose." 391 As
a result, the Department of Hawaiian Home Land's
reservations of water throughout the State are entitled to the full panoply of
constitutional protections afforded other public trust purposes . . . . To hold
otherwise would undermine the public trust doctrine, which is a state
constitutional doctrine, and the relevant policy declarations set forth in the
[State Water] Code.392
"The state water resources trust embodies a dual mandate of 1) protection
and 2) maximum reasonable and beneficial use."393 Specifically, the state has a
"duty to ensure the continued availability and existence of its water resources
for present and future generations," but also a "duty to promote the reasonable
and beneficial use of water resources in order to maximize their social and
economic benefits to the people of this state."394 With respect to the water
resources trust, moreover, the Hawai'i Supreme Court explicitly followed
California's decision in the Mono Lake case, suggesting that the water
resources trust is more protective than the navigable waters public trust
doctrine.395 Indeed, the water resources trust "precludes any grant or assertion
of vested rights to use water to the detriment of public trust purposes." 396 As in
California, moreover, the state may "revisit prior diversions and allocations,
even those made with due consideration of their effect on the public trust." 397
While the Commission may have to balance public and private interests in
water,
the constitutional requirements of 'protection' and 'conservation,' the
historical and continuing understanding of the trust as a guarantee of public
rights, and the common reality of the 'zero-sum' game between competing
water uses demand that any balancing between public and private purposes
begin with a presumption in favor of public use, access, and enjoyment ...
398
390. Id. at 448.
391. In re Waiola 0 Molokai, Inc., 83 P.3d 664, 694 (Haw. 2004).
392. Id. (citations omitted); see also In re Matter of the Contested Case Hearing on the Water Use
Permit Application Filed by Kukui (Molokai), Inc., 174 P.3d 320, 329, 330 (Haw. 2007) (affirming that
the public trust doctrine is a constitutional doctrine and the Department of Hawaiian Home Land's water
reservations are public trust uses).
393. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 451.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 452.
396. Id. at 453.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 454.
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Moreover, the Commission's decisions in favor of private commercial uses are
subject to "higher scrutiny."3 99 Moreover, the Commission must consider the
cumulative impacts of diversions and "implement reasonable measures to
mitigate this impact, including the use of alternative sources." 400
IDAHO
Date of Statehood: 1890
Water Law System: Prior appropriation
Idaho Constitution: Idaho has not constitutionalized its public trust doctrine.
However, its constitution does establish water rights. Relevant provisions of the
Idaho Constitution include:
* Art. XV, § 1: "The use of all waters now appropriated, or that may
hereafter be appropriated for sale, rental, or distribution; also of all
water originally appropriated for private use, but which after such
appropriation has heretofore been, or may hereafter be sold, rented,
or distributed, is hereby declared to be a public use, and subject to
the regulations and control of the state in the manner prescribed by
law."
* Art. XV, § 3: "The right to divert and appropriate the
unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses, shall
never be denied, except that the state may regulate and limit the use
thereof for power purposes. Priority of appropriation shall give the
better right as between those using the water .... "
* Art XV, § 7: "[T]he State Water Resource Agency shall have power
to formulate and implement a state water plan for optimal
development of water resources in the public interest. . . ."
Idaho Statutes: Idaho has codified its public trust doctrine in Idaho Code
Annotated §§ 58-1201 to 58-1203, which generally limits the public trust
doctrine and its potential impact on appropriated rights. In codifying the
doctrine, the Idaho Legislature made the following findings:
(1) Upon admission of the state of Idaho into the union, the title to the beds
of navigable waters became state property, and subject to its jurisdiction
and disposal under the equal footing doctrine. According to the United
States [S]upreme [C]ourt's decision in Shively v. Bowlby, the state has the
right to dispose of the beds of navigable waters, "in such manner as [it]
399. Id.; see also In re Water Use Permit Applications, 93 P.3d 643, 650, 657 (Haw. 2004) (noting
that "because water is a public trust resource and the public trust is a state constitutional doctrine, this
court recognizes certain qualifications to the standard of review regarding the Water Commission's
decisions" and in effect imposes a burden on proposed users to justify their uses of water).
400. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 455 (citations omitted).
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might deem proper . . . subject only to the paramount right of navigation
and commerce." The state has the right to determine for itself "to what
extent it will preserve its rights of ownership in them, or confer them on
others." Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 56 (1893); and
(2) Since the admission of the state of Idaho into the union, article XV of
the constitution of the state of Idaho has governed the appropriation and use
of the waters of Idaho. Pursuant to article XV of the constitution of the
state of Idaho, the legislature of the state of Idaho has enacted a
comprehensive system of laws for the appropriation, transfer and use of the
waters of Idaho, which addresses the public interest therein; and
(3) Upon admission of the state of Idaho into the union, the state was
granted certain lands by the United States government as an endowment for
designated institutions. Article IX of the constitution of the state of Idaho,
and laws enacted pursuant thereto [related to public school lands], establish
a comprehensive system of laws for the management of state endowment
lands, which addresses the public interest therein; and
(4) The common law doctrine known as the public trust doctrine, adopted
by inference in section 73-116, Idaho Code, had guided the alienation or
encumbrance of the title to the beds of navigable waters held in trust by the
state. The public trust doctrine has been used in court decisions and
pleadings in ways that have created confusion in the administration and
management of the waters and endowment lands; and
(5) The public's interest in the environment is protected in other parts of
Idaho's constitution or statutory law; and
(6) The purpose of this act is to clarify the application of the public trust
doctrine in the state of Idaho and to expressly declare the limits of this
common law doctrine in accordance with the authority recognized in each
state to define the extent of the common law.40 1
The legislation goes on to declare that "[t]he public trust doctrine as it is
applied in the state of Idaho is solely a limitation on the power of the state to
alienate or encumber the title to the beds of navigable waters as defined in this
chapter."402 Further, "[t]he public trust doctrine shall not be applied to any
purpose other than as provided in this chapter,"403 and it does not apply to
"[t]he appropriation or use of water, or the granting, transfer, administration, or
adjudication of water or water rights . . . or any other procedure or law
applicable to water rights in the state of Idaho" or to "[t]he protection or
401. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1201 (2009). For discussions of this legislation and its impacts on
Idaho's common-law public trust doctrine, see generally Michael C. Blumm, Renouncing the Public
Trust Doctrine: An Assessment of the Validity of Idaho House Bill 794, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 461 (1997);
James M. Kearney, Recent Statute Closing the Floodgates? Idaho's Statutory Limitation on the Public
Trust Doctrine, 34 IDAHO L. REv. 91 (1997); Lisa Lombardi, Note, The Public Trust Doctrine in Idaho,
33 IDAHO L. REv. 231 (1996).
402. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1203(1).
403. Id. § 58-1203(2).
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exercise of private property rights within the state of Idaho.'4 04 Finally, these
statutes define "navigable waters" as "those waters that were susceptible to
being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce on the date
of statehood, under the federal test of navigability" and identify the line of
"natural or ordinary high water mark" as the boundary of the beds of navigable
waters. 4 05
Other relevant statutes in Idaho include:
* IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-246: No prescriptive easements for
overflows are allowed in the beds of navigable waters.
* IDAHO CODE ANN. § 36-1601: This provision defines a "navigable
stream" to be "[a]ny stream which, in its natural state, during
normal high water, will float cut timber have a diameter in excess of
six (6) inches or any other commercial or floatable commodity or is
capable of being navigated by oar or motor propelled small craft for
pleasure or commercial purposes . . . .'4 06 It provides for public use
rights in "[n]avigable rivers, sloughs or streams within the meander
line or, when not meandered, between the flow lines of ordinary
high water thereof, and all rivers, sloughs and streams flowing
through any public lands of the state," which "shall be open to
public use as a public highway for travel and passage, up or
downstream, for business or pleasure, and to exercise the incidents
of navigation-boating, swimming, fishing, hunting, and all
recreational purposes." 407 However, this right of use does not
include a right of access over private property, except that the public
can portage around irrigation dams and other private
obstructions.40 8
* IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-101 to 42-114: Appropriation of Water.
* IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-501 to 42-505: Appropriations by the
Bureau of Land Management of the US Department of Interior.
* IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-602 to 42-619: Distribution of Water
Among Appropriators.
* IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-701 to 42-715: Headgates and Measuring
Devices.
* IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-1101 to 42-1108: Rights of Way.
* IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-1201 to 42-1209: Maintenance and Repair
of Ditches.
404. Id. § 58-1203(2)(b), (c).
405. Id. § 58-1202(1), (3).
406. Id. § 36-1601(a).
407. Id. § 36-1601(b).
408. Id. § 36-1601(c).
2010] 129
ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY
* IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-1401 to 42-1418: Water Rights
Adjudications.
o IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-1501 to 42-1508: Minimum Stream Flow.
* IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-3801: "The legislature of the state of Idaho
hereby declares that the public health, safety, and welfare requires
that the stream channels of the state and their environments be
protected against alteration for the protection of fish and wildlife
habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty, and water quality.
No alteration of any stream channel shall hereafter be made unless
approval therefor has been given as provided in this act."
* IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1302: This provision defines a "navigable
lake" to be "any permanent body of relatively still or slack water,
including man-made reservoirs, not privately owned and not a mere
marsh or stream eddy, and capable of accommodating boats or
canoes.' 4 09
Definition of "Navigable Waters":
By 1916, the Idaho Supreme Court had rejected the English tidal test of
navigability in favor of the navigability-in-fact test.410 Until January 1, 1977,
Idaho Code § 36-907 (1976) defined navigability for public fishing purposes to
include any stream supporting log or timber floatation during the high water
season. 411 This older statute codified the holding of Mashburn v. St. Joe
Improvement Co.4 12 However, on January 1, 1977, Idaho Code § 36-1601 took
effect, codifying the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Southern Idaho Fish &
Game Ass 'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc.,413 which established a log floatation test
for both state title and public fishing purposes and recognized that this test was
less restrictive than the federal test articulated in The Daniel Ball414 and Utah
v. United States.4 15
Idaho has codified the standard federal title test of "navigable waters"-
that is, "those waters that were susceptible to being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce on the date of statehood, under the
federal test of navigability"-for its public trust doctrine.416 Under this test, the
409. Id. § 58-1302(a).
410. N. Pac. Railway Co. v. Hirzel, 161 P. 854, 858-59 (Idaho 1916) (adopting McManus vs.
Carmichael, 3 Idaho 1 (1856)).
411. Ritter v. Standal, 566 P.2d 769, 770-71 & n.l (Idaho 1977).
412. 113 P. 92, 95 (Idaho 1911); see also Ritter, 566 P.2d at 770-71 (citations omitted).
413. 528 P.2d 1295, 1297-98 & n.l (Idaho 1974).
414. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
415. 403 U.S. 9 (1971).
416. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1201(3) (2009).
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Salmon River is a navigable water and owned by the state,417 as are the Snake
and Clearwater Rivers. 4 18
The public retains the right to use a broader category of "navigable
streams" that are defined in terms of log floatation and pleasure boating.419
Finally, Idaho defines a "navigable lake" to be "any permanent body of
relatively still or slack water, including man-made reservoirs, not privately
owned and not a mere marsh or stream eddy, and capable of accommodating
boats or canoes." 420
The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the Snake River in Idaho is
navigable. 421 However, as a result of federal reservations, Idaho does not have
title to the beds of Coeur d'Alene Lake or the St. Joe River; instead, the United
States hold title to those two waters in trust for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe.422
Rights in "Navigable Waters":
Although some early cases suggested that a landowner owns the beds of
non-tidal navigable-in-fact rivers,423 according to current case law and statutes,
a riparian owner on a navigable stream or river or a littoral owner on a
navigable lake takes title to the natural or ordinary high water mark.424 The
natural or ordinary high water mark is "the line that water impresses on the soil
by covering it for sufficient periods to deprive the soil of its vegetation and
destroy its value for agricultural purposes." 425
"' [T]he State owns in trust for the public title to the bed of a navigable
water below the OHWM [ordinary high water mark] as it existed at the time the
State was admitted into the Union."'426 Landowners cannot exclude the public
from using dry land below the OHWM, although they retain a concurrent right
of access.427 "Granting the Lakeshore Owners the right to exclude the public
from this portion of state lands would be inconsistent with the public trust
doctrine," which preserves the beds of navigable waters for public use.428
417. Callahan v. Price, 146 P. 732, 734-35 (Idaho 1915).
418. N. Pac. Railway Co. v. Hirzel, 161 P. 854, 859 (Idaho 1916).
419. IDAHO. CODE ANN. § 36-1601(a), (b).
420. Id. § 58-1302.
421. Moss v. Ramey, 239 U.S. 538, 544 (1916); Scott v. Lattig, 227 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1913).
422. Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001).
423. See Moss, 95 P. at 514) (citing Johnson vs. Johnson, 95 P. 499 (Idaho 1908)); Ulbright v.
Baslington, 119 P. 292, 293-94 (Idaho 1911).
424. In re Sanders Beach, 147 P.3d 75, 85 (Idaho 2006) (citing West v. Smith, 511 P.2d 1326, 1330
(Idaho 1973)); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1202(1).
425. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 58-104(9), 58-1202(2); Idaho Forest Indus., Inc. v. Hayden Lake
Watershed Improvement Dist., 17 P.3d 260, 264 (Idaho 2000).
426. In re Sanders Beach, 147 P.3d at 85 (quoting Erickson v. Idaho, 970 P.2d 1, 3 (Idaho 1998)).
427. Id.




Moreover, "[t]he public trust doctrine is based upon common law equitable
principles," and:
While those equitable principles in certain circumstances may no longer
apply to public trust property which has lost its navigable status naturally, it
may well be that a loss of navigability resulting from a manmade dike or
diversion may not, for equitable reasons, eliminate or destroy the public
trust status of land which was once subject to that trust.429
Similarly, public rights in a navigable river follow any artificial raising of the
river level. 430
Illinois Central Railroad established the principle that the state may not
abdicate its role as trustee of the lands beneath navigable waters to private
parties. 431 In the statutory public trust doctrine enacted in 1996, the Idaho
Legislature preserved this primary focus and principle of the public trust.432
Public trust lands conveyed to private parties by the Department of State Lands
are limited by that principle and remain subject to the public trust.433 "The
public trust doctrine at all times forms the outer boundaries of permissible
government action with respect to public trust resources." 434 As such, the
public trust doctrine creates both procedural and judicial review requirements.
Procedurally, "public trust resources may only be alienated or impaired through
open and visible actions, where the public is in fact informed of the proposed
action and has substantial opportunity to respond to the proposed action before
a final decision is made thereon." 435 Judicially, the courts make the final
determination as to whether a conveyance is valid, taking a close look at the
agency's decision:
[T]he court will examine, among other things, such factors as the degree of
the effect of the project on public trust uses, navigation, fishing, recreation,
and commerce; the impact of the individual project on the public trust
resource; the impact of the individual project when examined cumulatively
with existing impediments to full use of the public trust resource . . . ; the
impact of the project on the public trust resource when that resource is
examined in light of the primary purpose for which the resources is suited,
i.e., commerce, navigation, fishing, or recreation; and the degree to which
broad public uses are set aside in favor of more limited or private ones.436
429. Idaho Forest Indus., 733 P.2d at 738 (citing Rutledge v. Idaho, 482 P.2d 515 (Idaho 1981)).
430. Burrus v. Edward Rutledge Timber Co., 202 P. 1067, 1068 (Idaho 1921).
431. Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Idaho
1983).
432. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1203(1) (2009).
433. Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, 671 P.2d at 1095.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 1091.
436. Id. at 1092-93.
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Nevertheless, the state has the burden to prove its title by clear and
convincing evidence if the state is not the record title holder.437 Moreover,
"[t]here is no 'public trust doctrine' relating to land which is wholly
independent or unconnected with such navigable waters." 438 In addition, the
public trust doctrine does not apply to private property traceable to an 1892
patent from the United States government.439
Although public rights were initially limited to navigation and incidents of
navigation, such rights have expanded in Idaho to include fish and wildlife
habitat, recreation, aesthetic beauty, and water quality.440
By statute, the public trust doctrine does not apply to water rights." 1 This
law, enacted in 1996, invalidates a line of cases that had indicated that
"proprietary rights to use water ... are held subject to the public trust." 442
KANSAS
Date of Statehood: 1861
Water Law Regime: Prior appropriation
Kansas Constitution: Kansas has not constitutionalized its public trust
doctrine. Indeed, there are no provisions in the Kansas Constitution relevant to
water.
Kansas Statutes:
* KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-201 to 82a-218: Navigable Waters. If there
is a sudden (avulsive) change in a navigable river, the Secretary of
State must buy or condemn the new channel.4 3 The state will
acquire ownership to the high water mark.444 The state can also
convey the old channel. 445
* KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-701 to 82a-773: Kansas Water
Appropriation Act. "All water within the State of Kansas is hereby
437. Idaho Forest Indus., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Watershed Improvement Dist., 17 P.3d 260, 264
(Idaho 2000).
438. Idaho Forest Indus., 733 P.2d at 737.
439. State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 594 P.2d 1093, 1102 (Idaho 1979).
440. In re Sanders Beach, 147 P.3d 75, 85 (Idaho 2006); Idaho Forest Indus., 733 P.2d at 737;
Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, 671 P.2d at 1093.
441. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1203(2)(b) (2009).
442. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho, 911 P.2d 748, 750 (Idaho 1995); Kootenai Envtl.
Alliance, 671 P.2d at 1094 (holding that "the public trust doctrine takes precedence even over vested
water rights").
443. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-201 (2009).
444. Id. § 82a-202.
445. Id. § 82a-205.
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dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to the control
and regulation of the state in the manner herein prescribed."446 The
act allows for minimum streamflows and a permit system.447 The
act also addresses conservation plans and practices,448  and
establishes a water bank.449
Definition of "Navigable Waters":
Kansas courts have recognized that, under the English tidal test of
navigability, three categories of waters existed: the non-navigable waters;
intermediate waters, whose beds were in private ownership but whose waters
are subject to public rights of use; and the navigable waters subject to the ebb
and flow of the tide, whose beds belong to the Crown. 450 Nevertheless, in the
United States, the American navigable-in-fact test governs, and the ancient tidal
test was never part of Kansas common law. 451
Thus, for state title and public trust doctrine purposes, the Kansas courts
apply the federal title test of navigability. According to those courts,
Under this test, bodies of water are navigable and title to the beds under the
water are vested in the State if: (1) the bodies of water were used, or were
susceptible of being used, as a matter of fact, as highways for commerce;
(2) such use for commerce was possible under the natural conditions of the
body of water; (3) commerce was or could have been conducted in the
customary modes of trade or travel on water; and (4) all of these conditions
were satisfied at the time of statehood. 452
Older cases, however, allowed the establishment of navigability by judicial
notice, "at least so far as the great rivers are concerned."453 Moreover, lack of
446. Id § 82a-702.
447. Id. §§ 82a-703a to 82a-703c.
448. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-733.
449. Id. § 82a-763.
450. State ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Kan. 1990); Wood v. Fowler, 26 Kan. 682,
689 (1882).
451. Kansas v. Akers, 140 P. 637, 645-49 (Kan. 1914); Wood, 26 Kan. at 689.
452. Meek, 785 P.2d at 1359 (citing United States v. Holt Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1926)); see
also Hurst v. Dana, 122 P. 1041, 1042 (Kan. 1911) (noting that "any water to be navigable should be
susceptible of use for purposes of commerce or possess the capacity for valuable floatage in
transportation to market of the products of the country through which it runs, and should be of practical
usefulness to the public as a public highway in its own state and without aid of artificial means; that a
theoretical or potential navigability or one that is temporary, precarious and unprofitable, is not
sufficient"); Kregar v. Fogarty, 96 P. 845, 846-47 (Kan. 1908) (noting that navigability is a question of
fact determined through the federal commerce test; meandering is not dispositive).
453. Wood, 26 Kan. at 689 (addressing the navigability of the Kansas River); Hurst, 122 P. at 1042
(addressing the Arkansas River).
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use does not affect state title to a river that is navigable-in-fact. 454 There is no
state common law test of navigability in Kansas.455
Applying the federal test, the Kansas Supreme Court determined that
Shoal Creek was non-navigable. 456 The court emphasized that the creek did not
allow for any valuable floatage, that it dries up, and that parts of the creek are
not navigable even by canoes.457 Similarly, the Neosho River was not
navigable even though it could support log floatation and light boats over short
distances; it was never used to transport the products of the country. 458
By 1990, three rivers in Kansas had been declared navigable for title
purposes: the Kansas River, the Arkansas River, and the Missouri River.459
Three rivers had been declared non-navigable: the Neosho River, the Delaware
River, and the Smoky Hill River.460
Rights in "Navigable Waters":
For navigable streams, the riparian landowner owns "only to the
banks." 461 In contrast, landowners along non-navigable streams own the bed of
the stream and may put a fence across the stream to stop trespassing
canoeists.462 "Navigable waters and public waters are synonymous terms. This
state claims title to the beds of public streams only. The title to the beds of all
other streams is in the riparian owner."463
In navigable waters, both riparian owners and the general public have
rights; "[t]he stream is a public highway, and no one can maintain an exclusive
privilege to any part of the water." 464 Public rights include the right to take
ice. 465 Moreover:
The title of the state to the bed of a meandered stream is not an absolute
fee, which the state can dispose of as it wishes; but such title is vested in it
in trust for the benefit and common right of all the people, for the purposes
for which such property has been used from time immemorial, viz; the
common right of passage, of fishing, of the use of the waters for domestic,
454. Hurst, 122 P. at 1043.
455. Siler v. Dreyer, 327 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Kan. 1958).
456. Meek, 785 P.2d at 1360.
457. Id.
458. Webb v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Neosho County, 257 P. 966, 966 (Kan. 1927).
459. Meek, 785 P.2d at 1360 (citing Kansas v. Akers, 140 P. 637 (Kan. 1914); Hurst, 122 P. at
1041; Wood v. Fowler, 26 Kan. 682 (1882)).
460. Id (citing Webb v. Neosho County Commissioners, 257 P. 966 (Kan. 1927); Piazzek v.
Drainage Dist., 237 P. 1059 (Kan. 1925); Kreger v. Fogarty, 96 P. 845 (Kan. 1908)).
461. Id. at 1358; Kregar, 96 P. at 847.
462. Meek, 785 P.2d at 1358; Kregar, 96 P. at 848 (noting that title in non-navigable waters goes to
the thread of the stream).
463. Piazzek, 237 P. at 1060.




agricultural, and commercial purposes, and therefore the state has no
proprietary right in the bed of the stream or in the water which it can
sell.4 66
In addition, private persons cannot acquire prescriptive rights in these assets
against the public.467
In 1990, the Kansas Supreme Court refused to extend public trust concepts
to non-navigable streams based on state ownership of the water and § 82a-702
of the Kansas statutes. 468
Owners of the bed of a nonnavigable stream have the exclusive right of
control of everything above the stream bed, subject only to constitutional
and statutory limitations, restrictions, and regulations. Where the legislature
refuses to create a public trust for recreational purposes in nonnavigable
streams, courts should not alter the legislature's statement of public policy
by judicial legislation. 46 9
As a result, "[t]he public has no right to the use of nonnavigable water over-
lying private lands for recreational purposes without the consent of the
landowner." 4 70
MONTANA
Date of Statehood: 1889
Water Law System: Prior appropriation
Montana Constitution: The Montana Constitution has several provisions
related to water, public access, and environmental protection that the Montana
courts have deemed relevant to Montana's public trust doctrine.47 1 These and
other relevant provisions include:
* Preamble: "We the people of Montana grateful to God for the quiet
beauty of our state, the grandeur of our mountains, the vastness of
our rolling plains, and desiring to improve the quality of life,
equality of opportunity and to secure the blessings of liberty for this
and future generations to ordain and establish this constitution."
* Art. IX, § 1: "The state and each person shall maintain and improve
a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and future
generations.' 4 72  "The legislature shall provide for the
466. Kansas v. Akers, 140 P. 637, 640 (Kan. 1914).
467. Id. at 650.
468. State ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1356, 1364 (Kan. 1990).
469. Id. at 1364-65.
470. Id. at 1365.
471. See, e.g., In re Adjudication of the Existing Rights to Use of all Water, 55 P.3d 396, 404
(Mont. 2002) (linking the Constitution to the public trust doctrine).
472. MONT. CONST., art. IX, § 1(1) (1972).
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administration and enforcement of this duty.' 4 73 "The legislature
shall provide adequate remedies for the protection of the
environmental life support system from degradation and provide
adequate remedies to prevent unreasonable depletion and
degradation of natural resources." 474
* Art. IX, § 3: "All existing rights to the use of any waters for any
useful or beneficial purpose are hereby recognized and
confirmed." 4 75 "The use of all water that is now or may hereafter be
appropriated for sale, rent, distribution or other beneficial use, the
right of way over the lands of others for all ditches, drains, flumes,
canals, and aqueducts necessarily used in connection therewith, and
the sites for reservoirs necessary for collecting and storing water
shall be held to be a public use.'4 76 "All surface, underground,
flood, and atmospheric waters within the boundaries of the state are
property of the state for the use of its people and are subject to
appropriation for beneficial uses as provided by law.'4 7 7 "The
legislature shall provide for the administration, control, and
regulation of water rights and shall establish a system of centralized
records, in addition to the present system of local records.'4 7 8
* Art. IX, § 4: "The legislature shall provide for the identification,
acquisition, restoration, enhancement, preservation, and
administration of scenic, historic, archeologic, scientific, cultural,
and recreational areas, sites, records, and objects, for their use and
enjoyment by the people."
* Art. IX, § 7: "The opportunity to harvest wild fish and wild game
animals is a heritage that shall forever be preserved to the individual
citizens of the state and does not create a right of trespass on private
property or diminution of other private rights."
Montana Statutes:
* MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-301 to 23-2-322: Recreational Use of
Streams. These provisions define "ordinary high-water mark" to be
"the line that water impresses on land by covering it for sufficient
periods to cause physical characteristics that distinguish the area
below the line from the area above it. Characteristics of the area
below the line include, when appropriate, but are not limited to
deprivation of the soil of substantially all terrestrial vegetation and
473. Id. § 1(2).
474. Id § 1(3).
475. Id. § 3(1).
476. Id. § 3(2).
477. Id § 3(3).
478. Id § 3(4).
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destruction of its agricultural vegetative value. A flood plain
adjacent to surface waters is not considered to lie within the surface
waters' high-water marks.'4 79 Recreational uses of surface waters
include "fishing, hunting, swimming, floating in small craft or other
flotation devices, boating in motorized craft unless otherwise
prohibited or regulated by law, or craft propelled by oar or paddle,
other water-related pleasure activities, and related unavoidable or
incidental uses.'"48 0 "'Surface water' means, for the purpose of
determining the public's access for recreational use, a natural water
body, its bed, and its banks up to the ordinary high-water mark." 48 1
While codifying public recreational rights, these provisions ensure
that title to land is not affected by public access, 482 and that the
public can acquire no prescriptive easements as a result of its
recreational use of surface waters. 483 Moreover, the rights do not
apply to lakes.4 84 These provisions also restrict riparian landowners'
liability.485 However, the provisions do allow the public rights to
portage above the high-water mark.486
* MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-705: Nothing in the state's water quality
laws and water quality assessment provisions "may be construed to
divest, impair, or diminish any water right recognized pursuant to
Title 85."
* MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-7-104: Provisions for the protection of
streambeds "shall not impair, diminish, divest or control any
existing or vested water rights under the laws of the state of
Montana or the United States."
* MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-111: "Navigable waters and all streams
of sufficient capacity to transport the products of the country are
public ways for the purposes of navigation and such transportation.
This section shall not be construed so as to affect or impair, in any
manner, any rights acquired prior to July 1, 1901, by any person,
association of persons, or corporation. The right of any person,
association of persons, or corporation to take and use any water, as
now provided by law, from any stream or streams for the purpose of
irrigation or any beneficial or industrial pursuit shall not be
abridged."
* MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-112: "All lakes wholly or partly within
this state which have been meandered and returned as navigable by
479. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-301 (2009).
480. Id. § 23-2-301(10).
481. Id. § 23-2-301(12).
482. Id. § 23-2-309.
483. Id § 23-2-322.
484. Id. § 23-2-3 10.
485. Id. § 23-2-32 1.
486. Id. § 23-2-311.
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the surveyors employed by the government of the United States and
all lakes which are navigable in fact are hereby declared to be
navigable and public waters, and all persons shall have the same
rights therein and thereto that they have in and to any other
navigable streams or public waters.' 4 87 "All rivers and streams
which have been meandered and returned as navigable by surveyors
employed by the government of the United States and all rivers and
streams which are navigable in fact are hereby declared
navigable.' 488
* MONT. CODE ANN., Title 85, Chapter 2: Surface Water and Ground
Water. This chapter provides for water rights adjudications;
appropriations, permits, and certificates of water rights; utilization
of water; and Indian and federal water rights.
* MONT. CODE ANN., Title 85, Chapter 7: Irrigation Districts.
* MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-16-102: "All docks and wharves built on
any of the navigable waters of the state shall be public docks and
wharves, and all boats, vessels, and steamboats plying such
navigable waters shall have a right to land thereat and take on and
discharge their cargoes and passengers thereon. The owner of such
dock or wharf shall have the right to charge and collect from the
owner or owners of such boat, steamboat, or vessel a reasonable
compensation therefor."
* MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-16-107: With respect to land under a
navigable water, state ownership extends to the high water mark or
meander line.
* MONT. CODE ANN., Title 85, Chapter 20: Water Compacts.
* MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-305: "Navigable rivers, sloughs, or
streams between the lines of ordinary high water thereof of the state
of Montana and all rivers, sloughs, and streams flowing through any
public lands of the state shall hereafter be public waters for the
purpose of angling, and any rights of title to such streams and the
land between high water flow lines or within the meander lines of
navigable streams shall be subject to the right of any person owning
an angler's license of this state who desires to angle therein or along
their banks to go upon the same for such purpose."
Definition of "Navigable Waters":
Early on, the Montana Supreme Court rejected the common law "ebb and
flow" tidal rule of navigability in favor of the navigable-in-fact test.489 For
487. Id. § 85-1-112(1).
488. Id. § 85-1-112(2).
489. Gibson v. Kelly, 39 P. 517, 519 (Mont. 1895).
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purposes of state title to the beds and banks, Montana uses a federal test of
navigability based on The Daniel Ball and The Montello.490 However, in the
Montana Supreme Court's interpretation, this is essentially a log floatation test.
For example, evidence that the Dearborn River was used in 1887 to float
approximately 100,000 railroad ties, and used in 1888 and 1889 to float log
drives supported a finding that the river was navigable for state title
purposes. 491 State ownership of the bed also gives the state ownership of
minerals contained therein. 492
Nevertheless, "where title to the bed of [a river] rests within the State, the
test of navigability for use and not for title, is a test to be determined under
state law and not federal law." 493 In its case law relying on the Montana
Constitution, the Montana Supreme Court has employed a broad "recreational
use" test to determine which waters are subject to public use. Specifically,
the capability of use of the waters for recreational purposes determined
whether the waters can be so used. The Montana Constitution clearly
provides that the State owns the waters for the benefit of its people. The
Constitution does not limit the waters' use. Consequently, this Court cannot
limit their use by inventing some restrictive test.494
By statute, for purposes of public use rights, streams and lakes in Montana
are navigable if they are navigable in fact under a commerce definition or
meandered and returned as navigable by federal surveyors. 495 In addition, the
public has a right to fish in any waters that flow through public lands.496
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Big Horn River is navigable
and Montana owns its beds and banks.497
Rights in "Navigable Waters":
The line between private and state ownership of the beds of navigable
waters is the high-water mark or meander line.498 However, under older
490. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 166 (Mont. 1984).
491. Id.; see also Edwards v. Severin, 785 P.2d 1022, 1023-24 (Mont. 1990) (concluding that the
Yellowstone River is a navigable river because it could float logs).
492. Jackson v. Burlington N., Inc., 667 P.2d 406,408 (Mont. 1983).
493. Mont. Coal for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d at 168.
494. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Mont. 1984) (rejecting
both the federal navigability and "pleasure boat" tests for public rights); see also Mont. Coal for Stream
Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d at 169 (recreational use and fishing can make a stream navigable for public
use purposes, and "[s]treambed ownership by a private party is irrelevant," overruling Herrin v.
Sutherland, 241 P. 328 (Mont. 1925), which held that persons who waded a non-navigable creek had
committed a trespass, on the grounds that that holding "was contrary to the public trust doctrine and the
1972 Montana Constitution").
495. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-1-111,85-1-112 (2009).
496. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-305.
497. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 553-57 (1981).
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statutes, riparian landowners on navigable streams took title to the low water
mark, while landowners along non-navigable waters took title to the middle of
the stream or lake.499 Neveertheless, even under these cases, public rights
extended to the high water mark.500
"The public has the right to use the waters and the bed and banks up to the
high water mark," including portage "in the least intrusive manner
possible." 501Moreover, "[u]nder the Constitution and the public trust doctrine,
the public has an instream, non-diversionary right to the recreational use of the
State's navigable surface waters. 502 However, this right does not give the
public access rights over private property. 503 Early rights recognized included
the rights to fish and to shoot wild ducks. 504
Montana is one of the western states that has used public ownership of
water to extend public trust rights to non-navigable waters. Thus, the Montana
Supreme Court has emphasized that "[t]he public trust doctrine in Montana's
Constitution grants public ownership in water not in beds and banks of
streams."505 Moreover, "[t]he Montana Constitution makes no distinction
between Class I and Class II waters. All waters are owned by the State for the
use of its people." 506 As a result, "the public has the right to use the water for
recreational purposes and minimal use of underlying and adjoining real estate
essential to enjoyment of its ownership in water," even if the bed and banks are
privately owned. 507 "The public has a right of use up to the high water mark,
but only such use as is necessary to utilization of the water itself. We hold that
498. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-16-107; Galt v. Mont. Dep't of Fish, Wildlife, & Parks, 731 P.2d
912, 915 (Mont. 1987).
499. Montgomery v. Gehring, 400 P.2d 403, 405 (Mont. 1965) (citing MONT. REV. CODE. § 67-712
(1947)); see also Faucett v. Dewey Lumber Co., 266 P. 646, 648 (Mont. 1928) (noting that under MONT.
REV. CODE § 6771 (1921), landowners along navigable waters took title to the low-water mark); Herrin,
241 P. at 331 (same); Gibson v. Kelly, 39 P. 517, 519 (Mont. 1895) (noting that the boundary between
public and private ownership is the low water mark, based on Civ. CODE § 772 (1895)).
500. Gibson, 39 P. at 519-20 (recognizing public rights of fishing and navigation to this mark).
501. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Mont. 1984).
502. In re Adjudication of the Existing Rights to Use All the Water, 55 P.3d 396, 404 (Mont.
2002). For a more detailed discussion of recreational use rights in Montana, see generally Sarah K.
Stauffer, The Row on the Ruby: State Management of Public Trust Resources, the Right to Exclude, and
the Future of Recreational Stream Access in Montana, 30 ENVTL. L. 1421 (2006).
503. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d at 1091.
504. Herrin, 241 P. at 331.
505. Galt v. Montana Dep't of Fish, Wildlife, & Parks, 731 P.2d 912, 915 (Mont. 1987) (emphasis
added).
506. Id.
507. Id.; Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Hildeth, 684 P.2d at 1092 (noting that underlying
ownership of the bed does not matter for the public's recreational use right); Mont. Coal. for Stream
Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984) (holding that "under the public trust doctrine
and the 1972 Montana Constitution, any surface waters that are capable of recreational use may be so




any use of the bed and banks must be of minimal impact."508 Nevertheless,
Montana statutes make it clear that appropriated water rights trump any other
public interest in the waters, including environmental protections and public
use rights. 509
Montana statutes codify public rights of recreation, navigation, and fishing
in the navigable and public surface waters.510 Given the statutory limitations
regarding "surface waters" and "natural" waters in § 23-2-301 of the Montana
Code, recreational rights in artificial lakes are limited.511
NEBRASKA
Date of Statehood: 1867
Water Law System: Prior appropriation, although some riparian rights
remain 512
Nebraska Constitution: Nebraska's constitution contains several provisions
relating to water. These include:
* Art. XV, § 4: Water a Public Necessity. "The necessity of water for
domestic use and for irrigation purposes in the State of Nebraska is
hereby declared to be a natural want."
* Art XV, § 5: "The use of the water of every natural stream within
the State of Nebraska is hereby dedicated to the people of the state
for beneficial purposes, subject to the provisions of the following
section."
* Art. XV, § 6: This section establishes the right to divert
unappropriated waters, subject to a public interest limitation and a
preference for domestic use, followed by a preference for
agriculture.
* Art. XV, § 7: This section declares that the appropriation of water
for power uses is a public purpose.
Nebraska Statutes:
* NEB. REV. STAT. § Al-105: South Platte River Compact.
* NEB. REv. STAT. § Al-106: Republican River Compact.
508. Galt, 731 P.2d at 915; Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d at 172.
509. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-5-705,75-7-104,85-1-111 (2009).
510. Id §§ 23-2-301 to 23-2-322, 85-1-111, 85-1-112, 85-16-102, 87-2-305.
511. Ryan v. Harrison & Harrison Farms, L.L.P., No. 00-395, 2001 WL 828068, at *4 (Mont.
2001).
512. Koch v. Aupperle, 737 N.W.2d 869, 878 (Neb. 2007); Wasserman v. Coffee, 141 N.W.2d 738,
744-45 (Neb. 1966).
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* NEB. REv. STAT. § Al-110: Nebraska-South Dakota-Wyoming
Water Compact.
* NEB. REV. STAT. § Al-ill: Nebraska-Kansas Water Compact
Commission.
* NEB. REV. STAT. § Al- 112: Wyoming-Nebraska Compact on Upper
Niobrara River.
* NEB. REv. STAT. § Al-1 14: Missouri-Nebraska Boundary Compact.
Article VII(b) of the Compact prohibits the states from claiming the
beds of the Missouri River against private landowners.
* NEB. REV. STAT. § Al- 115: Blue River Basin Compact.
* NEB. REv. STAT. § Al-123: South Dakota-Nebraska Boundary
Compact. Article VII(b) of the Compact prohibits the states from
claiming the beds of the Missouri River against private landowners.
* NEB. REV. STAT., Chapter 46: Irrigation and Regulation of Water.
This chapter provides for water rights adjudications and ground
water regulation.
Definition of "Navigable Waters":
In 1906, the Nebraska Supreme Court observed the variations among the
states regarding what constituted "navigable waters" and blamed the
"confusion" on a variety of factors. 513 Noting that Nebraska had adopted
English common law, the court rejected the navigable-in-fact test for title as a
mistake and adhered instead to the common law ebb-and-flow tidal test-even
for the Missouri River.514 Despite holding that Nebraska lacked title in the
Missouri River, the court explained that "[t]he public retains its easement of the
right of passage along and over the waters of the river as a public highway.
This is the interest of the public in connection with such rivers which is
paramount, and which is, and should be, protected by the courts." 515
Rights in "Navigable Waters":
A landowner along navigable or non-navigable waters "owns to the thread
of the stream, and his riparian rights extend to existing and subsequently
formed islands." 516 "The only difference is that in the case of a navigable
513. Kinkead v. Turgeon, 109 N.W. 744, 744 (Neb. 1906).
514. Id. at 745-47.
515. Id. at 747. But see Clark v. Cambridge & Arapahoe Irrigation & Improvement Co., 64 N.W.
239, 240-41 (Neb. 1895) (accepting the navigable-in-fact test but nevertheless finding that the
Republican River was not navigable).
516. Monument Farms, Inc. v. Daggett, 520 N.W.2d 556, 561-62 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994);
Krumwielde v. Rose, 129 N.W.2d 491, 496 (Neb. 1964).
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stream, such as the Missouri River, it is subject to the superior easement of
navigation." 517 Further,
[t]he interest of the public in the waters and bed of a navigable river is
analogous to that of the public in a public road. It has the right of passage
over the stream as it had over the road. The owner of the land abutting upon
a private road can do nothing in any way to interfere with the rights of the
public in the same, nor can the riparian owner on the banks of a navigable
stream exercise any dominion over its waters or over the bed thereof in any
manner inconsistent with, or opposed to, the public easement.5 18
Apart from this, neither the courts nor the legislature have
comprehensively developed Nebraska's public trust law.
NEVADA
Date of Statehood: 1864
Water Law System: Prior appropriation
Nevada Constitution: There are no provisions relevant to water in the Nevada
Constitution.
Nevada Statutes:
* NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.450: Nuisance includes befouling,
obstructing, or rendering dangerous for passage "a lake, navigable
river, bay, stream, canal, ditch, millrace, or basin .... "
* NEV. REV. STAT. § 322.0052: This provision defines a littoral or
riparian residential parcel.
* NEV. REV. STAT. § 455B.420: "'Water access area' includes,
without limitation, a beach, river entry or exit point and land located
at or below the ordinary high-water mark of a navigable body of
water within this state."
* NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 532: State Engineer.
* NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 533: Adjudication of Vested
Water Rights; Appropriation of Public Waters. "The water of all
sources of water supply within the boundaries of the state whether
above or beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to the
public."5 19 These provisions also declare that recreational use of the
waters is a beneficial use.520
517. Krumwielde, 129 N.W.2d at 496 (citing Kinkead v. Turgeon, 109 N.W. 744 (Neb. 1906)).
518. Kinkead, 109 N.W. at 747.
519. NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025 (2008).
520. Id. § 533.030(2).
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* NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 534: Underground Water and
Wells.
* NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 535: Dams and Other
Obstructions.
* NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 536: Ditches, Canals, Flumes,
and Other Conduits.
* NEV. REv. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 537: Navigable Waters. This
chapter lists specific waters that the State of Nevada considers
navigable for title purposes. Thus, "[a]ll of the Colorado River
within the State of Nevada, from the Arizona line on the north to the
California line on the south, is hereby declared to be a navigable
stream for purposes of fixing ownership on the banks and beds
thereof, and title to the lands below the high water mark thereof is
held by the State of Nevada, insofar as they lie within the state." 52 1
Similarly, the Virgin River and Winnemuca Lake are navigable
waters, with title to their beds and banks in the State of Nevada.522
* NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 538: Interstate Waters,
Compacts, and Commissions. The Colorado River Compact is
codified at § 538.0 10.
* NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 539: Irrigation Districts.
* NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 540: Planning and Development
of Water Resources.
* NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 540A: Regional Planning and
Management.
* NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 541: Water Conservancy
Districts.
o NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 543: Control of Floods.
* NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 544: Modification of Weather.
Definition of "Navigable Waters":
In Chapter 537, Nevada's statutes declare certain waters to be navigable
for title purposes, including the Colorado River, the Virgin River, and
Winnemuca Lake.523 These statutes are effectively treated as conclusive
determinations of navigability for title purposes. 524
521. Id. § 537.010.
522. Id. §§ 537.020, 537.030.
523. NEV. REV. STAT. § 537 (2008).
524. See State Eng'r v. Cowles Bros, Inc., 478 P.2d 159, 160 (Nev. 1970) (concluding that, because
Winnemuca Lake went dry naturally and gradually, the court would normally have declared it non-




However, Chapter 537 does not provide a complete list of the navigable
waters in Nevada, and outside of these statutory declarations, the Nevada courts
use the federal test for navigability and recognize that the U.S. Supreme Court
has established different navigability tests for Commerce Clause and state title
purposes. 525 For state title purposes, the water must be navigable as of the date
of statehood.526 Moreover, "[a] body of water is navigable if it is used or is
usable in its ordinary condition, as a highway of commerce over which trade
and travel are or may be conducted."527 Nevertheless, the Nevada Supreme
Court has interpreted the federal title test to be a log floatation test, concluding
that:
[a]lthough no Supreme Court case has expressly based its decision of title
navigability on the capacity of a stream to float out logs, the emphasized
portions of . .. The Montello and Appalachian Power leads us to believe
that in the setting of this case navigability for title has been established.
Log driving was the first and apparently only important commercial use of
the Carson. The river was fortuitously and ideally located geographically
for this use. The Carson River was and is navigable.528
Moreover, Nevada courts have noted that the Supreme Court allows states to
use less stringent tests for navigability to define allowable public uses.529
Rights in "Navigable Waters":
The Nevada Supreme Court has noted that "the states hold title to the beds
of navigable watercourses in trust for the people of their respective states. Title
to navigable water beds are normally inalienable."530 As a result, in the absence
on an express legislative determination to convey these submerged lands, it is
presumed that state land patents did not convey them.531
Early case law indicates that private landowners own to the low water
mark of navigable waters. 532 However, if the title describes a meander line, the
landowner takes only to that meander line or high water line.533
525. State v. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231, 1233, 1235-36, 1238 (Nev. 1972).
526. State Eng'r, 478 P.2d at 160.
527. Id. (citing Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86 (1922)).
528. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d at 1236; see also Shoemaker v. Hatch, 13 Nev. 261, 267 (1878)
(concluding that the Truckee River is navigable because it is "a highway for the floatage of wood and
timber, and has been treated by the officers of the government as a navigable stream").
529. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d at 1235.
530. Id. at 1233, 1235-36, 1238.
531. Id.
532. Shoemaker, 13 Nev. at 267.
533. Michelsen v. Harvey, 822 P.2d 660, 662 (Nev. 1991); Reno Brewing Co. v. Pacjard, 103 P.
415 (Nev. 1909).
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Nevada's case law on its public trust doctrine is quite limited. Indeed, one
writer has declared that "Nevada remains the only western state that has not
addressed the public trust doctrine." 534
Nevertheless, as in many western states, the issue of the relationship
between appropriative water rights and the public trust doctrine has arisen in
Nevada, although the courts have largely side-stepped the issue. 535 The Nevada
Supreme Court has discussed the public trust doctrine in the water rights
context, however, stating that:
Under the Public Trust Doctrine, the state government, as trustee of all
public natural resources, owes a fiduciary obligation to the general public
to maintain public uses unless an alternative use would achieve a
countervailing public benefit. Thus, the Public Trust Doctrine serves to
protect public expectations in natural resources held in common against
destabilizing change. 536
Moreover, the State Engineer's
refusal to consider alternatives to the [water] project is not consistent with
the exercise of his functions as the trustee of water resources in Nevada and
his responsibility to insure that 'all sources of water supply within the ...
state whether above or beneath the surface of the ground' is managed as an
asset belonging to the public. In refusing to consider any of the alternatives
presented by the protestants to the use proposed by the applicants, the State
Engineer has violated his trust and has failed to consider adequately the
public's interest in its water resources. 537
As in Montana, the statutory declaration of public ownership of Nevada's
water may yet influence its public trust doctrine. In 1997, the Nevada Supreme
Court declared that "the most fundamental tenet of Nevada water law [is that]
'[t]he water of sources of water supply within the boundaries of the state
whether above or beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to the public."'
53 8
In addition, at least one justice of the Nevada Supreme Court has expressed a
willingness to consider "the existence and role of the public trust doctrine in the
State of Nevada," noting that in other states the doctrine has evolved to include
recreational and ecological uses and emphasizing the public ownership of water
in Nevada. 539 According to Justice Rose, "[t]his extension of the doctrine is
534. John P. Sande IV, A River Runs to It: Can the Public Trust Doctrine Save Walker Lake?, 44
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 831, 833 n.15 (2004).
535. See, e.g., Mineral County v. Nev. Dep't of Conservation & Natural Res, 20 P.3d 800, 807 n.35
(Nev. 2001) (avoiding the issue of how the public trust doctrine would apply to water rights affecting
Walker River on procedural grounds).
536. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Washoe County, 918 P.2d 697, 709 n.7 (Nev. 1996)
(citations omitted).
537. Id. at 709 (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025).
538. Desert Irrigation, Ltd. v. State, 944 P.2d 835, 842 (Nev. 1997) (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. §
533.025, with the court adding emphasis).
539. Mineral County, 20 P.3d at 807-08 (Rose, J., concurring).
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natural and necessary where, as here, the navigable water's existence is wholly
dependent on tributaries that appear to be over-appropriated."5 4 0
NEW MEXICO
Date of Statehood: 1912
Water Law System: Prior appropriation
New Mexico Constitution: The New Mexico Constitution includes several
provisions related to water, and the New Mexico courts have determined that
the constitutional declaration of public ownership of the waters is relevant to
public use rights. Relevant provisions of the Constitution include:
* Art. XVI, § 1: "All existing rights to the use of any waters in this
state for any useful or beneficial purpose are hereby recognized and
confirmed."
* Art. XVI, § 2: "The unappropriated water of every natural stream,
perennial or torrential, within the state of New Mexico, is hereby
declared to belong to the public and to be subject to appropriation
for beneficial use, in accordance with the laws of this state. Priority
of appropriation shall give the better right."
* Art. XVI, § 3: "Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and
the limit of the right to the use of water."
* Art. XVI, § 6(A): "The 'water trust fund' is created in the state
treasury to conserve and protect the water resources of New Mexico
and to ensure that New Mexico has the water it needs for a strong
and vibrant future. The purpose of the fund shall be to secure a
supply of clean and safe water for New Mexico's residents."
* Art. XX, § 21: "The protection of the state's beautiful and healthful
environment is hereby declared to be of fundamental importance to
the public interest, health, safety and the general welfare. The
Legislature shall provide for control of pollution and control of
despoilment of the air, water and other natural resources of this
state, consistent with the use and development of these resources for
the maximum benefit of the people."
New Mexico Statutes:
* N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-17-7: "A municipality shall consider
ordinances and codes to encourage water conservation and drought
management planning.. ..
540. Id. at 808 (connecting the public trust doctrine to NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025, which declares
public ownership of Nevada's water).
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* N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-27-1 to 3-27-9: Municipal Water Facilities.
* N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-53-1 to 3-53-5: Municipal Regulation of
Waters.
* N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-14: This provision prohibits diversions or
reductions of flows that are detrimental to game fish.
* N.M. STAT. ANN. § 19-13-2(C): This provision defines "state lands"
to include "all land owned by the state, all land owned by school
districts, beds of navigable rivers and lakes, submerged lands and
lands in which mineral rights have been reserved to the state."
* N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 1: Water Rights in General.
"All natural waters flowing in streams and watercourses, whether
such be perennial, or torrential, within the limits of the state of New
Mexico, belong to the public and are subject to appropriation for
beneficial use. A watercourse is hereby defined to be any river,
creek, arroyo, canyon, draw, or wash, or any other channel having
definite banks and bed with visible evidence of the occasional flow
of water."54 1 This article also contains provisions related to the
Pecos River water shortage crisis and New Mexico's obligations to
deliver water to Texas, §§ 72-1-2.1 et seq., and settlements of water
rights claims and disputes by tribes. 542
* N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 2: State Engineer.
* N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 3: Water Districts and Water
Masters.
* N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 4: Surveys, Investigations and
Adjudications of Water Rights.
* N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 4A: Water Project Finance.
* N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 5: Appropriation and Use of
Surface Waters.
* N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 5A: Ground Water Storage
and Recovery.
* N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 6: Water-Use Leasing.
* N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 7: Appeals from State
Engineer.
* N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 8: Offenses and Penalties
under the Water Act of 1907.
* N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 9: Application of the Water
Act of 1907.
* N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 10: Community Uses.




* N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 11: Salt Lakes. "All the salt
lakes within this state, and the salt which has, or may accumulate on
the shores thereof, is, and shall be free to the citizens, and each one
shall have power to collect salt on any occasion free from
molestation or disturbance." 54 3
* N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 12: Underground Waters.
"The water of underground streams, channels, artesian basins,
reservoirs or lakes, having reasonably ascertainable boundaries, is
declared to belong to the public and is subject to appropriation for
beneficial use."544
* N.M. STA. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 12A: Mine Dewatering.
* N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 13: Artesian Wells.
* N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 14: Interstate Stream
Commission; Protection of Interstate Streams.
* N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 15: Interstate Compacts. The
Colorado River Compact is codified within this chapter.545
Definition of "Navigable Waters":
New Mexico cases regarding title navigability are limited, and the most
important resulted in the U.S. Supreme Court declaring the Rio Grande non-
navigable. Specifically, the Court reversed the New Mexico Territorial Court to
find that "the Rio Grande is not navigable within the limits of the territory of
New Mexico. The mere fact that logs, poles, and rafts are floated down a
stream occasionally and in times of high water does not make it a navigable
river." 546 The Court went on to note:
Obviously, the Rio Grande, within the limits of New Mexico, is not a
stream over which, in its ordinary condition, trade and travel can be
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. Its use for
any purposes of transportation has been and is exceptional, and only in
times of temporary high water. The ordinary flow is not sufficient.547
More recently, the New Mexico Court of Appeals relied on the federal test
of navigability from The Daniel Ball to declare Navajo Lake to be navigable.548
However, this question arose in the context of the applicability of maritime law,
not state title.
543. Id.§72-11-1.
544. Id. § 72-12-1.
545. Id. § 72-15-5.
546. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 698 (1899) (citing The
Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 439 (1874)).
547. Id. at 699.
548. Wreyford v. Arnold, 477 P.2d 332, 336 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970) (citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S.
(10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870)).
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State title to the beds and banks of navigable waters is less critical to New
Mexico's public trust doctrine than in other states, because the New Mexico
Supreme Court held early on that the New Mexico Constitution's declaration of
public ownership of waters-Article XVI, § 2-is relevant to the definition of
"public waters" for public use purposes. Regarding this provision as a
declaration of existing law, not a change, the court concluded that beneficial
uses include recreation and fishing, unhampered by a doctrine of riparian
rights. 549 Moreover, navigability under federal law is not the only test for
determining whether waters are public; recreational use is enough.55 0
Rights in "Navigable Waters":
"So far as non-navigable streams are concerned, the common law rule,
seemingly without exception, is that the one owning both banks of a stream
likewise owns the entire bed thereof, the waters are private waters, and the
owner has the exclusive right to fish therein." 551 Although "[t]he same rule is
sometimes applied to navigable streams . . . it is conceded that the weight of
authority is, rather, that the bed and waters of a navigable stream are the
property of the public with adjoining land owners having no exclusive right to
fish therein." 552 Indeed:
Where there is no separation in ownership of soil and water, "the right to
hunt and trap from boats on rivers, lakes, streams, etc., is analogous to the
right to take fish from the water. As a general rule, the test as to the public
right of fowling, hunting, and trapping is the public or private ownership of
the soil beneath the waters."553
As in many western states, the fact that the New Mexico Constitution declares
waters to be publicly owned is relevant not just to state water law but also to
the public's rights to use those waters. In 1947, the New Mexico Supreme
Court declared that all waters are public waters until beneficially appropriated,
and hence the public can use all waters for outside recreation, sports, and
fishing.554
In 1899, the U.S. Supreme Court suggested with regard to the Rio Grande
River that the federal government's interest in downstream navigability may
limit application of the prior appropriation doctrine. Thus, even though the Rio
Grande is non-navigable in New Mexico, the Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation
Company could not divert the entire flow of the river and so destroy
549. State ex rel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421, 427-28 (N.M.
1947).
550. Id. at 430.
551. Id. at 426.
552. Id.
553. Id. (quoting 24 AM. JuR. 378).
554. Id. at 429-32.
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downstream navigability. 555 While the Court recognized that the western states
were moving toward prior appropriation, it still held that appropriative rights
under state law could not destroy the United States' rights to downstream
flow. 556 As a result, it remanded the case for a determination of the effects of
the irrigation company's proposed dam and diversion on downstream
navigability. 557 After the case made another trip to the Supreme Court,55 8 the
New Mexico Territorial Court eventually concluded that the irrigation company
had forfeited its right to build the dam.559
NORTH DAKOTA
Date of Statehood: 1889
Water Law System: Prior appropriation
North Dakota Constitution: The North Dakota Constitution has two
provisions potentially relevant to public trust principles:
* Art. XI, § 3: "All flowing streams and natural watercourses shall
forever remain the property of the state for mining, irrigating and
manufacturing purposes."
* Art. XI, § 27: "Hunting, trapping, fishing and the taking of game
area valued part of our heritage and will be forever preserved for the
people and managed by law and regulation for the public good."
North Dakota Statutes:
* N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15: "Except when the grant under which
the land is held involves a different intent, the owner of the upland,
when it borders on a navigable lake or stream, takes to the edge of
the lake or stream at low watermark. All navigable rivers shall
remain and be deemed public highways. In all cases when the
opposite banks of any stream not navigable belong to different
persons, the stream and the bed thereof shall become common to
both."
* N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-06-08: "Islands and accumulations of land
formed in the beds of streams which are navigable belong to the
state, if there is no title or prescription to the contrary. The control
and management, including the power to execute surface and
555. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 701-02 (1899).
556. Id. at 703.
557. Id.at 710.
558. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 65 P. 276 (N.M. Terr. 1900), rev'd and
remanded, 184 U.S. 416,424-25 (1902).
559. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 85 P. 393, 399 (N.M. Ter. 1906).
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mineral leases, of islands, relictions, and accumulations of land
owned by the state of North Dakota in navigable streams and waters
and the beds thereof, must be governed by chapter 61-33."
* N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01: "All waters within the limits of the
state from the following sources of water supply belong to the
public and are subject to appropriation for beneficial use and the
right to uses these waters must be acquired pursuant to chapter 61-
04": surface waters, "excluding diffuse surface waters," and all
waters underground.
* N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-08: "Every person who in any manner
obstructs the free navigation of any navigable watercourse within
this state is guilty of a misdemeanor."
* N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-17: This provision allows the booming of
logs on shores of navigable streams, but the owner must leave a
channel for free passage.
* N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-26: State Water Resources Policy.
* N.D. CENT. CODE, Chapter 61-04: Appropriation of Water. Among
other things, the proposed appropriation must be in the public
interest, which includes consideration of "the effect on fish and
game resources and public recreation opportunities."5 60 North
Dakota prioritizes uses of water; fish, wildlife, and recreational uses
are all included in the sixth priority, after domestic, municipal,
livestock, irrigation, and industrial uses. 56 1
* N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04.1-01: "[T]he state of North Dakota claims
its sovereign right to use the moisture contained in the clouds and
atmosphere within the state boundaries. All water derived as a result
of weather modification operations shall be considered a part of
North Dakota's basic water supply and all statutes, rules, and
regulations applying to natural precipitation shall also apply to
precipitation resulting from cloud seeding."
* N.D. CENT. CODE, Chapter 61-15: Water Conservation. A
"navigable lake" is "any lake which shall have been meandered and
its metes and bounds established by the government of the United
States in the survey of public lands." 5 62 This section also defines
"high water mark." Under its police power, the state has control of
navigable lakes "within the ordinary high water mark for the
purpose of constructing, maintaining, and operating dams, dikes,
ditches, fills, spillways, or other structures to promote the
conservation, development, storage, distribution, and utilization of
560. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06(4) (2009).
561. Id. § 61-04-06.1.
562. Id. § 61-15-01.
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such water and the propagation and preservation of wildlife." 56 3
These provisions also allow for water and wildlife conservation
projects.564 Finally, "[a]ny person who, without written consent of
the state engineer, shall drain or cause to be drained, or who shall
attempt to drain any lake or pond, which has been meandered by the
government of the United States in the survey of public lands, shall
be guilty of a class B misdemeanor." 56 5
* N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-33-01: "Sovereign lands" are "those areas,
including beds and islands, lying within the ordinary high
watermark of navigable lakes and streams."
Definition of "Navigable Waters":
Navigability for title purposes is a question of federal law, and a water is
navigable if it is navigable-in-fact. 566 North Dakota does not employ the tidal
navigability test.567 Instead:
When a stream is not tidewater . . . , it must be navigable in fact in its
natural state, without the aid of or reference to artificial means, and be of
sufficient capacity to render it capable of being used as a highway for
commerce, either in the transportation of the products of the mines, forests,
or of the soil of the country through which it runs, or of passengers ....
It must be capable of being used for such a purpose, that is, for a public
highway, a considerable part of the year, and it is not sufficient that it have
an adequate volume of water therefor only occasionally, as the result of
freshets, for brief periods of uncertain recurrence and duration.
5 68
The North Dakota Supreme Court has noted, however, that "the test as to
navigability applied in North Dakota is not as narrow as that in federal courts . .
. ."569 A water will be deemed navigable-in-fact for state title purposes if it
supports rowing for pleasure and hunting, the cutting and selling of ice, or
hunting from flat-bottomed boats. 5 70 Similarly, public uses supporting
navigability do not have to be commercial or pecuniary:
A use public in its character may exist when the waters may be used for the
convenience and enjoyment of the public, whether traveling upon trade
purposes or pleasure purposes. . . . Purposes of pleasure, public
563. Id. § 61-15-02.
564. Id. § 61-15-03.
565. Id. § 61-15-08.
566. Ozark-Mahoning Co. v. North Dakota, 37 N.W.2d 488, 490 (N.D. 1949).
567. Roberts v. Taylor. 181 N.W. 622, 625 (N.D. 1921).
568. Bissel v. Olson, 143 N.W. 340, 341 (N.D. 1913) (citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.)
557, 563; The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874)).
569. Ozark-Mahoning Co., 37 N.W.2d at 491.
570. North Dakota v. Brace, 36 N.W.2d 330, 333 (N.D. 1949).
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convenience, and enjoyment may be public as well as purposes of trade.
Navigation may as surely exist in the former as in the latter.571
In addition, it is the capacity for public use, not current use, that counts. 572
Even so, under this test Fuller Lake is non-navigable, because it is small
and marshy and its only public use is hunting.573 Similarly, Grenora Lake is
also not navigable:
There is no evidence that any use has ever been or could be made of the
waters of the lake either for pleasure or for profit, for travel, or for trade.
No boats were used thereon. The water at all times has been of such a
character that it was not habitable for fish. Neither the lake not its
surroundings are suitable for any purposes of pleasure. It is true that aquatic
birds sometimes rested on its surface and there is evidence that hunters
occasionally shot waterfowl that flew to or from the lake, but this was an
infrequent occurrence. 574
The provision of the North Dakota Constitution declaring waters to be
publicly. owned does not give the state title to the beds and banks.575 The
Legislature can declare waters navigable, but "[t]he Legislature may not adopt
a retroactive definition of navigability which would destroy a title already
vested under a federal grant, or transfer to the state a property right in a body of
water or the bed thereof that had previously been acquired by a private
owner." 576
Unless a waterway is meandered or declared navigable by the state
legislature, it is presumed to be non-navigable, and the burden of proof is on
the party claiming navigability. 57 7 Thus, the Mouse River was presumed non-
navigable, because the parties assumed that it was.57 8 In contrast, Devil's Lake
was stipulated to be navigable-in-fact based on boats using the lake for
commercial purposes. 579 Similarly, "it is clear from the undisputed testimony. .
. and from prior holdings of this court that the Missouri River is a navigable
stream in this state." 580
North Dakota engaged in a long battle with the United States to quiet title
to the Little Missouri River. Despite original findings that the river was
navigable, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed North Dakota's quiet title claim
on the grounds that North Dakota had failed to comply with the Quiet Title
571. Roberts, 181 N.W. at 626.
572. Id.
573. Brace, 36 N.W.2d at 334.
574. Ozark-Mahoning Co., 37 N.W.2d at 491.
575. Id. at 335; see also Roberts, 181 N.W. at 625 (noting that this constitutional provision "is a
declaration concerning public waters").
576. Brace, 36 N.W.2d at 332.
577. Amoco Oil Co. v. N.D. Highway Dep't, 262 N.W.2d 726, 728 (N.D. 1978).
578. Id.
579. Rutten v. North Dakota, 93 N.W.2d 796, 797 (N.D. 1958).
580. Hogue v. Bougois, 71 N.W.2d 47, 52 (N.D. 1955) (citing Gardner v. Green, 271 N.W. 775;
North Dakota v. Loy, 720 N.W.2d 668).
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Act's twelve-year statute of limitations5 81 for claims against the federal
government. 582 In 1986, Congress amended the Act to exempt state claims to
navigable rivers from the statute of limitations, and North Dakota re-filed its
action. Nevertheless, despite evidence of use by Indians, ferries, and explorers,
and modern use by recreational canoeists, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit concluded that the Little Missouri River is not navigable and that
title to its beds and banks remains in the United States. 583 The court applied
The Daniel Ball test of navigability. 584
Rights in "Navigable Waters":
Riparian landowners own to the thread of non-navigable streams. 585 The
federal equal footing doctrine gives states title to the beds underlying navigable
waterways to the high water mark, but states can then pick a different title line.
Despite a statutory provision establishing that riparian landowners generally
take title to the low water mark,586 "[w]hether North Dakota has limited its title
to the area below the low watermark has not been decided."58 7
Regardless of title, however, the public trust doctrine extends to the high
water mark, because under the equal footing doctrine and the public trust
doctrine, the state could not totally abdicate its interest in that land.588 Thus, the
state and private landowners have co-existent, overlapping interests in the shore
zone between the high and low water marks. 589 The ordinary high water mark
is determined by the existing state of the river, even if Army Corps dams-as
on the Missouri River-have raised the water level.590 "[T]he state has rights in
the property up to the ordinary high watermark. The ordinary high watermark is
ambulatory, and is not determined as of a fixed date." 591 The public trust
doctrine and its protection of the public's right of navigation support this
view. 592
581. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1972).
582. Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of University & School Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 284-93
(1983).
583. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of University & School Lands v. United States, 972 F.2d 235, 240
(8th Cir. 1992).
584. Id.at237-38.
585. Amoco Oil Co. v. North Dakota Highway Dep't, 262 N.W.2d 726, 728 (N.D. 1978) (citing St.
Paul & P.R.R. Co. v. Schurmeier, 72 U.S. 272, 287-89 (1868)).
586. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15 (2009).
587. J.P. Furlong Enterprises, Inc. v. Sun Exploration & Production Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 132 n.1
(N.D. 1988). But see State ex rel. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills (Mills 1), 523 N.W.2d 537, 540-42 (N.D.
1994).
588. Mills 1, 523 N.W.2d at 542-44.
589. State ex rel. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills (Mills 1l), 592 N.W.2d 591, 592 (N.D. 1999).
590. Id.
591. Id. (citing In re Ownership of the Bed of Devil's Lake, 423 N.W.2d 141, 143-44 (N.D.
1988)).
592. Id. at 593.
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"The purpose of state title was to protect the public right of navigation." 593
Indeed, by statute, "[a]ll navigable rivers shall remain and be deemed public
highways." 594 Thus, the policy of protecting the public right of navigation is
embodied in both the public trust doctrine and North Dakota statutes. 595 State
title and public rights shift to the new beds when navigable rivers change
course:
The Territorial Legislative Assembly recognized that our state would
receive title to the beds of navigable waters at statehood. Accordingly, by
1877, it had enacted a code that would secure title of the state to such lands
and modify common law so that the state's title would follow the
movement of the bed of the river. This accords with the underlying public
policy, since the purpose of a state holding title to a navigable riverbed is to
foster the public's right of navigation, traditionally the most important
feature of the public trust doctrine. Moreover, it seems to us that other
important aspects of the state's public interest, such as bathing, swimming,
recreation, and fishing, as well as irrigation, industrial and other water
supplies, are most closely associated with where the water is in the new
riverbed, not the old.596
The public trust doctrine does not prohibit all development, and hence the
granting of a permit to drain wetlands did not violate the public trust doctrine-
assuming that the doctrine even applied-when the State Engineer studied the
consequences, imposed conditions, and was subject to a public interest
requirement. 59 7 However, the public trust doctrine does limit the state's
discretionary authority "to allocate vital state resources," as enunciated in
Illinois Central Railroad.59 8
Moreover, the doctrine is not restricted to conveyances of real property;
instead, "[t]he State holds the navigable waters, as well as the lands beneath
them, in trust for the public," as provided in the North Dakota Constitution and
refined in statutes.599 Thus, North Dakota's public trust doctrine applies to
appropriations of water. When the State Engineer issues water permits, "the
Public Trust Doctrine requires, at a minimum, a determination of the potential
effect of the allocation of water on the present water supply and future needs of
this State. This necessarily involves planning responsibility." 600 While the
593. J.P. Furlong Enters., Inc. v. Sun Exploration & Production Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 132 (N.D.
1988).
594. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15 (2009).
595. J.P. Furlong Enters., 423 N.W.2d at 136-37.
596. Id. at 140.
597. In the Matter of the Application for Permits to Drain Related to Stone Creek Channel
Improvements & White Spur Drain, 424 N.W.2s 894, 901 (N.D. 1988) (citing United Plainsmen v. N.D.
Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 463 (N.D. 1976)).
598. United Plainsmen Ass'n, 247 N.W.2d at 460.
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North Dakota Supreme Court also acknowledged that "[i]t is evident that the
Public Trust Doctrine is assuming an expanding role in environmental law," it
saw no need for such expansive declarations in the context of water rights
permitting.601 Instead, even as "[c]onfined to traditional concepts, the Doctrine
confirms the State's role as trustee of the public waters. It permits alienation
and allocation of such precious state resources only after an analysis of present
supply and future need." 602
OKLAHOMA
Date of Statehood: 1907
Water Law System: Prior appropriation and riparian rights603
Oklahoma Constitution: Only one provision of the Oklahoma Constitution is
relevant to water. It declares that "[t]he Legislature shall have power and shall
provide for a system of levees, drains, and ditches and of irrigation in this State
when deemed expedient. . . ."604
Oklahoma Statutes:
* OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 60: This section preserves riparian
rights to use water for domestic use.
* OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 337: "Islands and accumulations of land
formed in the beds of streams which are navigable, belong to the
state, if there is no title or prescription to the contrary."
* 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 1: Irrigation and Water Rights.
* 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter lA: Oklahoma Dam Safety Act.
* 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 2: Irrigation Districts.
* 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 4: Conservation in General.
601. Id. at 463.
602. Id.; see also N.D. State Water Comm'n v. Bd. of Managers, 332 N.W.2d 254, 258 (N.D. 1983)
(holding that the State does not lose its authority over the waters of a lake merely because the bed is
privately owned and determining that "[p]rotecting the integrity of the waters of the state is a valid
exercise of the Commission's duties pursuant to § 61-02-12, NDCC, as well as being part of the state's
affirmative duty under the 'public trust' doctrine"; as a result the Commission had authority to control
the drainage of a non-navigable lake).
603. Franco-Am. Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 571-72 (Okla. 1990)
(noting that while the 1963 amendments to Oklahoma's water law modified riparian rights, Oklahoma
riparian owners retain "a vested common-law right to the reasonable use of the stream," and the
legislature's attempt to extinguish those riparian rights by giving ownership of all water to the state was
unconstitutional; however, appropriative rights for irrigation have existed since 1897, and riparian and
appropriative rights are co-existent).
604. OKLA. CONST., art. XVI, § 3.
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* 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 5: Conservancy Act of
Oklahoma.
* 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 8: Grand River Dam Authority.
* 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 11: Oklahoma Groundwater
Law.
* 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 14: Oklahoma Water Resources
Board.
* 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 14A: Oklahoma Weather
Modification Act.
* 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 15: Port Authorities.
* 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 17: Regional Water Distribution
Act.
* 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 18: Rural Water, Sewer, Gas and
Solid Waste Management Districts Act.
* 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 20: Kansas-Oklahoma Arkansas
River Basin Compact.
* 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 20A: Arkansas River Basin
Compact Arkansas-Oklahoma.
* 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 20B: Red River Compact.
* 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 21: Scenic Rivers Act.
* 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 22: Conservation District Act.
* 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 23: Oklahoma Floodplain
Management Act.
* 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 25: Oklahoma Weather
Modification Act.
Definition of"Navigable Waters":
Navigability is a question of fact, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
adopted and applied the federal test of navigability from The Montello.60 5
Under this test, the South Canadian River is non-navigable, and avulsive
(sudden) changes to the river did not change title.60 6 Similarly, no stipulation
was allowed as to the navigability of the Grand River or the Neosho River, and
both were found non-navigable under the federal test of navigability. 607
605. The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 439 (1874); see Hale v. Record, 146 P. 587, 587 (Okla.
1915).
606. State ex rel. Comm'rs of Land Office v. Warder, 198 P.2d 402, 406-07 (Okla. 1948).
607. Hanes v. Oklahoma, 973 P.2d 330, 333-34 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998).
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court has distinguished navigability for title
purposes from navigability for public use purposes. Thus, it found that the
Kiamichi River was navigable for fishing and pleasure but not for commerce:
[W]e find that the Kiamichi River is one of the beautiful streams of
southeastern Oklahoma that it has for many years been known as one of the
best fishing streams in the State and used by the public for fishing,
recreation and pleasure; that at one time the stream was used for
commercial purposes in that logs were floated down its channel to be used
for mill purposes; that at the site of the controversy herein the river was
between 150 and 200 feet in width; that many small boats used the river. 608
Thus, the river was not navigable for title purposes and private landowners
owned the bed of the river. However, that ownership is "subject to the rights of
the public to use the river as a public highway," and the landowner "does not. .
. have exclusive fishing rights therein." 609 Thus, the Kiamichi River was
"navigable" in the sense that the public could use the river, but not in the sense
that the state owned the bed.610
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that the Arkansas River is
navigable; as a result, title to the bed vested in the state. 611 However, eight
years later, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that under the federal test of
navigability, the Arkansas River along the Osage Indian Reservation in
Oklahoma is non-navigable and belongs to the United States in trust for the
Tribe. 612 The Oklahoma Supreme Court responded by declaring that the Osage
Tribe had title only to the bed of the non-navigable portions.613
In 1953, the Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that the Arkansas River
was navigable from its confluence with the Grand River, vesting title to the bed
in the state.614 However, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the entire
river below its confluence with the Grand River, while navigable, was reserved
to the Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw tribes by treaty.615
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the Red River is not
navigable anywhere in Oklahoma, so the state does not own its beds. 616
608. Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933, 935 (Okla. 1969).
609. Id
610. Id at 936.
611. Oklahoma v. Nolegs, 139 P. 943, 945 (Okla. 1914).
612. Brewer Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1922).
613. Vickey v. Yahola Sand & Gravel Co., 12 P.2d 881, 885 (Okla. 1932). But see Aladdin
Petroleum Corp. v. State ex rel. Comm'rs of Land Office, 191 P.2d 224, 229-30 (Okla. 1948) (applying
the U.S. Supreme Court's non-navigability analysis to the Arkansas River).
614. Lynch v. Clements, 263 P.2d 153, 156 (Okla. 1953).
615. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-32 (1970); United States v. Cherokee
Nation of Oklahoma, 480 U.S. 700, 701 (1987).
616. Oklahoma v. Texas, 259 U.S. 565, 566-67 (1922); accord Aladdin Petroleum Corp., 191 P.2d
at 228-29. Contra Hale v. Record, 146 P. 587, 588 (Okla. 1915) (finding the Red River to be navigable).
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Rights in "Navi2able Waters":
The state takes title to the beds of navigable rivers to the high water
mark.617 Moreover, pursuant to Illinois Central Railroad, the government has a
right to regulate public wharves and piers in navigable waters, loading places
along navigable waters, and rights in navigable waters. 618 The Oklahoma
courts have not otherwise extensively addressed the state public trust doctrine,
except to hold that the public has rights of boating, recreation, and fishing in
waters that are not navigable under the federal title test.619
When the Oklahoma Supreme Court acknowledged the co-existence of
riparian and appropriative water rights in 1990, the dissent was "of the . . .
opinion that the majority confuses certain public rights in our streams as being
exclusive private property rights of riparians." 620 In contrast, the dissent was
willing to establish an expansive public trust doctrine that would require
minimum flows in Oklahoma's rivers and supersede private rights.621
OREGON
Date of Statehood: 1859
Water Law System: Prior appropriation 622
Oregon Constitution: Oregon has not constitutionalized its public trust
doctrine. However, the Oregon Constitution contains several relevant
provisions, including:
* Art. I, § 1: As part of its private property takings protections, the
Oregon Constitution states that "the use of all roads, ways and
waterways necessary to promote the transportation of the raw
products of mine or farm or forest or water for beneficial use or
drainage is necessary to the development and welfare of the state
and is declared a public use."
* Art XI-D, § 1: "The rights, title and interest in and to all water for
the development of water power and to water power sites, which the
617. Oklahoma v. Nolegs,139 P. 943, 945-46 (Okla. 1914); City of Tulsa v. Comm'rs of Land
Office, 101 P.2d 246, 248 (Okla. 1940).
618. Sublett v. City of Tulsa, 405 P.2d 185, 196 (Okla. 1965).
619. Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933, 935-36 (Okla. 1969).
620. Franco-Am. Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 595 (Okla. 1990)
(Hargrave, J., dissenting).
621. Id.at595-96.




state of Oregon now owns or may hereafter acquire, shall be held by
it in perpetuity."
* Art. XI-D, § 2: As part of its constitutional authority over water
power, "[t]he state of Oregon is authorized and empowered," inter
alia: (1) "[t]o control and/or develop the water power within the
state"; (2) "[tlo lease water and water power sites for the
development of water power"; (3) "[t]o develop, separately or in
conjunction with the United States, or in conjunction with the
political subdivisions of this state, any water power within the state,
and to acquire, construct, maintain and/or operate hydroelectric
power plants, transmission and distribution lines"; (4) "[t]o develop,
separately or in conjunction with the United States, with any state or
states, or political subdivisions thereof, or with any political
subdivision of this state, any water power in any interstate stream
and to acquire, construct, maintain and/or operate hydroelectric
power plants, transmission and distribution lines"; (5) "[tlo contract
with the United States, with any state or states, or political
subdivisions thereof, or with any political subdivision of this state,
for the purchase or acquisition of water, water power and/or electric
energy for use, transmission, distribution, sale and/or disposal
thereof'; and (6) "[t]o do any and all things necessary or convenient
to carry out the provisions of this article."
* Art XI-D, § 4: Nothing in the constitutional authority over water
power "shall be construed to affect in any way the laws, and the
administration thereof, now existing or hereafter enacted, relating to
the appropriation and use of water for beneficial purposes, other
than for the development of water power."
* Art. XI-H, § 1: This article provides for "loans and grants for the
purpose of planning, acquisition, construction, alteration or
improvement of facilities for or activities related to, the collection,
treatment, dilution and disposal of all forms of waste in or upon the
air, water and lands of this state."
* Article XI-I(l): This article covers water development projects and
creates a Water Development Fund. "The fund shall be used to
provide financing for loans for residents of this state for
construction of water development projects for irrigation, drainage,
fish protection, watershed restoration and municipal uses and for the
acquisition of easements and rights of way for water development
projects authorized by law."
* Art. XV, §§ 4, 4a: These two provisions allow state lottery funds to
be used for "the public purpose of financing the protection, repair,
operation, creation and development of state parks, ocean shores
and public beach access areas, historic sites and recreation areas . ..
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* Art. XV, §§ 4, 4b: These two provisions allow state lottery funds to
be used for salmonid and wildlife protection, including protection
and restoration of watersheds, aquatic habitats, and water quality.
Oregon Statutes:
* OR. REV. STAT., Chapter 196: Columbia River Gorge; Ocean
Resource Planning; Wetlands; Removal and Fill. "The protection,
conservation and best use of the water resources of this state are
matters of the utmost public concern. Streams, lakes, bays, estuaries
and other bodies of water in this state, including not only water and
materials for domestic, agricultural and industrial use but also
habitats and spawning areas for fish, avenues for transportation and
sites for commerce and public recreation, are vital to the economy
and well-being of this state and its people. Unregulated removal of
material from the beds and banks of the waters of this state may
create hazards to the health, safety and welfare of the people of this
state. Unregulated filling in the waters of this state for any purpose,
may result in interfering with or injuring public navigation, fishery
and recreational uses of the waters. In order to provide for the best
possible use of the water resources of this state, it is desirable to
centralize authority in the Director of the Department of State
Lands, and implement control of the removal of material from the
beds and banks or filling of the waters of this state." 623 The Director
of the Department of State Lands may issue permits for the fill or
dredging of water resources only if the activity: "(a) [i]s consistent
with the protection, conservation and best use of the water resources
of this state . . ; and (b) [w]ould not unreasonably interfere with the
paramount policy of this state to preserve the use of its waters for
navigation, fishing and public recreation." 624 The Oregon courts
have concluded that these two provisions (as formerly numbered)
"are a codification of the public trust doctrine."625
* OR. REv. STAT., Chapter 274: Submersible and Submerged Lands.
In general, "submerged lands" in Oregon are "lands lying below the
line of ordinary low water of all navigable waters within the
boundaries of this state as heretofore or hereafter established,
whether such waters are tidal or nontidal." 626 "Submersible lands,"
in contrast, are the "lands lying between the line of ordinary high
water and the line of ordinary low water of all navigable waters and
all islands, shore lands, or other such lands held by or granted to this
623. OR. REv. STAT. § 196.805 (2009).
624. Id. § 196.825(1).
625. Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands, 581 P.2d 520, 527 (Or. Ct. App. 1978), affd, 590 P.2d 709
(Or. 1979).
626. OR. REV. STAT § 274.005(7).
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state by virtue of her sovereignty, wherever applicable, within the
boundaries of this state as heretofore or hereafter established,
whether such waters or lands are tidal or nontidal." 627 The "line of
ordinary high water" is "the line on the bank or shore to which the
high water ordinarily rises annually in season," while the "line of
ordinary low water" is "the line on the bank or shore to which the
low water ordinarily recedes annually in season." 628 "Tidal
submerged lands" are "lands lying below the line of mean low tide
in the beds of all tidal waters within the boundaries of this state as
heretofore or hereafter established."6 29 "The title to the submersible
and submerged lands of all navigable streams and lakes in this state
now existing or which may have been in existence in 1859 when the
state was admitted to the Union, or at any time since admission, and
which has not become vested in any person, is vested in the State of
Oregon. The State of Oregon is the owner of the submersible and
submerged lands of such streams and lakes, and may use and
dispose of the same as provided by law."630 "The State Land Board
has exclusive jurisdiction to assert title to submerged or submersible
lands in navigable waterways on behalf of the State of Oregon," 63 1
and this chapter provides procedures for the administrative
determination of navigability. 632 Moreover, "all meandered lakes
are declared to be navigable and public waters," with title to their
submerged and submersible lands vested in the State of Oregon
unless otherwise validly conveyed.633 "The Department of State
Lands [had] exclusive jurisdiction over all ungranted tidal
submerged lands owned by this state . . . ."634
OR. REV. STAT., Chapter 537: Water Rights Act. "All water within
the state from all sources of water supply belongs to the public,"
including ground water.6 35 The Act allows for instream water rights
for public uses,63 6 and public uses include but are not limited to
recreation, "conservation, maintenance and enhancement of aquatic
and fish life, wildlife, fish and wildlife habitat and any other
ecological values," pollution abatement, and navigation. 637 In
addition, "[p]ublic uses are beneficial uses," but "[t]he recognition
of an in-stream water right . .. shall not diminish the public's rights
627. Id. § 274.005(8).
628. Id. § 274.005(3), (4).
629. Id. § 274.705(7).
630. Id. § 274.025(1).
631. Id. § 274.402(1).
632. Id. §§ 274.404 to 274.412.
633. Id. § 274.430(1).
634. Id. § 274.710.
635. Id. §§ 537.010, 537.525.
636. Id. §§ 537.332- 537.360.
637. Id. § 537.332(5)(b).
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in the ownership and control of the waters of this state or the public
trust therein." 638 The Water Rights Act also allows for extensions of
the irrigation season6 39 and encourages conservation of water.640
OR. REV. STAT., Chapter 780: Improvement and Use of Navigable
Streams: "All channels of rivers and watercourses made navigable
or the navigation of which is improved . .. shall be public highways,
and shall be free to all crafts navigating them."64 1
Definition of "Navigable Waters":
For title purposes, Oregon originally adhered to the ebb-and-flow tidal test
of navigability. 64 2 Thus, because the Tualatin River was not subject to the ebb
and flow of the tide, its bed and banks were privately owned.643 In contrast, the
bed and banks of the Columbia River, which is subject to the ebb-and-flow of
the tide, are owned by the state.644 Moreover, in tidal waters, state title
advances with the rising of the sea.645
However, the Oregon Supreme Court soon thereafter adopted a fairly
liberal log floatation test of navigability that extended public use navigability to
navigable-in-fact waters. It held in 1869 that:
any stream in this state is navigable on whose waters logs or timbers can be
floated to market, and that they are public highways for that purpose; and
that it is not necessary that they be navigable the whole year for that
purpose to constitute them as such. If at high water they can be used for
floating timber, then they are navigable; and the question of their
navigability is a question of fact, to be determined as any other question of
fact by a jury. Any stream in which logs will go by the force of the water is
navigable. 64 6
This rule, the court held, best served Oregon public policy:
638. Id. § 537.334(1), (2).
639. Id. § 537.385.
640. Id. § 537.460.
641. Id. § 780.030.
642. See Weise v. Smith, 3 Or. 445, 448-49 (1869) (recognizing that the navigable-in-fact test has
largely replaced the ebb-and-flow tidal test in the United States); Hinman v. Warren, 6 Or. 408, 411
(1877) (holding that "the tide lands-those uncovered by the ebb and flow of the sea-belong to the
state of Oregon by virtue of its sovereignty"); Hogg v. Davis, 30 P. 160, 160 (Or. 1892) (same); Bowlby
v. Shively, 30 P. 154, 156 (Or. 1892), affd, 152 U.S. 1 (1894) ("Upon the admission of the state into the
Union, the tide lands became the property of the state, and subject to its jurisdiction and disposal.").
643. Shaw v. Oswego Iron Co., 10 Or. 371, 376, 380-82 (1882).
644. Hinman, 6 Or. at 411-12; see also Atkinson v. Tax Comm'n of Or., 303 U.S. 20, 22 (1938)
(determining that Oregon, not the United States, owns the bed of the Columbia River on Oregon's side
of the border with Washington); Hume v. Rogue River Packing Co., 92 P. 1065, 1067 (Or. 1907)
(determining that the Rogue River is navigable, and its bed is owned by the State, because it is
influenced by the tide for at least four miles).
645. Wilson v. Shively, 4 P. 324, 325-26 (Or. 1884).
646. Felger v. Robinson, 3 Or. 455, 457-58 (1869).
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And we think it the rule that best accords with common sense and public
convenience, for these rapid streams, penetrating deep into the mountains,
are the only means by which timber can be brought from these rugged
sections, without great labor and expense; and by their use large tracts of
timber, otherwise too remote or difficult of access, can be rendered of great
value, as the country shall grow and timber become scarce.647
Thus, "[a] stream, which, in its natural condition, is capable of being commonly
and generally useful for floating boats, rafts or logs, for any useful purpose of
agriculture or trade, though it be private property, and not strictly navigable, is
subject to the public use as a passageway." 648
As such, the Oregon courts early on distinguished three categories of
waters:
First, Such rivers, or arms of the sea, in which the tide ebbs and flows; and
in these, which are technically called navigable, the sovereign is the owner
of the subjacent soil, and all right in it belongs exclusively to the public.
Second, Such streams as are navigable in fact for boats, vessels, or lighters;
and in these, which are termed public highways, the public have an
easement for the purposes of navigation and commerce, but the title of the
subjacent soil to the middle of the stream, and the right to the use of the
water flowing over it is in the riparian owner, subject to the superior rights
of the public to use it for the purposes of transportation and trade. Third,
Such streams as are so small or shallow as not to be navigable for any
purpose; and in these the public have no rights of a highway or otherwise,
and they are altogether private property. 649
In 1935, however, the State of Oregon was involved in litigation in the
U.S. Supreme Court that applied the federal navigable-in-fact test to determine
whether Oregon had title to the beds of Lake Malheur, Mud Lake, Harney
Lake, the Narrows, and Sand Reef.6 50 The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized
that navigability for purposes of title is a federal question65 1 and applied the
647. Id. at 458.
648. Weise v. Smith, 3 Or. 445, 449 (1869); see also Haines v. Hall, 20 P. 831, 835 (Or. 1888)
("Whether the creek in question is navigable or not ... depends upon its capacity in a natural state to
float logs and timber, and whether its use for that purpose will be an advantage to the public."); Nutter v.
Gallagher, 24 P. 250, 252-53 (Or. 1890); Kamm v. Normand, 91 P. 448, 450-53 (Or. 1907); Lebanon
Lumber Co. v. Leonard, 136 P. 891, 892 (Or. 1913); Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 175 P. 437, 440-42
(Or. 1918).
649. Shaw v. Oswego Iron Co., 10 Or. 371, 375-76 (1882); see also Haines v. Welch, 12 P. 502,
503 (noting that navigability "depends upon [the water's] capacity, extent and importance. If it is
capable of serving an important public use as a channel for commerce, it should be considered public;
but if it is only a brook, although it might carry down saw logs for a few days during a freshet, it is not,
therefore, a public highway. (citation omitted) And even if it were public, in the sense that it is useful to
float products to market, it can only be used with due regard to the rights of the owner of its banks
through which it flows.").
650. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).
651. Id. at 14.
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federal commerce-based test to determine that none of the waters in question
was navigable in fact:
[N]either trade nor travel did then or at any time since has or could or can
move over said [waters], or any of them, in their natural or ordinary
conditions according to the customary modes of trade or travel over water; .
. . nor has any of them since been used or susceptible of being used in the
natural or ordinary condition of any of them as permanent or other
highways or channels for useful or other commerce. 652
As a result, the Oregon courts now apply the federal navigable-in-fact test of
navigability as well as the tidal test. Moreover, while acknowledging that this
test derives from The Daniel Ball, The Montello, and United States v. Utah,
they apply this title test broadly, emphasizing that the extent of commerce on a
river is not the test.653 Timber use and log floatation are still evidence of
navigability, 654 and the Oregon Court of Appeals declared the John Day River
navigable on the basis of Native American use and log floatation for timber
purposes. 655
In addition, according to contemporary Oregon statutes, all meandered
lakes are considered navigable and public, unless otherwise validly
conveyed. 656 Moreover, by statute, Oregon recognizes both the tidal and
navigable-in-fact tests for navigability. 657 Thus, Oregon now asserts title by
statute to a broader category of waters than the federal title navigability test
would allow, because Oregon asserts title to the submerged and submersible
lands of waters which became navigable after its admission to the United States
in 1859, unless those lands have been validly conveyed to private persons. 658
Rights in "Navigable Waters":
Oregon provided the occasion for the U.S. Supreme Court to determine
that, once submerged lands passed from the federal government to the states,
issues of title as between the state and private landowners were to be
determined by state law.659 This case involved the Willamette River, and
652. Id. at 15 (citing United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1926); United States v.
Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 76 (1931); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86 (1922);
Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 586 (1922); Econ. Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113,
123 (1921); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 698 (1899); The Daniel
Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870)).
653. Nw. Steelheaders Ass'n. Inc. v. Simantel, 112 P.3d 383, 389-90 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
654. Id. at 390.
655. Id. at 391-95.
656. OR. REV. STAT. § 274.430(1) (2009).
657. Id. § 274.005(7)-(8).
658. Id. § 274.025(i).
659. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 370-72 (1977)
(overruling Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973)).
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Oregon eventually decided that, under Oregon law, the state retained ownership
of the bed after an avulsive change to the river.660
Oregon also provided the occasion for the U.S. Supreme Court to declare
that, as a federal matter, states take title to the beds of navigable waters to the
high-water mark.661 Oregon has now codified this rule. 662 Moreover, no
adverse possession of lands below the low-water mark of navigable waters is
allowed.
In Oregon, riparian owners retain riparian rights to use the water and
submerged lands below the high-water mark, including the right to wharf out,
the right to moor logs on the water, and a preference in leasing or purchasing
tidelands, if the state decides to lease or sell them.663 However, these rights are
subject to the public's rights of use.664
The Oregon courts have acknowledged that
lands underlying navigable waters have been recognized as unique and
limited resources and have been accorded special protection to insure their
preservation for public water-related uses such as navigation, fishery and
recreation. Under the common law public trust doctrine, the public use of
such waters could not be substantially modified except for water-related
purposes.665
"The state, as trustee for the people, bears the responsibility of preserving and
protecting the right of public use of the waters for those purposes." 666
These trustee responsibilities have been applied to fishing regulation. As a
result, statutes purporting to convey exclusive rights to fish in navigable waters
violated the privileges and immunities clause in the Oregon Constitution.667
Nevertheless, because the state has jurisdiction over navigable waters, it can
660. State ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 582 P.2d 1352 (Or. 1978).
661. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14-15, 26 (1897) (involving the Columbia River).
662. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 274.025(1), 274.005; see also Hinman v. Warren, 6 Or. 408, 412 (Or.
1877) (concluding that the high tide line is the property line for properties along the Columbia River,
regardless of what the grant says); Parker v. W. Coast Packing Co., 21 P. 822, 824 (Or. 1889) (holding
that the state owns submerged lands on a navigable river to the high water mark); Oregon v. Portland
Gen. Elec. Co., 95 P. 722, 728-29 (Or. 1908) (same).
663. Smith Tug & Barge Co. v. Columbia Pac. Towing Corp., 443 P.2d 205, 207-18 (Or. 1958)
(reviewing the history of Oregon's case law on the subject).
664. Id. at 218.
665. Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 581 P.2d 520, 523 (Or. App. 1978), affd, 590 P.2d 709
(Or. 1979).
666. Or. Shores Conservation Coal. v. Or. Fish & Wildlife Comm'n, 662 P.2d 356, 364 (Or. Ct.
App. 1983); see also Wilson v. Welch, 7 P. 341, 344 (Or. 1885) ("The state does own the channel of the
navigable river within its boundaries, and the shore of its bays, harbors, and inlets between high and low
water, but its ownership is a trust for the public.").
667. Hume v. Rogue River Packing Co., 92 P. 1065, 1072-73 (Or. 1907); see also Johnson v. Hoy,
47 P.2d 252, 252 (Or. 1935) (holding that the Legislature cannot grant an exclusive right to fish for
salmon).
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regulate fishing.6 68 Specifically, fishing methods can be enjoined if they
interfere with the public's common right of fishing.66 9
Under the public trust doctrine, "[w]hile certain of the state's interests are
alienable, its obligation as trustee of the public interest remains.... Thus, all
submerged and submersible lands are subject to the paramount responsibility of
the state to preserve and protect the public interest."6 70 Like California, Oregon
views waters as a limited and precious resource:
The severe restriction on the power of the state as trustee to modify water
resources is predicated not only upon the importance of the public use of
such waters and lands, but upon the exhaustible and irreplaceable nature of
the resources and its fundamental important to our society and our
environment. These resources, after all, can only be spent once. Therefore,
the law has historically and consistently recognized that rivers and estuaries
once destroyed or diminished may never be restored to the public and,
accordingly, has required the highest degree of protection from the public
trustee. 671
As a result, the purpose of a private use of navigable waters is critical to
whether the use may be allowed under the public trust doctrine. Following
Illinois Central Railroad, the Oregon courts have concluded "that water
resources should be devoted to uses which are consistent with their nature and
should be protected from inimical uses." 672 Undertakings in furtherance of and
consistent with the trust, "such as the construction of wharves, docks and
piers," are permitted, while "upland-related activities which consume water
resources by adapting them to uncharacteristic uses" must be examined more
closely. 673 However, to the extent that the Oregon public trust doctrine
prohibits some uses, it "does not prohibit [activities] other than water-related
uses . . . ."674 Moreover, the State Lands Board does not give up the jus
publicum in leasing submerged lands. 675
668. Oregon v. Nielsen, 95 P. 720, 722 (Or. 1908); Antony v. Veatch, 220 P.2d 493, 498-99 (Or.
1950).
669. Radich v. Frederckson, 10 P.2d 352, 355 (Or. 1932); Johnson, 47 P.2d at 252.
670. Morse, 581 P.2d at 524.
671. Id.
672. Id. at 525.
673. Id. For an earlier review of Oregon's public trust doctrine, see generally Michael B. Huston,
The Public Trust Doctrine in Oregon, 19 ENvTL. L. 623 (1989). For an argument in favor of expanding
that doctrine, see generally Scott B. Yates, Comment, A Case For the Extension of the Public Trust
Doctrine in Oregon, 27 ENVTL. L. 663 (1997).
674. Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 590 P.2d 709, 711 (Or. 1979); see also Cook v. Dabney,
139 P. 721, 722 (Or. 1914) (holding that the Oregon State Lands Board cannot convey submerged lands
"in a manner and for a purpose which would act as a direct and permanent impediment to navigation,"
because doing so would violate the public trust doctrine); Hinman v. Warren, 6 Or. 408, 412 (1877)
(holding that the State "has no authority to dispose of its tidelands in such a manner as may interfere
with the free and untrammeled navigation of its rivers, bays, inlets and the like. The grantees of the state
[to properties along the Columbia River] took the land subject to every easement growing out of the
right of navigation inherent in the public."); Bowlby v. Shively, 30 P. 154, 160 (Or. 1892), aff'd, 152
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Oregon's Water Rights Act explicitly acknowledges the public trust
doctrine and prohibits instream water rights from diminishing public rights in
waters under that doctrine. 676 Moreover, under Oregon case law, private
landowners cannot divert navigable-in-fact rivers subject to public use
rights.677
Oregon statutes extend public rights to any waters made navigable by the
state678 and to non-navigable, privately owned waters that can float boats, rafts
or logs. 679 The private owner cannot deny the public its right of navigation,
including the right to bypass obstructions by traveling over private land, but the
public has only an "incidental" right to "meddle" with the privately owned
banks.680
In addition, the public has acquired the right to use the dry sand portions
of beaches through the doctrine of custom.681 As a result, there is no taking of
private property when the state denies landowners permits to build sea walls. 682
SOUTH DAKOTA
Date of Statehood: 1889
Water Law System: Prior appropriation
South Dakota Constitution: The South Dakota Constitution has no provisions
relevant to the public trust doctrine.
South Dakota Statutes:
* S.D. COD. L. § 1-2-8: South Dakota-Nebraska Boundary Compact.
* S.D. COD. L. § 8-03: "The public has a right to use the strip of land
50 feet landward from all navigable waters provided the strip is
U.S. 1 (1894) (holding that the state can dispose of tidelands, but only subject "to the paramount right of
navigation and commerce," and "the owner of the upland or tide water has certain rights, arising from
his adjacency to such waters, subordinate, however, to their use by the public for navigation and
fishing").
675. Brusco Tugboat Co. v. Oregon, 589 P.2d 712, 718 (Or. 1978).
676. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.334(2) (2009).
677. Shaw v. Oswego Iron Co., 10 Or. 371, 383 (1882).
678. OR. REv. STAT. § 780.030.
679. Weise v. Smith, 3 Or. 445, 449 (1869).
680. Id. at 450.
681. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673-78 (Or. 1969). For an argument that the
public trust doctrine still plays a role in protecting public rights in Oregon's beaches, see generally Erin
Pitts, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Tool for Ensuring Continued Public Use of Oregon
Beaches, 22 ENVTL. L. 731 (1992).
682. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 451 (Or. 1993).
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between the ordinary high water mark and ordinary low water mark
of public bodies of water."
* S.D. COD. L. Chapter 34A-10: Environmental Protection Act. This
act creates a private right of action "for the protection of the air,
water, and other natural resources and the public trust therein from
pollution, impairment, or destruction." 683 Similarly, agencies can
allow parties to intervene in agency proceedings if the proceeding in
question "involves conduct which has the effect of polluting,
impairing, or destroying the air, water, or other natural resources or
the public trust therein."684 The act also allows the courts to "grant
temporary equitable relief where necessary for the protection of the
air, water, and other natural resources or the public trust therein
from pollution, impairment, or destruction," 685 and requires the
courts to "adjudicate the impact of the defendant's conduct on the
air, water, or other natural resources and on the public trust therein
in accordance with this chapter." 686 In both administrative and
judicial proceedings, "any alleged pollution, impairment, or
destruction of the air, water or other natural resources or the public
trust therein, shall be determined, and no conduct shall be
authorized or approved which does, or is likely to have such effect
so long as there is a feasible and prudent alternative consistent with
the reasonable requirements of the public health, safety, and
welfare." 68 7 Courts may "grant temporary and permanent equitable
relief, or may impose conditions on the defendant that are required
to protect the air, water, and other natural resources or the public
trust therein from pollution, impairment, or destruction." 688
* S.D. COD. L. Title 43, Chapter 17: Water Boundaries and Riparian
Lands. "The ownership of land below ordinary high-water mark,
and of land below the water of a navigable lake or stream, is
regulated by the laws of the United States or by such laws of the
state as the Legislature may enact." 689 "Unless the grant under
which the land is held indicates a different intent, the owner of the
upland, if it borders upon a navigable lake or stream, takes to the
edge of the lake or stream at low water mark. All navigable rivers
and lakes are public highways within fifty feet landward from the
water's nearest edge, provided that the outer boundary of such
public highway may not expand beyond the ordinary high water
mark and may not contract within the ordinary low water mark, and
683. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34A-10-1 (2009) (emphasis added).
684. Id. § 34A-10-2 (emphasis added).
685. Id. § 34A-10-5 (emphasis added).
686. Id. § 34A-10-7 (emphasis added).
687. Id. § 34A-10-8.
688. Id. § 34A-10-11.
689. Id. § 43-17-1.
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subject to §§ 43-17-29, 43-17-31, 43-17-32, and 43-17-33."690 "In
all cases where the opposite banks of any streams not navigable
belong to different persons, the stream and the bed thereof shall
become common to both." 691 "The Water Management Board shall
establish ... the ordinary high water mark and install benchmarks
and may establish the ordinary low water mark on public lakes
which are used for public purposes including, but not limited to
boating, fishing, swimming, hunting, skating, picnicking, and
similar recreational pursuits." 692 "If any water level rises above the
ordinary high water mark of a navigable lake, the right of the public
to enjoyment of the entire lake may not be limited, except that
access to the lake shall be by public right-of-way or by permission
of the riparian landowner . . . ."693 "A stream, or portion of a
stream, is navigable if it can support a vessel capable of carrying
one or more persons throughout the period between the first of May
to the thirtieth of September, inclusive, in two out of every ten
years. A dry draw, as defined in § 46-1-6, is not navigable. This
section does not apply to any stream or portion of a stream which is
navigable pursuant to federal law. Any person may petition the
Water Management Board for a declaratory ruling as to the
navigability of any stream, or portion of a stream, in this state." 6 94
Under certain circumstances, riparian owners can fence navigable
waters.695 However, the fence must be constructed so "that the right
of the public to utilize the navigable stream is not prohibited or
unduly restricted." 696 Moreover, the right to fence "does not apply
to any river or stream or portion of any river or stream that has been
determined to be navigable pursuant to federal law." 697
* S.D. COD. L. Title 46, Chapter 1: Water Resources Act: Definitions
and General Provisions. Under these provisions, "the people of the
state have a paramount interest in the use of all the water of the state
and that the state shall determine what water of the state, surface
and underground, can be converted to public use or controlled for
public protection."698 Moreover, "all water within the state is the
property of the people of the state, but the right to the use of water
may be acquired by appropriation as provided by law."699
"[B]ecause of conditions prevailing in this state the general welfare
690. Id. § 43-17-2.
691. Id. § 43-17-4.
692. Id. § 43-17-21.
693. Id. § 43-17-29.
694. Id. § 43-17-34.
695. Id. § 43-17-35.
696. Id.
697. Id.
698. Id. § 46-1-1.
699. Id. § 46-1-3.
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requires that the water resources of the state be put to beneficial use
to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or
unreasonable method of use of water be prevented, and that the
conservation of such water is to be exercised with a view to the
reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people
and for the public welfare. The right to water or to the use or flow of
water in or from any natural stream or watercourse in this state is
and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for
the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall not
extend to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of
diversion of water." 700 Domestic use takes precedence. 701
* S.D. COD. L. Title 46, Chapter 2: Water Resources Act: Water
Management Board and Chief Engineer.
* S.D. COD. L. Title 46, Chapter 2A: Water Resources Act:
Administrative Procedure for Appropriation of Water.
* S.D. COD. L. Title 46, Chapter 3A: Water Resources Act: Weather
Modification Activities.
* S.D. COD. L. Title 46, Chapter 4: Water Resources Act: Dry-Draw
and Nonnavigable Stream Dams.
* S.D. COD. L. Title 46, Chapter 5: Water Resources Act:
Appropriation of Water.
* S.D. COD. L. Title 46, Chapter 6: Water Resources Act:
Groundwater and Wells.
* S.D. COD. L. Title 46, Chapter 7: Water Resources Act: Storage,
Diversion, and Irrigation Works.
* S.D. COD. L. Title 46, Chapter 8: Water Resources Act: Eminent
Domain.
* S.D. COD. L. Title 46, Chapter 10: Water Resources Act:
Adjudication of Water Rights.
* S.D. COD. L. Title 46, Chapter 10A: Water Resources Act: Water
Use Control Areas.
* S.D. COD. L. Title 46, Chapter 12: Water Resources Act: Irrigation
Districts.
Definition of "Navigable Waters":
South Dakota recognizes several categories of navigable waters. The test
of navigability for title purposes under the equal footing doctrine is a federal
700. Id. § 46-1-4.
701. Id. § 46-1-5.
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test.702 According to the South Dakota Supreme Court, the ebb-and-flow tidal
test of title navigability is not useful in South Dakota.703 Instead, the state uses
the navigable-in-fact test for other waters. 704 Under this test, Lake Albert is
navigable. 705 In addition, by statute, South Dakota has identified the Missouri
River, James River, Boise des Sioux River, and the lower five miles of the Big
Sioux River as being federally navigable. 706
For purposes of determining whether the public has rights to use waters,
South Dakota uses a common law "pleasure boat" test for navigability.707 For
public use purposes, "whether or not waters are navigable depends upon the
natural availability of waters for public purposes taking into consideration the
natural character and surroundings of a lake or stream. This division of lakes
and streams into navigable and nonnavigable is the equivalent of classification
of public and private waters." 708
By statute, South Dakota defines "navigable water" for public use
purposes to be "[a] stream, or portion of a stream [that] can support a vessel
capable of carrying one or more persons throughout the period between the first
of May to the thirtieth of September, inclusive, in two out of every ten
years." 709 However, this definition "does not apply to any stream or portion of
a stream which is navigable pursuant to federal law." 710
Rights in "Navigable Waters":
Fairly continuously under South Dakota's statutes, private landowners
have owned navigable waters to the low-water mark.71' However, the
landowner's title is "absolute" only to the high water mark; title to lands
between the high water and low water marks is subject to the rights of the
public.712 The public has access to and a right to use these lands for
"navigating, boating, fishing, fowling, and like public uses." 713 Nevertheless,
702. Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 829-31 (S.D. 2004).
703. Flisrand v. Madson, 152 N.W. 796, 799 (S.D. 1912).
704. Id. at 799-800.
705. Id.
706. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-17-38.
707. Parks, 676 N.W.2d at 830-31 (citing Hillebrand v. Knapp, 274 N.W. 821 (S.D. 1937)).
708. Hillebrand, 274 N.W. at 822.
709. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-17-34.
710. Id.
711. Flisrand v. Madson, 152 N.W. 796, 799 (S.D. 1912) (citing Civ. CODE § 289); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 43-17-2.
712. Flisrand, 152 N.W. at 799 (citing Civ. CODE § 289); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-17-2.
713. Flisrand, 152 N.W. at 799 (citing CIv. CODE § 289); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-17-2; see also
Hillebrand, 274 N.W. at 822 (listing sailing, rowing, fishing, fowling, bathing, skating, taking water,
and cutting ice as public uses).
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the ordinary high water mark can migrate, and public rights follow natural
changes in the waterway. 7 14
In contrast, at common law, landowners have "absolute ownership" of the
beds of non-federally navigable waters.7 15 However, under current statutes,
[u]nless the grant under which the land is held indicates a different intent,
the owner of the upland, if it borders upon a navigable lake or stream, takes
to the edge of the lake or stream at low water mark. All navigable rivers
and lakes are public highways within fifty feet landward from the water's
nearest edge, provided that the outer boundary of such public highway may
not expand beyond the ordinary high water mark and may not contract
within the ordinary low water mark ... .716
For federally navigable waters, "[o]nce the beds of the navigable waters are in
state ownership, they are held subject to a public trust and cannot be conveyed
unless it would promote a public trust purpose." 717
As in many western states, public ownership of water for prior
appropriation purposes is becoming relevant to public rights in non-navigable
waters in South Dakota. Recently, the South Dakota Supreme Court declared
that "[n]ever in South Dakota has determining the navigability of a water body
been a matter of deciding if the water itself is public or private."7 18 Instead,
under the Desert Land Act of 1877,719 non-navigable waters became subject to
state control. 720 When the legislature adopted the prior appropriation doctrine
in 1905, it qualified riparian owners' rights to the water, and several states have
recognized public rights in water despite private ownership of the bed,
including Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Wyoming, Minnesota, North Dakota,
and Iowa.72 1 Moreover, in 1955 the South Dakota Legislature confirmed that
all water is public property.722 As a result, the Water Resources Act works in
tandem with the public trust doctrine:
[W]hile we regard the public trust doctrine and Water Resources Act as
having shared principles, the Act does not supplant the scope of the public
trust doctrine. The Water Resources Act evinces a legislative intent both to
allocate and regulate water resources. In part, this Act codifies public trust
714. S.D. Wildlife Fed'n v. Water Mgmt. Bd., 382 N.W.2d 26, 31-32 (S.D. 1986).
715. Flisrand, 152 N.W. at 799, 801.
716. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS. § 43-17-2.
717. Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 829 (S.D. 2004) (declaring Illinois Central Railroad Co. to
be the first definition of the public trust doctrine); Flisrand, 152 N.W. at 799-800.
718. Parks, 676 N.W.2d at 829. For a more extensive discussion of this case, see generally Janice
Holmes, Note, Following the Crowd: The Supreme Court of South Dakota Expands the Scope of the
Public Trust Doctrine to Non-Navigable, Non-Meandered Bodies of Water in Parks v. Cooper, 38
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1317 (2005).
719. 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-23 (2006).
720. Parks, 676 N.W.2d. at 831-32 (citing Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Cement Co., 295 U.S.
142, 162-64 (1935)).
721. Id.at833-36.
722. Id. at 837.
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principles. The first three sections of the Act embody the core principles of
the public trust doctrine-"the people of the state have a paramount interest
in the use of all the water of the state," SDCL 46-1-1; "the state shall
determine in what way the water of the state, both surface and
underground, should be developed for the greatest public benefit," SDCL
46-1-2; and "all water within the state is the property of the people of the
state." SDCL 46-1-3.723
Thus, even when increased precipitation creates new lakes over private
property that had never really existed before, "the State of South Dakota retains
the right to use, control, and develop the water in these lakes as a separate asset
in trust for the public," and the public trust doctrine applies independently of
bed ownership. 724 "[A]ll waters within South Dakota, not just those waters
considered navigable under the federal test, are held in trust by the State for the
public." 725 The public purposes for which these lakes can be used potentially
include, but are not limited to, "boating, fishing, swimming, hunting, skating,
picnicking, and similar recreational pursuits." 726 However, the court noted, it
would be better for the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to
regulate public recreational use of new non-navigable lakes, because "it is
ultimately up to the Legislature to decide how these [new] waters are to be
beneficially used in the public interest" and to carry out these policies "through
a coordination of all state agencies and resources." 727
South Dakota's Environmental Protection Act also embodies the public
trust doctrine. 728 This act "authoriz[es] legal action to protect 'the air, water




Date of Statehood: 1845
Water Law System: Prior appropriation after 1895730
Texas Constitution: The Texas Court of Appeals recently indicated that
Article XVI, § 59(a) of the Texas Constitution is relevant to the public trust
doctrine.731 This provision states:
723. Id. at 838.
724. Id.
725. Id. at 838-39.
726. Id. at 840 (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-17-21).
727. Id. at 841.
728. Id. at 838.
729. Id. (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34A-10-1).
730. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 1.001(b) (Vernon 2009).
731. Cummins v. Travis County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 17, 175 S.W.3d 34, 49
(Tex. App. 2005).
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The conservation and development of all of the natural resources of this
State, and development of parks and recreational facilities, including the
control, storing, preservation and distribution of its storm and flood waters,
the waters of its rivers and streams, for irrigation, power and all other
useful purposes, the reclamation and irrigation of its arid, semiarid and
other lands needing irrigation, the reclamation and drainage of its
overflowed lands, and other lands needing drainage, the conservation and
development of its forests, water and hydro-electric power, the navigation
of its inland and coastal waters, and the preservation and conservation of all
such natural resources of the State are each and all hereby declared public
rights and duties; and the Legislature shall pass all such laws as may be
appropriate thereto.732
No other provisions of the Texas Constitution discuss rights in water.
Texas Statutes:
* TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 21.001: This provision defines a
"navigable stream" to be "a stream which retains an average width
of 30 feet from the mouth up."
* TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN., Chapter 33: Coastal Public Lands
Management Act of 1973. "The natural resources of the surface
estate in coastal public land shall be preserved. These resources
include the natural aesthetic values of those areas and the value of
the areas in their natural state for the protection and nurture of all
types of marine life and wildlife."73 3 "Uses which the public at
large may enjoy and in which the public at large may participate
shall take priority over those uses which are limited to fewer
individuals."734 "The public interest in navigation in the intracoastal
water shall be protected." 735 'Coastal public land' means all or any
portion of state-owned submerged land, the water overlying that
land, and all state-owned islands or portions of islands in the coastal
area."736 'Submerged land' means any land extending from the
boundary between the land of the state and the littoral owners
seaward to the low-water mark on any saltwater lake, bay, inlet,
estuary, or inland water within the tidewater limits, and any land
lying beneath the body of water, but for the purposes of this chapter
only, shall exclude beaches bordering on and the water of the open
Gulf of Mexico and the land lying beneath this water." 737 The act
732. TEX. CONST., art. XVI, § 59(a).
733. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 33.001(b) (Vernon 2009).
734. Id. § 33.001(c).
735. Id. § 33.001(d).
736. Id. § 33.004(6).
737. Id. § 33.004(11).
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provides for a Coastal Management Program.738 Although the act
allows for leasing of coastal public land, "[m]embers of the public
may not be excluded from coastal public land leased for public
recreational purposes or from an estuarine preserve." 739
* TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 61.001-61.26: Texas Open Beaches
Act. "It is declared and affirmed to be the public policy of this state
that the public, individually and collectively, shall have the free and
unrestricted right of ingress and egress to and from the state-owned
beaches bordering on the seaward shore of the Gulf of Mexico, or if
the public has acquired a right of use or easement to or over an area
by prescription, dedication, or has retained a right by virtue of
continuous right in the public, the public shall have the free and
unrestricted right of ingress and egress to the larger area extending
from the line of mean low tide to the line of vegetation bordering on
the Gulf of Mexico." 740 'Beach' means state-owned beaches to
which the public has the right of ingress and egress bordering on the
seaward shore of the Gulf of Mexico or any larger area extending
from the line of mean low tide to the line of vegetation bordering on
the Gulf of Mexico if the public has acquired a right of use or
easement to or over the area by prescription, dedication, or has
retained a right by virtue of continuous right in the public."74 1 This
act was upheld in Moody v. White.742
* TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 134.006: This provision of the Texas
Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act ensures that the Act
"does not affect the right of a person under other law to enforce or
protect the person's interest in water resources affected by a surface
coal mining operation."
* TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 90.001: This provision defines
"navigable river or stream" to be "a river or stream that retains an
average width of 30 or more feet from the mouth or confluence up."
* TEX. WATER CODE ANN., Chapter 11: Water Rights. "The water of
the ordinary flow, underflow, and tides of every flowing river,
natural stream, and lake, and of every bay or arm of the Gulf of
Mexico, and the storm water, floodwater, and rainwater of every
river, natural stream, canyon, ravine, depression, and watershed in
the state is the property of the state." 74 3 The right to appropriate can
be subordinate to instream flow needs.7 44 "The waters of the state
are held in trust for the public, and the right to use state water may
738. Id § 33.053.
739. Id. § 33.108.
740. Id. § 61.011(a).
741. Id. § 61.012.
742. 593 S.W.2d 372, 379-80 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
743. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021(a) (Vemon 2009).
744. Id. § 11.023(a).
178 [Vol. 37:53
WESTERN STATES' PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES
be appropriated only as expressly authorized by law." 74 5 Moreover,
"[m]aintaining the biological soundness of the state's rivers, lakes,
bays, and estuaries is of great importance to the public's economic
health and general well-being. The legislature encourages voluntary
water and land stewardship to benefit the water in the state," 74 6 and
"[t]he legislature has expressly required the commission while
balancing all other public interests to consider and, to the extent
practicable, provide for the freshwater inflows and instream flows
necessary to maintain the viability of the state's streams, rivers, and
bay and estuary systems in the commission's regular granting of
permits for the use of state waters." 747 Water rights can be taken by
eminent domain. 74 8 The Water Code provides for pro rata
distribution of water during shortages. 749 Obstruction of navigable
streams is prohibited. 750
Definition of"Navigable Waters":
Texas follows the tidal test of navigability for title purposes, and, as such,
"[t]he bays, inlets, and other waters along the Gulf Coast which are subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide of the Gulf of Mexico are defined as 'navigable
waters."' 751 Applying this test, the Texas Supreme Court noted that Tres
Palacios Bay was an arm of the Gulf of Mexico and thus held it navigable for
title purposes. 752
However, Texas also follows the navigable-in-fact test.753 "[S]treams or
lakes . . . are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being
used, in their natural and ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over
which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of
trade and travel on water . . . ."754 Moreover, the courts consider the
navigability test "broad" because navigable waters in Texas "include waters
745. Id. § 11.0235(a).
746. Id. § 11.0235(b).
747. Id. § 11.0235(c).
748. Id. § 11.033.
749. Id. § 11.039.
750. Id. § 11.096.
751. Lorino v. Crawford Packing Co., 175 S.W.2d 410, 411 (Tex. 1943) (citing City of Galveston
v. Mann, 143 S.W.2d 1028, 1033 (Tex. 1940); Crary v. Port Arthur Channel & Dock Co., 47 S.W. 967,
970 (Tex. 1898)); Butler v. Sadler, 399 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
752. Lorino, 175 S.W.2d at 411 (citing Texas v. Bradford, 50 S.W.2d 1065, 1069 (Tex. 1932)).
753. TH Invs., Inc. v. Kirby Inland Marine, 218 S.W.3d 173, 182 n.7 (Tex. App. 2007) (citations
omitted); Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 86 S.W.2d 441, 443-44 (Texas 1935).
754. Hix v. Robertson, 211 S.W.3d 423, 428 n.3 (Tex. App. 2006) (quoting Taylor Fishing Club v.
Hammett, 88 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (quoting United States v. Holt State Bank, 270
U.S. 49, 56 (1926))).
2010] 179
ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY
within the tidewater limits of the Gulf of Mexico and streams that are navigable
in law or fact." 755
Nevertheless, "[e]very inland lake or pond that has the capacity to float a
boat is not necessarily navigable. It must be of such size and so situated as to be
generally and commonly useful as a highway for transportation of goods or
passengers between the points connected thereby." 756 Thus, even though boats
could float on Stanmire Lake, the lake could not practically be used for
commerce, and hence it was not navigable. 757 Conversely, under this test, as
well as the tidal test, the Old River and San Jacinto River are navigable. 75 8 in
addition, the Colorado River is navigable, and the state owns its bed.759
By statute, Texas has defined "navigable stream" to be a river or stream
"which retains an average width of 30 feet from the mouth up." 760 While the
Texas Court of Appeals referenced this definition in a recent case in connection
with title navigability, 761 the real "effect of this statute is to render all streams
navigable in law that have an average width of 30 feet, regardless of ownership
of the bed of the streams and regardless of whether they are actually
navigable." 762 Thus, creeks not navigable in fact can still be subject to public
use under these statutes.763 This legislation dates back to 1929 and was enacted
"because survey lines has incorrectly crossed navigable streams," and the
legislation "sought to rectify those errors by relinquishing title in the
streambeds while reserving the public's right to the waters of navigable
streams." 764 However, versions of the thirty-foot rule have actually existed in
Texas since 1837.765 Public rights in these waters include navigation, fishing,
recreation, and commercial uses. 766 For example, Hog Creek is a statutorily
navigable stream and the public has a right to enjoy its waters, including by
fishing, and those rights extend to a lake formed by damming the creek.767
755. THlnvs., 218 S.W.3d at 182 n.7.
756. Taylor Fishing Club, 88 S.W.2d at 129.
757. Id. at 130. But see Weider v. Texas, 196 S.W. 868, 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) (declaring
Green Lake navigable because it could float boats for fishing, and discussing the "pleasure boat" and log
floatation tests of navigability with approval); Orange Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 126 S.W. 604, 606
(Tex. Civ. App. 1910) (holding that log floatation was enough to make a water navigable, citing The
Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 432 (1874)).
758. Taylor Fishing Club, 88 S.W.2d at 184.
759. Nat'l Resort Communities, Inc. v. Cain, 479 S.W.2d 341, 349-50 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
760. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 21.001 (Vernon 2009); see also TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE
ANN. § 90.001 (Vernon 2009).
761. TH Invs., Inc. v. Kirby Inland Marine, 218 S.W.3d 173,184 (Tex. App. 2007).
762. Tex. River Barges v. City of San Antonio, 21 S.W.3d 347, 352 (Tex. App. 2000).
763. Hix v. Robertson, 211 S.W.3d 423, 427-28 (Tex. App. 2006); see also Port Acres
Sportsman's Club v. Mann, 541 S.W.2d 847, 848-49 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (holding that the Big Hill
Bayou, which was deemed non-navigable in 1875, was navigable under the statute).
764. Hix, 211 S.W.3d at 428.
765. Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 86 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tex. 1935).
766. Tex. River Barges, 21 S.W.3d at 352.
767. Hix, 211 S.W.3d at 428.
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However, the adjoining lake was not navigable because the statute does not
apply to lakes. 768 In addition, both the north and south forks of the Upper
Guadalupe River are navigable under this statutory definition.769
Rights in "Navigable Waters":
"Title to land covered by the bays, inlets, and arms of the Gulf of Mexico
with tidewater limits is in the State, and those lands constitute public property
that is held in trust for the use and benefit of the people." 770 As such,
submerged lands are different from ordinary public lands. 771 The shore is the
stretch of land between the high and low water marks, and as a "settled
principle of English common law," title to the shore belongs to the state.772
Until the shore is granted, the state "holds the right, both to the water and land
under the water, for the public use; and the right of passing and repassing,
navigation, fishing, etc., etc., are common to all the citizens, subject of course
to such general regulations as may be imposed for the general benefit." 773
Public rights include hunting, fishing, navigation, "and other. lawful
purposes." 774
In common law land grants after 1840, the boundary between state and
private property in tidal lands is the mean high tide line. 775 For Spanish or
Mexican grants, the boundary is the mean higher high tide line, 776 which is the
average of the higher of the two daily high tides over time. In contrast, "[m]ean
high tide is measured by taking an average of all the daily highest readings over
a long time. Mean high tide is the same as mean high water."777 Title to islands
follows title to the bed.77 8
"[T]wo presumptions arise regarding submerged lands: (1) they are owned
by the State and (2) the State has not acted to divest them." 779 "[O]nly the
Texas Legislature may convey submerged tidal lands." 780 However, unlike in
768. Id. at 428-29.
769. In re Adjudication of Upper Guadalupe River Segment of Guadalupe River Basin, 625 S.W.2d
353, 362-63 (Tex. App. 1981).
770. Natland Corp. v. Baker's Port, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tex. App. 1993); City of Corpus
Christi v. Davis, 622 S.W.2d 640, 643 (Tex. App. 1981).
771. Lorino v. Crawford Packing Co., 175 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Tex. 1943).
772. City of Galveston v. Menard, 23 Tex. 349, 1859 WL 6290, at *9 (1859).
773. Id. at *11 (citations omitted).
774. Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 86 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tex. 1935); see generally Michael D.
Morrison, The Public Trust Doctrine: Insuring the Needs of Texas Bays and Estuaries, 37 BAYLOR L.
REv. 365 (1985).
775. City of Corpus Christi, 622 S.W.2d at 643 (citing Rudder v. Ponder, 293 S.W.2d 736 (Tex.
1956)); TH Invs., Inc. v. Kirby Inland Marine, 218 S.W.3d 173,184 (Tex. App. 2007).
776. THInvs., 218 S.W.3d at 184.
777. Id. at 184 n. 10 (citation omitted).
778. Turner v. Mullins, 162 S.W.3d 356, 361-62 (Tex. App. 2005).
779. THInvs., 218 S.W.3d at 182-83.
780. Id. at 183.
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most states, when the State of Texas does grant submerged lands to individuals,
there is no implied reservation in favor of the public trust, despite the ruling in
Illinois Central Railroad.781
The state's ownership of water782 is relevant to the operation of the public
trust doctrine in Texas. 783 "The purpose of the State maintaining title to the
beds and waters of all navigable bodies is to protect the public's interest in
those scarce natural resources." 7 84 As such, "the State, as trustee, is entitled to
regulate those waters and submerged lands to protect its citizens' health and
safety and to conserve natural resources." 785
There are also indications from the Texas courts that fish and other aquatic
life are subject to public trust principles. As far back as 1942, the Texas Civil
Court of Appeals declared:
The waters of all natural streams of this State and all fish and other aquatic
life contained in fresh water rivers, creeks, stream, and lakes or sloughs
subject to overflow from rivers or other streams within the borders of this
State, are declared to be the property of the State; and the Game, Fish ad
Oyster Commission has jurisdiction over and control over such rivers and
aquatic life. The ownership is in trust for the people . . . , and pollution of
streams and water courses is condemned .... The Constitution of Texas,
Art. 16, § 59(a) . . . designates rivers and streams as natural resources,
declares that such belong to the State, and expressly invests the Legislature
with the preservation and conservation of such resources.786
UTAH
Date of Statehood: 1890
Water Law System: Prior appropriation
781. Natland Corp. v. Baker's Port, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 52, 59-60 (Tex. App. 1993) (citing Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 473, 481-84 (1988); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26
(1894); City of Galveston v. Menard, 23 Tex. 349 (1859); Texas v. Lain, 349 S.W.2d 579 (Texas
1961)); City of Galveston v. Menard, 23 Tex. 349, 1859 WL 6290, at *12 (1859).
782. TEx WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021(a) (Vernon 2009).
783. Cummins v. Travis County Water Control & Improvement Dist., 175 S.W.2d 34, 48 (Tex.
App. 2005). For a lengthier discussion of this case, see generally Amy Mockenhaupt, Cummins v.
Travis County Water Control and Improvement Dist., 175 S. W.3d 34 (Tex. App. 2005), 9 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 269 (2005).
784. Cummins, 175 S.W.2d at 49.
785. Id. (citing Goldsmith & Powell v. Texas, 159 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942)); see
also Carruthers v. Terramar Beach Cmty. Improvement Ass'n, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. 1983)
("The waters of public navigable streams are held by the State in trust for the public, primarily for
navigation purposes." (citing Motl v. Boyd, 286 S.W. 458 (Tex. 1926))).
786. Goldsmith & Powell, 159 S.W.2d at 535.
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Utah Constitution: Utah has not constitutionalized its public trust doctrine.
However, several provisions of the Utah Constitution are relevant. These
include:
* Art. XI, § 6: "No municipal corporation, shall directly or indirectly,
lease, sell, alien or dispose of any waterworks, water rights, or
sources of water supply now, or hereafter to be owned or controlled
by it; but all such waterworks, water rights and sources of water
supply now owned or hereafter to be acquired by any municipal
corporation, shall be preserved, maintained and operated by it for
supplying its inhabitants with water at reasonable charges: Provided,
That nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent any
such municipal corporation from exchanging water-rights, or
sources of water supply, for other water-rights or sources of water
supply of equal value, and to be devoted in like manner to the public
supply of its inhabitants."
* Art. XVII, § 1: "All existing rights to the use of any of the waters in
the State for any useful or beneficial purpose, are hereby recognized
and confirmed."
* Art. XX, § 1: "All lands of the State that have been, or may
hereafter be granted to the State by Congress, and all lands acquired
by gift, grant or devise, from any person or corporation, or that may
otherwise be acquired, are hereby accepted, and declared to be the
public lands of the State; and shall be held in trust for the people, to
be disposed of as may be provided by law, for the respective
purposes for which they have been or may be granted, donated,
devised or otherwise acquired."
Utah Statutes:
* UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-21-4(1): "[T]here is reserved to the public
the right of access to all lands owned by the state, including those
lands lying below the official government meander line of navigable
waters, for the purpose of hunting, trapping, or fishing."
* UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-9-6(5): The Marketable Record Title Act
does not apply to sovereign lands.
* UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-34-3.2: Wetlands Protection Account.
"Funds in the Wetlands Protect Account may be used in accordance
with the public trust doctrine." 78 7
* UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-1-1: This provision defines "public trust
assets" to be "those lands and resources, including sovereign lands,
administered by the" Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands.788




"Sovereign lands," in turn, are "those lands lying below the ordinary
high water mark of navigable bodies of water at the date of
statehood and owned by the state by virtue of its sovereignty." 789
* UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-2-5: The Division of Forestry, Fire, and
State Lands (DFFSL) can limit public use of leased parcels of
sovereign lands to protect lessees from hunting, trapping, or fishing.
* UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-10-l: The DFFSL "is the management
authority for sovereign lands, and may exchange, sell, or lease
sovereign lands but only in the quantities and for the purposes as
serve the public interest and do not interfere with the public
trust." 790 "Nothing in this section shall be construed as asserting
state ownership of the beds of nonnavigable lakes, bays, rivers, or
streams." 79 1
* UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-10-2(1): The DFFSL, "with the approval
of the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources
and the governor, may set aside for public or recreational use any
part of the lands claimed by the state as the beds of lakes or
streams."
* UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-10-3: This provision allows for
agreements and establishes dispute resolution procedures to
establish boundaries of sovereign lands.
* UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-10-8: This provision provides for
management of the Great Salt Lake.
* UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1: "All waters in this state, whether above
or under the ground are hereby declared to be the property of the
public, subject to all existing rights to the use thereof."
* UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-5: "The use of water for beneficial
purposes, as provided in this title, is hereby declared to be a public
use."
* UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-3-1 to 73-3-31: Appropriation of Water.
"Rights to the use of the unappropriated public waters in this state
may be acquired only as provided in this title. No appropriation of
water may be made and no rights to the use thereof initiated and no
notice of intent to appropriate shall be recognized except application
for such appropriation first be made to the state engineer in the
manner hereinafter provided, and not otherwise. The appropriation
must be for some useful and beneficial purpose, and, as between
appropriators, the one first in time shall be first in rights; provided,
that when a use designated by an application to appropriate any of
the unappropriated waters of the state would materially interfere
789. Id. § 65A-1-1(5).
790. Id. § 65A-10-l(1).
791. Id. § 65A-10-1(2).
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with a more beneficial use of such water, the application shall be
dealt with as provided in Section 73-3-8. No right to the use of
water either appropriated or unappropriated can be acquired by
adverse use or adverse possession." 792
Definition of "Navigable Waters":
Utah has provided the U.S. Supreme Court with several occasions to
discuss the definition of navigability that gives states title to the beds and banks
of navigable waters. For example, in litigation regarding title to the Green
River, the Grand River, and the Colorado River in Utah, the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed that states received title to the beds and banks of navigable
waters upon statehood, while the federal government retained title to the beds
and banks of non-navigable waters.7 93 The question of title navigability is a
federal question, and hence the fact that the Utah Legislature in 1927 passed
legislation declaring these three rivers navigable was irrelevant. 794
Summarizing its prior case law, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that:
The test of navigability has frequently been stated by this Court. In The
Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 563 ... , the Court said: "Those rivers must be
regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And
they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being
used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which
trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade
and travel on water." In The Montello, 20 Wall. 430, 441 . . . , it was
pointed out that "the true test of navigability of a stream does not depend
on the mode by which commerce is, or may be, conducted, nor the
difficulties attending navigation," and that "it would be a narrow rule to
hold that in this country, unless a river was capable of being navigation by
steam or sail vessels, it could not be treated as a public highway." The
principles thus laid down have recently been restated in United States v.
Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 .. ., where the Court said:
'The rule long since approved by this court in applying the Constitution
and laws of the United States is that streams or lakes which are
navigable in fact must be regarded as navigable in law; that they are
navigable in fact when they are used, or susceptible of being used, in
their natural and ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over
which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes
of trade and travel on water; and further that navigability does not
depend on the particular mode in which such use is or may be had-
whether by steamboats, sailing vessels or flatboats-nor an absence of
occasional difficulties in navigation, but the fact, if it be a fact, that the
792. Id. § 73-3-1.
793. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931).
794. Id. at 75 & n.6.
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stream in its natural and ordinary condition affords a channel for useful
commerce.' 795
Moreover, "[t]he extent of existing commerce is not the test."796
Under this test, all three rivers were declared navigable, and Utah owns
their beds and banks. 797 Similarly, the Great Salt Lake is navigable and owned
by Utah. 798 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, "the fact that the Great Salt
Lake is not a part of a navigable interstate or international commercial highway
in no way interferes with the principle of public ownership of its bed." 799
Finally, Utah owns the bed and banks of Utah Lake, another navigable lake. 800
In 1927, the Utah Supreme Court rejected the English ebb-and-flow tidal
test of navigability. 80' According to that court's most recent definition of
navigability, a body of water is navigable for title purposes "if it is useful for
commerce and has 'practical usefulness to the public as a public highway' . . .
."802 In contrast, "[a] theoretical or potential navigability, or one that is
temporary, precarious, and unprofitable, is not sufficient."803 Under this test,
Scipio Lake was not navigable because the lake was not, and was not likely to
become, "a valuable factor in commerce." 804
Rights in "Navigable Waters":
In waters navigable for title purposes, private landowners own only to the
high water mark, often deemed the equivalent of the meander line.805 The high
water mark is "the mark on the land where valuable vegetation ceased to grow
because the land was inundated by water for long periods of time." 806
795. Id. at 76.
796. Id. at 82.
797. Id. at 89.
798. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); see also Morton, Int'l, Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp.
Co., 495 P.2d 31, 34 (Utah 1972) ("The Great Salt Lake is the property of Utah subject only to
regulation of navigation by Congress."); Utah State Road Comm'n v. Hardy Salt Co., 486 P.2d 391, 392
(Utah 1971) (declaring the Great Salt Lake navigable under the Equal Footing Doctrine); Deseret
Livestock Co. v. Utah, 171 P.2d 401, 403 (Utah 1946) (declaring the Great Salt Lake navigable under
the principles of United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 89).
799. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. at 10 (citations omitted).
800. Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 203-09 (1987); see also Utah v.
Rollo, 262 P. 987, 989-90 (Utah 1927) (declaring Utah Lake navigable under the rules of United States
v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926) and Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. I (1894)).
801. Rollo, 262 P. at 991-92.
802. Conater v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 899-900 (Utah 2008) (quoting Monroe v. Utah, 175 P.2d
759, 761 (Utah 1946) (quoting Harrison v. Fite, 148 F. 781, 784 (8th Cir. 1906))).
803. Monroe, 175 P.2dat 761.
804. Id. at 762.
805. Provo City v. Jacobsen, 217 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1950); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-21-
4(1) (2009) (citing the meander line as the line for public rights); UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-I-1(5) (citing
the high water mark as the boundary of sovereign lands). But see Knudsen v. Omanson, 37 P. 250, 251
(Utah 1894) (emphasizing that the border is the water line, not the meander line).
806. Provo City, 217 P.2d at 578.
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For navigable waters and sovereign lands in Utah, the essence of the
public trust doctrine, as expressed in Illinois Central Railroad, "is that
navigable waters should not be given without restriction to private parties and
should be preserved for the general public for uses such as commerce,
navigation, and fishing."80 7 Deciding whether a conveyance of sovereign lands
to a private party was in the public interest is a question of fact for trial. 808
Public ownership of the water itself has expanded the scope of Utah's
public trust doctrine by giving the public rights to use non-navigable waters.
Under Utah Code Annotated § 73-1-1, waters are owned by the public. The
Utah Supreme Court has explained that:
Public ownership is founded on the principle that water, a scarce and
essential resource in this area of the country, is indispensable to the welfare
of all people; and the State must therefore assume the responsibility of
allocating the use of water for the benefit and welfare of the people of the
State as a whole.809
Thus:
Under this "doctrine of public ownership," the public owns state waters and
has "an easement over the water regardless of who owns the water bed
beneath." In granting this public this easement, "state policy recognizes an
interest of the public in the use of state waters for recreational purposes."
This court has enumerated the specific recreational rights that are within
the easement's scope. They include "the right to float leisure craft, hunt,
fish, and participate in any lawful activity when utilizing that water."8 10
Bed ownership is thus irrelevant for the public's rights to use waters in the
state.811 Moreover, "the scope of the public's easement in state waters provides
the public the right to engage in all recreational activities that utilize the water
and does not, limit the public to activities that can be performed upon the
water." 812 As a result, "the public has the right to touch privately owned beds
of state waters in ways incidental to all recreational rights provided for in the
easement." 813
Utah appears to have extended its public trust doctrine to ecological
protection. As the Utah Supreme Court has explained,
The 'public trust' doctrine . . . protects the ecological integrity of public
lands and their public recreational uses for the benefit of the public at large.
807. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 635 (Utah 1990) (citing Kootenai Envtl.
Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983)).
808. Id. at 635-36.
809. JJNP Co. v. Utah, 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982).
810. Conater v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 899-900 (Utah 2008) (quoting JJNP Co., 655 P.2d at
1137). See generally Teresa Mareck, Searching for the Public Trust Doctrine in Utah Water Law, 15 J.
ENERGY, NATURAL REs., & ENVTL. L. 321 (1995).
811. Conater, 194 P.3d at 899-900.
812. Id. at 901.
813. Id. at 901-02 (limiting criminal trespass liability for water users).
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The public trust doctrine, however, is limited to sovereign lands and
perhaps other state lands that are not subject to specific trusts, such as
school trust lands. 8 14
WASHINGTON
Date of Statehood: 1889
Water Law System: Prior appropriation. However, existing riparian rights
have been protected, especially with respect to non-navigable waters. 815 With
respect to navigable waters, "the state's title to the beds and shores of navigable
lakes and streams is paramount and absolute, and ... an abutting owner has no
riparian or littoral right in the waters or shores of the stream." 8 16
Washington Constitution: Washington has constitutionalized some of its
public trust doctrine, particularly with regard to state ownership of submerged
lands and the Illinois Central Railroad limitation on conveyances of submerged
lands. Moreover, several provisions of the Washington Constitution are
relevant to water and submerged lands. These include:
* Art. XV, § 1: "The state shall never give, sell or lease to any private
person, corporation, or association any rights whatever in the waters
beyond such harbor lines, nor shall any of the area lying between
any harbor line and the line of ordinary high water, and within not
less than fifty feet nor more than two thousand feet of such harbor
line (as the commission shall determine) be sold or granted by the
state, nor its rights to control the same relinquished, but such area
shall be forever reserved for landings, wharves, streets, and other
conveniences of navigation and commerce."
* Art. XV, § 2: Leases for wharves and docks in harbors and tidal
waters are limited to 30 years.
* Art. XVII, § 1: "The state of Washington asserts its ownership to the
beds and shores of all navigable waters in the state up to and
including the line of ordinary high tide, in waters where the tide
ebbs and flows, and up to and including the line of ordinary high
water within the banks of all navigable rivers and lakes: Provided,
That this section shall not be construed so as to debar any person
from asserting his claim to vested rights in the courts of the state."
814. Nat'1 Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 919 (Utah 1993).
815. City of New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co., 64 P. 735, 738 (Wash. 1901).
816. Hill v. Newell, 149 P. 951, 952 (Wash. 1915); see also Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 26 P. 539, 541-
42 (Wash. 1891) (holding that there are no riparian rights on navigable waters).
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* Art. XVII, § 2: "The state of Washington disclaims all title in and
claim to all tide, swamp and overflowed lands, patented by the
United States: Provided, the same is not impeached for fraud."
* Art. XXI, § 1: "The use of the waters of this state for irrigation,
mining and manufacturing purposes shall be deemed a public use."
Washington Statutes:
* WASH. REV. CODE § 79.02.010(1): "Aquatic lands" are "all state-
owned tidelands, shorelands, harbor areas, and the beds of navigable
waters as defined in chapter 79.90 RCW that are administered by
the [D]epartment [of Natural Resources]."
* WASH. REV. CODE § 79.02.095: Normal public lands statutes do not
apply to state tidelands, shorelands, harbor areas, and the beds of
navigable waters.
* WASH. REV. CODE § 79.100.010(2): For purposes of dealing with
derelict vessels, "aquatic lands" are "all tidelands, shorelands,
harbor areas, and the beds of navigable waters, including lands
owned by the state and lands owned by other public or private
entities."
* WASH. REV. CODE §§ 79.105.001 to 79.105.904: Aquatic Lands.
"Aquatic lands" are "all tidelands, shorelands, harbor areas, and the
beds of navigable waters."8 17 "Beds of navigable waters" are "those
lands lying waterward of and below the line of navigability on rivers
and lakes not subject to tidal flow, or extreme low tide mark in
navigable tidal waters, or the outer harbor line where harbor area
has been created." 8 18 "First-class shorelands" are "the shores of a
navigable lake or river belonging to the state, not subject to tidal
flow, lying between the line of ordinary high water and the line of
navigability, or inner harbor line where established and within or in
front of the corporate limits of any city or within two miles of either
side." 8 19 "The legislature finds that state-owned aquatic lands are a
finite natural resource of great value and an irreplaceable public
heritage." 820 The state is to manage aquatic lands to encourage
public use and access and to ensure environmental protection. 82 1
Moreover, in managing aquatic lands, the state "shall preserve and
enhance water-dependent uses," which are favored over non-water
dependent use; highest priority goes to "uses which enhance
renewable resources, water-borne commerce, and the navigational
817. WASH. REv. CODE § 79.105.060(1) (2009).
818. Id. § 79.105.060(2).
819. Id. § 79.105.060(3).
820. Id. § 79.105.010.
821. Id. § 79.105.030.
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and biological capacity of the waters . . . ."822 Specifically, the
Department must consider the value of state-owned aquatic lands
"as wildlife habitat, natural area preserve, representative ecosystem,
or spawning area" before leasing the lands or allowing changes in
use.8 23 Sales and leases of these lands are allowed but require a
permit.824 Similarly, land exchanges are allowed "if the exchange is
in the public interest and will actively contribute to the public
benefits ... 825
* WASH. REV. CODE §§ 79.130.010 to 79.130.900: Beds of Navigable
Waters. The legislative intent of these provisions is the same as in §
79.105.001, relating to aquatic lands.826 Leases of these beds are
allowed. 827
* WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.03.005 to 90.03.611: Water Code. "It is
the policy of the state to promote the use of the public waters in a
fashion which provides for obtaining maximum net benefits arising
from both diversionary uses of the state's public waters and the
retention of waters within streams and lakes in sufficient quantity
and quality to protect instream and natural values and rights." 828
"Subject to existing rights all waters within the state belong to the
public. . . ."829 The Water Code requires minimum flows and levels
to be protected. 830
* WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.14.010 to 90.14.910: Registration, Waiver,
and Relinquishment.
* WASH. REv. CODE §§ 90.16.010 to 90.16.120: Appropriation of
Water for Public and Industrial Purposes.
* WASH. REv. CODE §§ 90.20.010 to 90.20.110: Appropriation
Procedure.
* WASH. REv. CODE §§ 90.22.010 to 90.22.060: Minimum Water
Flows and Levels.
* WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.40.010 to 90.40.100: Water Rights of
United States.
* WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.42.005 to 90.42.900: Water Resource
Management. The legislature found that Washington was facing a
822. Id. § 79.105.210(1).
823. Id. § 79.105.210(3).
824. See id. §§ 79.105.100-79.105.160.
825. Id. § 79.105.400.
826. Id § 79.130.001.
827. Id § 79.130.010.
828. Id. § 90.03.005.
829. Id § 90.03.010.
830. Id. § 90.03.247.
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water shortage.83 1 These provisions establish a trust water rights
program 832 and water banking. 833
* WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.44.010 to 90.44.520: Regulation of Public
Ground Waters.
Definition of "Navi2able Waters":
Washington recognizes both the "ebb and flow" tidal test and the
navigable-in-fact test for title navigability. 834 Thus, a slough was considered
navigable when it was navigable during the ebbing and flowing of the tide
and has been and can be used as a public highway for boats, scows, and
other ordinary modes of water transportation for general commercial
purposes, and especially for rafting, booming, and floating and towing of
logs up and down the same; that said slough has been so used for at least
twenty years. 835
Washington has used a log floatation test, in combination with the
declaration in Article XVII § 1, of the Washington Constitution, to find the
Cowlitz River navigable for purposes of state ownership and control.836
Similarly, Lake Union was declared navigable because it is capable of being
navigated.837 However, "a stream which can only be made navigable or
floatable by artificial means is not a public highway." 838 Moreover, the
Washington Supreme Court has also applied the federal commerce test of
navigability. 839
The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the Columbia River is a
navigable river under the federal test. 840 As a result, Washington, not the
United States, owns the beds and banks of that river on the Washington side of
the Oregon-Washington border. 84 1
831. Id. § 90.42.005(2)(a).
832. See id §§ 90.42.030-90.42.040.
833. Id § 90.42.100.
834. WASH. CONST., art. XVII, § 1; Brace & Hergert Mill Co. v. Washington, 95 P. 278, 280
(Wash. 1908); City of New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co., 64 P. 735, 737-38 (Wash. 1901).
835. Dawson v. McMillan, 75 P. 807, 808-09 (Wash. 1904).
836. Robinson v. Silver Lake Railway & Lumber Co., 279 P. 1109, 1113-14 (Wash. 1929).
837. Brace & Hergert Mill Co., 95 P. at 281.
838. East Hoquiam Boom & Logging Co. v. Neeson, 54 P. 1001, 1002 (Wash. 1898) (citing The
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870)).
839. Lefevre v. Wash. Monument & Cut Stone Co., 81 P.2d 819, 822 (Wash. 1938) (citing
Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922); Snively v. Washington, 9 P.2d 773, 774 (Wash. 1932); Smith
v. Washington, 50 P.2d 32, 32-33 (Wash. 1935); Proctor v. Sim, 236 P. 114, 116 (Wash. 1925)).
840. Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Comm'n of State of Wash., 302 U.S. 186, 197-99 (1937).
841. Id. at 198.
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Rights in "Navigable Waters":
In Washington, the ordinary high water mark is the boundary between
state and private ownership in navigable waters. 842 However, "the public has
the right to go where the navigable waters go, even though the navigable waters
lie over privately owned lands." 843
Before Washington changed its policies in 1971 to limit sales and leases of
aquatic lands, "the state had sold approximately 60 percent of its tidelands and
30 percent of its shorelands." 84 Despite the state's power to engage in such
sales and leases, however, "[t]he Legislature has never had the authority . . . to
sell or otherwise abdicate state sovereignty or dominion over such tidelands
and shorelands." 845 The state cannot convey this jus publicum,
and the state holds such dominion in trust for the public. It is this principle
which is referred to as the 'public trust doctrine.' Although not always
clearly labeled or articulated as such, our review of Washington law
establishes that the doctrine has always existed in the State of
Washington.846
Moreover, in general, in every grant of submerged lands "there was an implied
reservation of the public right."847
Washington's Shoreline Management Act of 1971848 fully meets the
requirements of the public trust doctrine.849 As such, public recreational docks
permitted under the Act do not violate the doctrine.850 Similarly, a county
ordinance banning personal watercraft in navigable waters did not violate the
public trust doctrine, because the doctrine is flexible, the "county had not given
up its right of control over its waters," and "the Ordinance is consistent with the
goals of statewide environmental protection statutes"; plus, "it would be an odd
use of the public trust doctrine to sanction an activity that actually harms and
damages the waters and wildlife of this state." 851
842. Brace & Hergert Mill Co., 95 P. at 280.
843. Wilbour v. Gallagher, 462 P.2d 232, 238 (Wash. 1969). See generally Lorraine Bodi, The
Public Trust Doctrine in the State of Washington: Does It Make Any Difference to the Public?, 19
ENVTL. L. 645 (1989).
844. Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 992 (Wash. 1987).
845. Id.
846. Id. at 994 (citations omitted).
847. City of New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co., 64 P. 735, 737 (Wash. 1901); see also Lake
Union Drydock Co., Inc. v. Wash. Dep't of Natural Res., 179 P.3d 844, 851 (Wash. App. 2008) (holding
that the Department cannot lease shorelands for $1.93 per acre (which is considered "virtually rent-
free") because, under the public trust doctrine, the state cannot give away the jus publicum).
848. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58 (2009).
849. Caminiti, 732 P.2d at 995.
850. Id. at 997.
851. Weden v. San Juan County, 958 P.2d 273, 283-84 (Wash. 1998). But see Biggers v. City of
Brainbridge Island, 169 P.3d 14, 22 (Wash. 2007) (en banc) (holding that the Washington Constitution
and the public trust doctrine limit local government authority to regulate the shoreline use, and police
powers are limited there). See generally Ralph W. Johnson, The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal Zone
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Because the public trust doctrine existed in Washington prior to the
Shoreline Management Act of 1971, there could be no regulatory takings
claims based on that statute's limitations on shoreland property's use.852 "The
public trust doctrine resembles a 'covenant running with the land (or lake or
marsh or shore) for the benefit of the public and the land's dependent
wildlife."' 853 As a result, owners along shorelands "never had the right to
dredge or fill [their] tidelands, either for a residential community or
farmlands." 854
In navigable waters, the public has rights of navigation, fishing, boating,
swimming, water skiing, and other related recreation. 855 Such other rights
probably include boating, bathing, fishing, fowling, skating, cutting ice, water
skiing, and skin diving. 856 However, "in Washington, the public trust doctrine
does not encompass the right to gather clams on private property," because
shellfish rights follow title to the submerged lands.857
Nevertheless, Washington's public trust doctrine is limited to surface
navigable waters, and the Washington Supreme Court has refused to apply it to
either ground waters or non-navigable waters.858 Moreover, absent specific
statutory authorization, state agencies cannot "assume the State's public trust
duties and regulate in order to protect the public trust."859 As a result, the
public trust doctrine does not apply to the Department of Ecology's
implementation of state water law. 860
In contrast, Washington has flirted with applying some version of a public
trust doctrine to wildlife, especially shellfish. For example, the Washington
Court of Appeals has stated that the public trust doctrine applies to the
Department of Natural Resources' regulation of shellfish such as geoducks. 861
Management in Washington State, 67 WASH. L. REV. 521 (1992) (discussing the relationship of the
doctrine to police power and coastal planning).
852. Orion Corp. v. Washington, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072-73 (Wash. 1987).
853. Id. (quoting Scott Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is It Amphibious?, I ENvTL. L. & LITIG.
107, 118 (1986)).
854. Id. at 1073.
855. Caminiti, 732 P.2d at 994 (citing Wilbour v. Gallagher, 462 P.2d 232, 239 (Wash. 1969)).
856. Wilbour, 462 P.2d at 239 n.7. See generally Davison, supra note 146 (arguing that
Washington's public trust doctrine is already broader in the rights it protects).
857. Washington v. Longshore, 982 P.2d 1191, 1195-96 (Wash. App. 1999), aff'd, 5 P.3d 1256,
1259-63 (Wash. 2000) (en banc); see also Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass'n v. Washington State
Dep't of Natural Res., 101 P.3d 891, 895 (Wash. App. 2004) (noting that shellfish are not typical
wildlife in Washington because they are considered part of the land).
858. See Rettowski v. Dep't of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232, 239 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
859. Id.
860. Id. at 239-40; see also R.D. Merrill Co. v. Wash. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 969 P.2d
458, 467 (Wash. 1999) (holding that, in the water rights context, the public trust doctrine is not an
independent source of regulatory authority for the Department of Ecology); Postema v. Wash. Pollution
Control Hearings Bd., 11 P.3d 726, 744 (Wash. 2000) (en banc) (same).
861. Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass'n, 101 P.3d at 895. But see Citizens for Responsible
Wildlife Mgmt. v. Washington, 103 P.3d 203, 205 (Wash. App. 2004) ("No Washington case has
applied the public trust doctrine to terrestrial wildlife or resources. But we need not decide whether the
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Nevertheless, the Department's regulation of the commercial geoduck harvest
pursuant to the wildlife statutes did not violate the public trust doctrine despite
the public right to fish, because the state must "balance the protection of the
public's right to use resources on public land with the protection of the
resources that enable these activities," the Department had not given up its
control over the state's geoduck resources, and the regulation facilitated
sustainable geoduck harvesting and natural regeneration of the resource,
serving the public interest. 862 Because the state owns the beds of navigable
waters and because, under Washington case law, shellfish are considered part
of the beds, the Department "has a continuing obligation under the public trust
doctrine to manage the use of the resources on the land for the public interest.
And [case law] is consistent with the conclusion that shellfish embedded on
public property are resources that invoke a public right under the public trust
doctrine." 863
WYOMING
Date of Statehood: 1890
Water Law System: Prior appropriation 864
Wyoming Constitution: Wyoming has constitutionalized public rights in
water through the constitutional declaration that waters belong to the state.
Several other constitutional provisions are also relevant:
* Art. I, § 31: "Water being essential to industrial prosperity, of
limited amount, and easy of diversion from its natural channels, its
control must be in the state, which, in providing for its use, shall
equally guard all the various interests involved."
* Art. 8, § 1: Irrigation and Water Rights. "The water of all natural
streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still water, within the
public trust doctrine applies [to prohibitions on terrestrial hunting and trapping] because, even if it does,
Citizens' challenge fails." (emphasis added)).
862. Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass'n, 101 P.3d at 895-97 (examining WASH REV. CODE §
79.135.210 (2005)).
863. Id. at 896; see also Nelson Alaska Seafoods, Inc. v. Washington, 177 P.3d 1161, 1164 (Wash.
App. 2008) (upholding a tax on geoduck harvests on the first commercial owner and noting that the
Department of Natural Resources merely regulated the harvest in accordance with the public trust
doctrine). For a discussion of whether Washington's public trust doctrine could apply to other
environmental issues, see Ralph W. Johnson, Oil and the Public Trust Doctrine in Washington, 14 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 671, 671-73, 688-707 (1991) (discussing the application of the doctrine to oil
spills).
864. See Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 61 P. 258, 259 (Wyo. 1900) (noting that prior appropriation
legislation had been in place since 1875 and holding that "[iln this state the doctrine prevails that a right
to the use of water may be acquired by priority of appropriation for beneficial purpose, in contravention
to the common law rule that every riparian owner is entitled to the continued natural flow of the waters
of the stream running through or adjacent to his lands").
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boundaries of the state, are hereby declared to be the property of the
state."
* Art. 8, § 2: "There shall be constituted a board of control, to be
composed of the state engineer and superintendents of the water
divisions, which shall, under such regulations as may be prescribed
by law, have the supervisions of the waters of the state and of their
appropriation, distribution and diversion, and of the various officers
connected therewith. Its decisions shall be subject to review by the
courts of the state."
* Art. 8, § 3: "Priority of appropriation for beneficial uses shall give
the better right. No appropriation shall be denied except when such
denial is demanded by the public interest."
* Art. 8, § 4: "The legislature shall by law divide the state into four
(4) water divisions, and provide for the appointment of
superintendents thereof."
* Art. 8, § 5: This provision establishes the office of the state
engineer.
* Art. 13, § 5: Municipal corporations have authority to acquire water
rights.
* Art. 16, § 10: This provision governs the construction and
improvement of works for the conservation and utilization of water.
Wyoming Statutes:
* WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-37-106: Adjudication of Water Rights.
* WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-10-401: This provision prohibits obstruction
of a "public river or stream, declared navigable by law," or pollution
of waters.
* WYo. STAT. ANN. Title 41, Chapter 3: Water Rights. This provision
establishes preferences for domestic and transportation purposes,
steam power plants, and industrial purposes.865 "The legislature
finds, recognizes and declares that the transfer of water outside the
boundaries of the state may have a significant impact on the water
and other resources of the state. Further, this impact may differ
substantially from that caused by uses of the water within the state.
Therefore, all water being the property of the state and part of the
natural resources of the state, it shall be controlled and managed by
the state for the purposes of protecting, conserving and preserving to
the state the maximum permanent beneficial use of the state's
waters." 866 These statutes encompass reservoirs (Article 3);
865. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-102 (2009).
866. Id. § 41-3-115(a).
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abandonment of water rights (Article 4); water divisions and
superintendents (Article 5); water districts and commissioners
(Article 6); water conservancy districts (Article 7); flood control
districts (Article 8); underground water (Article 9); and instream
flows (Article 10).
* WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-12-301: Colorado River Compact.
Definition of "Navigable Waters":
The Wyoming Supreme Court acknowledges the variety of definitions of
"navigable waters," including the federal commerce definition, which it uses as
the title definition of navigability. The court noted:
We understand that "navigability in the Federal sense" means the capability
or susceptibility of waters, in their natural condition, of being used for
navigation in interstate or international commerce, and navigability in any
other sense may mean any one of a variety of definitions given navigability
by either of the several states of the Union. 867
Historical statutes in Wyoming reference transportation and log floatation. 86 8
Regarding public use rights in Wyoming, "the actual usability of the
waters is alone the limit of the public's right to employ them." 869 Except in
federally navigable waters, "the exclusive control of waters is vested in the
state," and hence "[i]t follows that the state may lay down and follow such
criteria for cataloguing waters as navigable or nonnavigable, as it sees fit, and
the state may also decide the ownership of submerged lands, irrespective of the
navigable or nonnavigable character of the waters above them." 8 70 As a result,
because the Wyoming Constitution gives the waters to the state, fine
distinctions of navigability are unimportant. 87 1 "The test of navigability does
not determine other uses to which the state may put its waters even though
navigability would determine the title to the land underlying them." 872
Rights in "Navigable Waters":
"[I]f a river is nonavigable the bed and channel of the stream belong to
the riparian owner."873
Nevertheless, in Wyoming, the public has rights in the waters themselves,
irrespective of bed ownership. According to the Wyoming Supreme Court:




871. Id. at 144.
872. Id.
873. Id. at 145.
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At the modem common law, public waters are generally confined to those
which are navigable; and public rights therein to navigation and fishery,
and privileges incident thereto. In the arid region of this country another
public use has been recognized by custom and laws, and sanctioned by the
courts-a public use sufficient to support the exercise of eminent
domain. 874
Thus, Wyoming waters are public, and the constitutional declaration of state
ownership is valid.875
More expansively, "the Legislature was aware that, without regard to their
being navigable or nonnavigable in the Federal sense or any other concept of
navigability, [the state's] waters are usable for purposes other than irrigation,
consumption, power or mining and that the waters might be used for
transportation by floatation." 876 As a result, the public has a right to float in the
North Platte River, which was also recognized in the 1959 State Laws of
Wyoming.877
State ownership of the waters themselves impresses those waters with a
public trust.878 The public can float craft down any waters so usable, regardless
of bed ownership, and can scrape bottom, disembark, and pull the craft over
shoals.879 Moreover, members of the public can hunt or fish while floating.880
However, public use rights do not give the public the right to wade or walk on
privately owned streambeds.88'
874. Farm Inv. Co. v, Carpenter, 61 P. 258, 264 (Wyo. 1900).
875. Id. at 264-65.
876. Day, 362 P.2d at 143.
877. Id. at 139.
878. Id. at 145.
879. Id. at 145-46.
880. Id. at 147.
881. Id. at 146.
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our
online companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact ecologylawcurrents@
boalt.org. Responses to articles may be viewed at our website, http://www.boalt.org/elq.
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